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 ABSTRACT 
 
This research deals with the ethical evaluation of risk impositions, i.e. actions that 
expose other human beings to risk. When – under what circumstances or conditions – is 
it acceptable to perform an action that exposes others to risk? The research attends to 
this question in three parts. 
 
The first part of the research explores the notion of risk and its relevance for normative 
philosophy. The history of the term risk is discussed, as well as its relation to ethical 
concepts such as agency, knowledge, harm, safety, blame, trust, and responsibility. 
 
The second part of the research investigates how four branches of mainstream ethical 
theory – utilitarianism, deontology, rights-based ethics, and contractualism – 
individually evaluate risk impositions. These theories of right action bring to the fore 
several ethical considerations that influence the acceptability of risk impositions: the 
likeliness and severity of harm; the likeliness and extent of benefit; the obligation not to 
harm without good reason; rights not to be harmed without good reason; compensation 
for suffered harm; consent to risk exposure; distribution of risks and benefits; 
knowledge about consequences and victims; relations between cause and effect; and 
power relations between risk-imposing agents and risk-bearers.  
 
A multitude of these considerations can determine the acceptability of a particular risk 
imposition, depending on the context in which the risk is imposed. Quality judgement is 
indispensable, for a risk-imposing agent must judge which considerations are most 
important in the given situation, to what extent they matter, and whether they justify the 
risk imposition. An honest and adequate evaluation of risk impositions then has to take 
all mentioned considerations into account, and be attentive to the motives, character, 
and judgement of agents. However, the traditional normative approaches fail to provide 
such a holistic evaluation, as they tend to focus solely on several considerations, and 
lack attention to the context in which risks are imposed. 
 
The third and last part of the research therefore develops an alternative approach to the 
evaluation of risk impositions, which combines theories of action with theories of 
virtue. The proposed alternative interprets the notion of responsibility in virtue-ethical 
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 terms, i.e. as the virtue of answerability. It argues that the acceptability of risk 
impositions is directly correlated to the extent to which a risk-imposing agent is 
answerable for her actions. It argues that answerability has to be understood 
conversationally, as a call-and-response process between risk-imposing agent and risk-
bearer. And it argues that a risk-imposing agent should aim to be answerable, and can 
take responsibility, for her actions in three ways: by providing reasons for acting, by 
responding in a practically adequate way to risked or actual harm, and by responding in 
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 OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie navorsing handel oor die etiese beoordeling van risiko-imposisies, d.i. dade 
waarin ‘n agent ander mense aan risiko’s blootstel. Wanneer – onder watter 
omstandighede of voorwaardes – is dit aanvaarbaar om ‘n handeling uit te voer wat 
ander mense aan risiko’s blootstel? Die navorsing behandel hierdie vraag in drie dele. 
 
Die eerste deel van die navorsing ondersoek die begrip risiko en die relevansie daarvan 
vir normatiewe filosofie. Die geskiedenis van die begrip risiko word bespreek sowel as 
die verhouding tussen risiko en aanverwante morele begrippe soos agentskap, kennis, 
skade, veiligheid, blaam, vertroue en verantwoordelikheid. 
 
Die tweede deel van die navorsing ondersoek hoe vier hoofstroom tipes etiek-teorie – 
utilitarisme, deontologie, regte-gebaseerde etiek en sosiale kontrak-teorie – elk 
individueel risiko-imposisies moreel evalueer. Hierdie teorieë i.s. (moreel) regte optrede 
bring verskillende etiese oorwegings wat die aanvaarbaarheid van regte-imposisies 
beïnvloed, aan die lig: die waarskynlikheid en intensiteit van skade; die 
waarskynlikheid en omvang van bevoordeling; die obligasie om nie skade te berokken 
sonder goeie rede nie; regte wat nie geskend mag word sonder goeie rede nie; 
kompensasie vir skade wat gely is; toestemming vir risiko-blootstelling; die 
verspreiding van risiko-voordele; kennis van gevolge en van slagoffers; verhoudinge 
tussen oorsaak en gevolg; en magsverhoudinge tussen diegene wat mense aan risiko’s 
blootstel en diegene wat aan risiko’s blootgestel word self. 
 
'n Veelheid van laasgenoemde oorwegings kan die aanvaarbaarheid van 'n spesifieke 
risiko-imposisie vasstel, afhangende van die konteks waarin die risiko sigself voordoen. 
Kwaliteit-oordeel is onontbeerlik, want diegene wat mense aan risiko’s blootstel moet 
oordeel watter oorwegings die belangrikste is in die gegewe situasie, in watter mate 
hulle van belang is, en of hulle die risiko-imposisie regverdig. 'n Eerlike en toereikende 
evaluering van risiko-imposisies moet al die genoemde oorwegings in ag neem, en let 
op die motiewe, karakter en oordeel van agente. Die tradisionele normatiewe 
benaderings bied egter nie so 'n holistiese evaluering aan nie, aangesien hulle geneig is 
om slegs op enkele oorwegings te fokus, en nie aandag te gee aan die konteks waarin 
risiko's opgelê word nie. 
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Die derde en laaste deel van die navorsing ontwikkel daarom ‘n alternatiewe benadering 
tot die evaluering van risiko-imposisies – ‘n benadering wat teorieë i.s. regte handelinge 
met deugdeteorie kombineer. Hierdie voorgestelde alternatief interpreteer die begrip 
verantwoordelikheid in deugde-etiese terme, d.i. as die deug van verantwoordbaarheid. 
Dit argumenteer dat die aanvaarbaarheid van risiko-imposisies direk korreleer met die 
mate waarin die agent wat aan ander aan risiko’s blootstel, verantwoordbaar is vir haar 
aksies. Dit argumenteer dat verantwoordbaarheid in dialogiese terme verstaan moet 
word, as naamlik ‘n roep-en-respons proses tussen die agent wat die risiko laat gebeur 
en die een wat aan die risiko blootgestel is. Hierdie benadering argumenteer ook dat ‘n 
agent wat ander aan risiko’s blootstel daarna moet streef om vir sy/haar dade 
verantwoordelikheid te aanvaar op drieërlei maniere: deur redes vir optrede te verskaf, 
deur in ‘n praktiese sin toereikend te reageer op riskante of werklike skade, en deur op 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Life is an inherently risky endeavour. People take, and are faced with, risks every day. 
When they cross streets, drive cars, and smoke cigarettes; when they work at jobs, save 
money, and invest their savings; when they eat meals, take medication and get 
vaccinated; when they kiss others, propose marriages, and raise children. They are also 
exposed, and expose others, to risks. Risks of road accidents, power failures, and 
workplace hazards; risks of robberies, immigration waves, and terrorist attacks. It is 
therefore not surprising that risk is a widely used concept in many professional 
disciplines: business enterprises, insurance, policymaking, legal regulation, crime 
prevention, defence, warfare, technology, scientific research, medical care, and 
sustainability issues. To live is to confront risks, and dealing with risks is then an 
integral part of life. 
Risk ethics 
One takes a risk, or performs an action that involves risk, when one acts even though 
the outcome of one’s action is uncertain. The term risk is used specifically if that 
uncertain outcome is understood in negative terms: risk is then, roughly defined, the 
chance or possibility of something bad happening as a result of one’s action. What is 
bad about the possible outcome can be understood in various ways, but essentially risk 
refers to harmful or damaging outcomes. Consider a driver jumping a yellow light and 
the risk of a car collision, a tour company guiding a hiking trip and the risk of an 
outdoor accident, or a government closing its borders and the risk of international 
tension. 
 
Because risky actions involve possible negative consequences as a result of human 
choice or conduct, they are by definition receptive to moral evaluation.1 However, the 
evaluation of risky actions seems to pose problems for traditional Western ethics.2 In 
Western ethics the evaluation of actions, namely, focuses mainly on determined actions, 
i.e. actions of which the outcomes are (assumed to be) known with certainty. When 
                                                
1 Moral evaluation concerns the assessment of the rightness or wrongness of human actions, as well as 
their associated intentions and consequences. Ethical evaluation concerns the systematic elaboration of 
such assessments, for example in the form of a normative theory. 
2 This research focuses on Western ethics. When I refer to traditional or mainstream normative theories, I 
refer specifically to those branches of ethical theorising that are traditional or mainstream in Western 
ethics, such as virtue ethics, utilitarianism, deontology, rights-based ethics, and contractualism. 
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 2 
evaluating actions such as lying, stealing, cheating, or killing, often (it is assumed that) 
there is no uncertainty about the harmfulness of the outcomes of such actions: 
uncertainty is limited to whether, and on the basis of which principles, performing 
harmful actions can be deemed justifiable. Can people lie, steal, cheat, or kill? Or 
should they care for, protect, or save? And if so, why or when? 
 
However, risky actions are by definition indeterminate, i.e. their outcomes are 
uncertain. The fact that actions involving risk will only possibly, not certainly, result in 
harmful outcomes, leads one to wonder: are risky actions bad per se? If actions that 
involve risk do not result in harm, can they still be considered wrong? How should one 
evaluate actions that do not immediately or directly bring about negative outcomes, but 
increase the possibility of such outcomes occurring? To go back to some earlier 
examples, what is wrong – or is there something wrong at all – about jumping a yellow 
light or taking a group of people hiking? A general worry among philosophers is that 
mainstream ethical theories might not be able to adequately guide human actions when 
the outcomes of those actions are uncertain. This has been the impetus for developing a 
separate, and relatively young, field in normative philosophy that deals specifically with 
ethical questions evoked by risks: risk ethics. Risk ethics shifts the focus from harm – a 
main focus point of normative philosophy in general – to potential harm. 
The evaluation of risk impositions 
Risky actions fall into two categories. Firstly, there are actions of individual risk-taking, 
like taking medication of which some but not all side effects are known. Secondly, there 
are risk impositions: actions through which an agent – be it an individual person, or a 
collective agent such as a business or a government – exposes others to risk, like a 
doctor prescribing a patient such medication, or a factory making the drug. Often 
individual risk-taking overlaps with exposing others to risk, as one can think of many 
cases in which agents perform actions that not only expose themselves, but also others, 
to risk. 3  Consider someone driving fast while transporting a passenger, or having 
unprotected intercourse with a partner. To impose a risk on others is then to perform an 
                                                
3  One can distinguish ‘imposing a risk on others’ from ‘exposing others to risk’. Imposing has a 
connotation of actively doing something, whereas exposing has a more passive connotation of letting 
something happen: comparable to the distinction between an action and an omission. However, I do not 
use this distinction, as I believe that imposing risk and exposing to risk equally demand justification. I use 
imposing and exposing interchangeably throughout this research. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 3 
action that exposes others to the possibility of harm. Risk impositions comprise ‘pure’ 
risk impositions, i.e. actions performed by agents that only expose others, and not the 
agents themselves, to risk, such as hiring underpaid workers to do a dangerous job. 
They also comprise risk impositions that are part of risk-taking actions, i.e. actions 
performed by agents that expose others, as well as the agents themselves, to risk, such 
as driving, smoking, or having sex. From an ethical point of view, a risk imposition is 
more problematic than an action of individual risk-taking. The latter often only has to be 
deemed justifiable by the one taking the risk: that person has the freedom and autonomy 
to do what he or she thinks is best in the face of uncertainty. The former however 
involves the possibility of harm to others, and harm to others generally needs to be 
justified interpersonally. 
 
Now are risk impositions wrong per se? Because most actions involve some kind of risk 
to others, this question needs to be answered negatively. For if one were prohibited 
from performing any action that involves risk to others, or which exposes others to even 
the slightest possibility of harm, life would not be liveable. But there must also be some 
kind of limit to, or threshold for, the risk that people are permitted to impose on others: 
otherwise life would be equally unliveable. So, when is a risk negligible, tolerable, 
excusable, permissible, or allowable? How much risk do people find acceptable in their 
own lives and those of others? And when is it justifiable to expose others to risk? These 
questions lead to the main research question: 
 
When – under which circumstances or conditions – it is acceptable to impose a 
risk on others? 
 
Let me demarcate the field of research opened up by this question. Firstly, I focus 
specifically on risk impositions, i.e. actions that involve the possibility of harm to 
others, and not on individual risk-taking that only exposes the risk-taker to the 
possibility of harm. Secondly, I limit myself to actions that impose a risk on other 
human beings. I then leave out of consideration the risks that human beings impose on 
non-human entities and creatures, such as the atmosphere or animals. However, I do 
include risks that human beings impose on the wellbeing or integrity of non-human 
entities and creatures if they have repercussions for other human beings – a prime 
example being climate change and its negative effects on human life around the planet. 
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Ethical principles and considerations 
The underlying difficulty here is how to make morally justifiable and responsible 
choices when one is not certain about the outcomes of one’s actions. This not only 
affects consequentialism, the branch of normative thinking explicitly focused on 
outcomes. Other normative theories also struggle to determine the acceptability of 
choices and actions under conditions of uncertainty. Take a deontologist, who stresses 
the importance of the duty not to harm others. Now if one does not know, or cannot 
predict, the outcomes of one’s actions, how can one then determine whether one’s 
actions are in accordance with this duty? Consider passive smoking and its associated 
health risks: when, or at what point, does smoking in the vicinity of others in fact 
constitute harm? Does the duty of non-maleficence entail that one does not smoke one 
cigarette near another person, two cigarettes, ten, a hundred? Should ethical principles 
with which determinate actions are evaluated be applied with the same rigour to 
indeterminate actions? Or should one be sensitive to how likely or how bad the negative 
outcomes are, and use less rigorous principles in less likely or less bad cases? These 
questions invite one to think about issues concerning knowledge, prediction, and 
uncertainty on the one hand, and decision-making, justifiability, and responsibility on 
the other. Risk ethics in general, and this research in particular, is concerned with these 
issues. 
 
Risk is not a topic that is often explored from an ethical perspective. A reason for this is 
that the dominant understanding of risk – as scientific, technical, and calculative – has 
for a long time shunned ethical reflection. This understanding, namely, assumes that if a 
risk is calculated objectively and accurately, it will be apparent how it should be dealt 
with: human judgement becomes superfluous. When risk is approached from an ethical 
point of view, the term is generally interpreted in utilitarian terms. The acceptability of 
risk is then determined by a cost-benefit analysis, i.e. a utilitarian calculus: a risk is 
acceptable if and only if it yields the most benefit for the greatest number of people. 
However, there are many other moral considerations apart from costly and beneficial 
outcomes that play a role in the evaluation of the acceptability of risk. The major 
contribution of risk ethics so far is that it has drawn attention to these considerations, 
and has shown that risk is not merely a technocratic affair. 
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Consider the risks involved in medical experiments on human subjects. It is not the case 
that if a) such risks are proven to be small or unlikely, or b) a cost-benefit analysis 
shows that overall benefits significantly exceed the overall costs, participants can 
straightforwardly be exposed to the risks. The risks are deemed acceptable if and only if 
a) a cost-benefit analysis shows that the benefits significantly exceed the costs for the 
participants themselves, or b) the risks are understandably communicated to the 
participants, who have then consented to take part in the research exposing them to 
potentially negative effects. Voluntariness, autonomous decision-making, consent, and 
respect for individual persons and their rights are but a few of the moral considerations 
that influence the evaluation of the acceptability of risk impositions. 
 
Other considerations are the availability of alternatives (could other, less risky, choices 
be made?); the distribution of possible harms and benefits (do some people shoulder the 
burden of risk exposure while others only stand to benefit?); the division of power (who 
is involved in the decision-making process with regard to risks?); and the promise or 
possibility of compensation (if harm materialises, can it be compensated?). In order to 
properly investigate what are the ethical foundations of these moral considerations and 
what they demand under conditions of uncertainty, one might have to move away from 
a purely utilitarian focus towards a broader understanding of the acceptability of risks. 
As Carl Cranor (2007: 51) notes: “Thinking clearly about risks and their acceptability in 
our lives is too important to be left to technical risk assessors and cost-benefit theorists”. 
Overview of the literature 
According to Neelke Doorn (2015: 355), philosophers began to notice the moral 
significance of uncertainty in general, and risk in particular, in the 1960s ([Doorn refers 
to]; Frankfurt 1962; Millet 1962; Axinn 1966; Ingle 1968). But when Robert Nozick, in 
his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), drew the attention of a wider audience to 
the problems risk poses for ethical evaluation, he secured the place of risk on the moral 
philosophical agenda. He is therefore often mentioned as the first philosopher to discuss 
risk from an ethical perspective. From the 1980s and into the 1990s, risk ethics started 
to develop as a separate normative field often linked to the ethics of science and 
technology and subsequently dealing with questions of safety, precaution, 
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permissibility, responsibility, and distribution of benefits and burdens (Jonas 1984; 
Sauer 1982; Altham 1984; Gibson 1985; MacLean 1986; Teuber 1990; Shrader-
Frechette 1980, 1985a, 1985b, 1990, 1991). From the 2000s onwards, risk ethics has 
been established as a, albeit rather small and niche-like, field of its own. A prime 
indicator of this is the central role the relationship between ethics and risk plays in 
overview works such as Risk: Philosophical Perspectives (Lewens 2007), The Ethics of 
Technological Risk (Roeser & Asveld 2009), and the Handbook of Risk Theory: 
Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics and Social Implications of Risk (Roeser, 
Hillerbrand, Sandin & Peterson 2012). 
 
Nozick looked at risk impositions from a rights-based perspective, and asked whether 
the possibility of harming someone by performing a risky action could in itself 
constitute a violation of a natural right. If someone has a right that others should not 
cause one harm, does one then also have a right that others should not perform actions 
that increase the possibility of being harmed? Nozick argued that from a rights-based 
perspective, this distinction cannot be made, as it is impossible to draw a line to 
determine “which probabilities impose unacceptably great risks upon others” (1974: 
75). Rights are either infringed upon or respected, and to perform an action that possibly 
harms a person is to cross the boundary of that person’s right against being harmed. 
However, Nozick stated that not all rights infringements should be prohibited: some 
infringements are to be allowed if due compensation can be provided. By analysing risk 
from the perspective of rights, Nozick opened up the way for discussing the relationship 
between ethics and risk at the intersection of philosophy and law (Schroeder 1986; 
Thomson 1985, 1986, 1990, 1991; Perry 1995, 2001, 2007; Cranor 1990, 1997; 
McCarthy 1997; Sunstein 2002, 2005; Finkelstein 2003; Oberdiek 2009, 2012, 2014; 
Bolatito Asiata 2010). 
 
Evaluating risk impositions can be done from the perspective of other ethical theories as 
well, and some work has been done on scrutinising the tenability of different normative 
perspectives on risk. Each theory approaches the evaluation of risky actions4 with a 
different set of principles: where rights-based ethics focuses on rights and claims (see 
previous references), utilitarianism draws attention to harmful and beneficial outcomes 
                                                
4 I sometimes use the term risky action, but always refer to those risky actions that are risk impositions, 
i.e. that involve harm to others, except when explicitly stated otherwise. 
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(Hansson 2004b, 2007a, 2013), deontology to duties and obligations (Oberdiek 2009, 
2012, 2014), contractualism to agreements, justifiability, and consent (Lenman 2008; 
Fried 2012a, 2012b, 2016; James 2012; Frick 2015; Nickel n. d.), and virtue ethics to 
virtues and character (Luntley 2003; Athanassoulis & Ross 2010, Nihlén Fahlquist & 
Van de Poel 2012; Nihlén Fahlquist 2015). Also, some philosophers have worked on 
listing the moral considerations that can influence the acceptability of risks – such as 
alternative options, distribution of harms and benefits, consent, and compensation – 
independent from specific theoretical frameworks (Sauer 1982; Aven 2007; Ersdal & 
Aven 2008; Brännmark & Sahlin 2010; Hayenhjelm & Wolff 2012; Vanem 2012; 
Espinoza & Peterson 2012; Doorn 2015).  
 
The contributions of philosopher Sven Ove Hansson to the field of risk ethics deserve 
special notice. Hansson is chair of the Department of Philosophy and History of 
Technology at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden, where he leads 
a research group on the ethics of risk. He has been writing on risk and its philosophical 
and moral dimensions since 1989, and has supervised the PhDs of several philosophers 
that are now well known within the field of risk ethics, such as Martin Peterson, Per 
Sandin, Madeleine Hayenhjelm, and Hélène Hermansson. Hansson’s ideas have 
culminated in the book The Ethics of Risk: Ethical Analysis in an Uncertain World 
(2013), in which he not only elaborates on moral considerations but also the tenability 
of ethical theories in the context of risk. 
Positioning the research 
Even though Hansson’s work and the works of the aforementioned authors provide a 
rough overview of the ethical concepts that are important for the evaluation of risks, the 
debate tends to be fragmented and cluttered. Moreover, the theoretical foundations of 
these concepts are often not examined. In fact, a structural discussion and comparison of 
the mainstream normative perspectives on risk impositions, and the principles and 
considerations they prioritise, is insufficiently developed. This research seeks to address 
this gap. It approaches the evaluation of risk impositions from multiple theoretical 
angles, namely, utilitarianism, deontology, rights-based ethics, contractualism, and 
virtue-ethics. I have chosen these normative theories specifically as they represent a 
main systematic strand in the Western tradition of ethical thinking. What principles do 
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these theories apply when evaluating risk impositions, what considerations do they 
prioritise, and can one determine the acceptability of an action involving risk to others 
from these ethical perspectives? By analysing and comparing these perspectives, I hope 
to be able to develop my own account of the evaluation of risk impositions. 
Research design 
The research comprises three parts that each focus on a separate research question: 
- Part I is made up of Chapter 1 and 2, and deals with the question: What is a risk? 
- Part II is made up of Chapter 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and deals with the question: Do 
mainstream ethical theories provide a convincing evaluation of risk 
impositions? 
- Part III is made up of Chapter 8, and deals with the question: Can a virtue-
ethical understanding of responsibility offer a tenable alternative evaluation of 
risk impositions? 
Part I: What is a risk? 
In order to evaluate risk impositions, risk must first of all be defined. Many scholars 
working on the ethics of risk gloss over the fact that risk is a notoriously difficult notion 
to define. Moreover, the morally relevant properties of risk, such as the fact that 
identifying something as risky always entails a value judgement, are not, or only 
marginally, acknowledged, or sometimes merely assumed to be evident. Part I of the 
research, comprising the first two chapters, is therefore dedicated to answering the 
following question: What is a risk? The aim of Chapter 1 is to provide a substantial 
understanding of risk, and the aim of Chapter 2 is to explore the relation between 
morality and risk. 
 
Risk is a widely used, but ambiguous term. There is not one standard definition or 
common meaning of risk across different fields. This mainly has to do with the 
equivocal definitions of risk throughout the etymological evolution of the term. In 
Chapter 1 I will therefore begin with a thorough analysis of existing definitions, their 
negative and positive connotations, as well as the historical development of risk from 
pre-modern to modern times. I will continue to draft two categories of prerequisites for 
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speaking about risk in a meaningful way, namely, agency and knowledge, and elaborate 
on the constituting role they play with regard to risk. Agency is a prerequisite for risk 
because one only speaks of risk when there is some kind of decision or act involved. 
Risks are run, taken, imposed, distributed, or avoided, and these verbs signify an active 
position, either in terms of the creation or the management of risks. In the category of 
agency, I discuss the capacity for decision-making, as well as the extent of influence on, 
and control over, particular outcomes or the general state of the world. The second 
prerequisite for risk is knowledge, but it is a prerequisite in an ambiguous sense. For 
something to qualify as a risk, one should simultaneously be aware of and uncertain 
about the possibility of harm. In the category of knowledge, I discuss notions such as 
prudence, foresight, prediction and unpredictability, probability, uncertainty, and 
ignorance. 
 
The understanding of risk as a harmful, unwanted, or undesirable event hints at value 
judgements in determining what a risk is. There are several moral notions related to risk 
that make it interesting from a normative perspective, and in Chapter 2 I will focus on 
providing a concise analysis of these notions. I discuss harm and benefit, safety and 
adventure, moral emotions, values, and judgements, blame, trust, and responsibility.  
 
The overarching aim of answering the first research question is to have an 
understanding of risk and its moral relevancy. However, with such an understanding I 
still have to attend to the second problem, namely, that it is insufficiently clear how 
ethical principles and considerations, or normative theories in general, guide human 
action and decision-making in contexts of risk and uncertainty. 
Part II: Do mainstream ethical theories provide a convincing evaluation of risk 
impositions? 
Part II comprises Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Chapter 3 will evaluate the utilitarian 
perspective on the evaluation of risk impositions; Chapter 4 concerns the deontological 
perspective; Chapter 5 the rights-based perspective; and Chapter 6 the contractualist 
perspective. One might question what the value is of structuring a research project 
according to such broad branches of normative theory. As I mentioned, the ethical 
literature on risk evaluation is fragmented: different authors write from different 
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normative perspectives that highlight different, but in my opinion equally important, 
moral considerations. I not only want to provide an overview of how mainstream 
normative perspectives generally evaluate risk impositions, but also want to critically 
discuss their contributions in relation to each another. Such a cross-comparison can 
show the strong points and shortcomings of separate theoretical perspectives, and 
enables me to appraise whether they can on their own provide tenable evaluations of 
risk impositions. 
 
Chapter 7 comprises a short recapitulation, in which I reflect on the previous four 
chapters. I will argue that these perspectives each highlight important considerations, 
but on their own cannot fully account for the evaluation of risk impositions. In isolation, 
they lack normative force and fail to provide a convincing evaluation of actions that 
expose others to risk. Moreover, attention will be drawn to the fact that most scholars 
notably fail to mention virtue-ethical principles in the appraisal of risk impositions. The 
importance of character and the ability to make good and wise choices under conditions 
of risk and uncertainty are structurally overlooked. Only a few authors explore a virtue-
ethical perspective on exposing others to risk (Luntley 2003; Athanassoulis & Ross 
2010, Nihlén Fahlquist & Van de Poel 2012; Nihlén Fahlquist 2015). 
 
The minor attention to virtue ethics in contexts of risk can be explained by the fact that 
the field of risk ethics tends to have a problematic one-sided focus on actions, their 
possible or probable outcomes and effects, and their adherence to normative principles. 
Risk ethics zooms in on the principles determining the moral justifiability of risk-
imposing actions (duties, rights, consent, etc.), thereby marginalising the moral 
justifiability of making decisions to impose a risk on others. Whereas traditional ethics 
generally has a bias towards determined outcomes, risk ethics generally has a bias 
towards possible or probable outcomes. 
 
A preoccupation with (determined, probable, or possible) outcomes and effects of risky 
actions is understandable, since they will or can affect persons exposed to risks. 
Discussions on risk from other fields such as economics and technology are then almost 
exclusively outcome-centred. However, such a focus diverts the attention away from the 
point in time when the decision is made to expose others to risk, and away from the 
agent – be it one person, a group of people, an institution, an organisation, etc. – that 
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makes the decision. There is no denying that outcomes and effects will influence the 
acceptability of a risk imposition. But since they have not materialised yet at the 
moment of decision-making, they will remain sophisticated guesses and provide 
insufficient grounds for a substantial ethical evaluation of that decision. It then seems as 
if risk ethics falls into a similar trap to traditional ethics: making ethical evaluation 
dependent on outcomes. Evaluating risky actions at the time of decision-making 
requires an ethical principle that acknowledges the importance of outcomes, but also 
focuses on decision-making agents, the quality of their judgement, and their reasons for 
imposing a risk. 
 
This invites the question: is there (a normative theory based on) such a principle? An 
obvious answer is virtue ethics, and notions of virtue and phronēsis, i.e. practically wise 
decision-making. Another promising candidate is responsibility ethics, and its principle 
of responsible decision-making. I want to analyse the possibility of making virtuous, 
practically wise, and responsible decisions with regard to risk impositions by combining 
the two perspectives. I want to interpret responsibility as a virtue, and explore the 
contributions of this approach to the evaluation of risk impositions. 
Part III: Can a virtue-ethical understanding of responsibility offer a tenable 
alternative evaluation of risk impositions? 
Chapter 8 makes up Part III of the research, in which I explore how one can be 
responsible, or make responsible decisions, in the face of uncertainty. I propose a 
marriage between virtue ethics and the notion of responsibility, and argue for an 
understanding of responsibility as the virtue of answerability. I understand answerability 
as an interactive process of call and answer, request and response. Answerability as a 
virtue then originates, and can only exist, in the dialogical exchange between two or 
more agents.  
 
I claim it is acceptable to expose others to risk if the risk-imposing agent is answerable 
for his, her, or its actions. This can entail that one is able and willing to provide reasons 
for one’s actions to others: reasons that justify why one chooses to act in a way that 
involves risk to others. However, answerability is more than a form of rational 
responsiveness. It also entails having appropriate attitudes and emotions with regard to 
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situations involving risk or harm to others, such as respect, care, and compassion. 
Moreover, it entails the ability and willingness to adequately manage such situations, by 
for example minimising risk, or compensating for harm. But the ethical burden to be 
answerable in these different ways – rational, attitudinal, and practical – cannot be 
placed solely on the risk-imposing agent. As mentioned, answerability is an interactive 
process, and therefore its content has to be determined conversationally. 
 
Building on the findings from Part II, Part III of this research will be dedicated to 
exploring the ethical foundations of reasons that justify risk impositions, as well as 
ways in which to respond in an attitudinally appropriate and practically adequate way to 


























1. UNDERSTANDING RISK 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of the first two chapters is to provide a thorough and comprehensive analysis of 
the notion of risk from an ethical perspective. The analysis will comprise a critical 
reflection on the existing literature on risk. In the first chapter the ambiguous meaning 
of risk is explored, and in the following order attention is paid to: the different 
definitions of risk; the related difficulty of drafting one sound and inclusive definition; 
etymologies of risk; the significance of risk in the transition from pre-modern to modern 
and postmodern times; and conceptions of agency and knowledge as prerequisites for 
speaking about risk. These endeavours provide a substantial understanding of the notion 
of risk, which is necessary for any further investigation into the subject. 
1.2 Defining risk 
1.2.1 Can risk be defined? 
It is useful to begin the exploration of any concept with a dictionary definition. The 
Cambridge Dictionary (2016, s. v. ‘risk’) defines risk as “the possibility of something 
bad happening [or] something bad that might happen”. Consider the risk of an accident 
when driving through a thick mist: risk might refer to the possibility of an accident, 
perhaps even expressed in percentages, or to the accident itself. This is a clear starting 
point, but as will be discussed in this chapter, risk has many more meanings. When the 
international Society for Risk Analysis met in 1996 at their annual congress, 
businessman Stan Kaplan (1997: 407) inauspiciously stated: 
 
Many of you here remember that when our Society for Risk Analysis 
was brand new, one of the first things it did was to establish a committee 
to define the word “risk”. This committee labored [sic] for 4 years and 
then gave up, saying in its final report, that maybe it’s better not to 
define risk. Let each author define it in his own way, only please each 
should explain clearly what way that is. 
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Twenty years later this battle is still being waged, as the subsequent years have yielded 
some, but not conclusive, conceptual clarity about risk. It is a common and widely used 
word, but definitions seem to vary among individual applications, disciplines, 
situations, and contexts, rendering it ambiguous and inconsistent in character. To 
illustrate the lack of a generally accepted conceptualisation, let us take a look at some 
ways in which the different meanings of risk have been explained. 
 
Michael Bollig (2006: 8) argues that risk can refer to different things. It can refer to a 
hazard, such as lightning or fire; an object or person that might create a hazard, such as 
a nuclear power plant or a smoker; or a hazardous activity, such as an expedition into a 
jungle. However, all these things can in fact be classified into Bollig’s second category: 
they are causes of possible harm to people, and things that people value. Lightning 
constitutes a risk because it can electrocute a person or set a house on fire. A nuclear 
power plant constitutes a risk because it can explode or leak radiation, which causes 
sickness in persons as well as harm to the natural environment around it. A jungle 
expedition constitutes a risk because participants might encounter deadly animals or 
poisonous plants. 
 
Hansson (2007, 2013) provides a more encompassing list of the different connotations 
of risk. Firstly, risk can refer to an unwanted event, like bankruptcy or a traffic collision, 
which may or may not occur. Secondly, it can refer to the cause of a possible but 
unwanted event, as in the examples mentioned by Bollig. Think of the lack of financial 
planning as the cause of bankruptcy, or reckless driving as the cause of a traffic 
collision (and in turn bankruptcy or a traffic collision as the causes of other unwanted 
things). Thirdly, it can refer to the probability of an unwanted event. Examples are a 
risk of less than 1 in 1000 that a specific company will go bankrupt, or a risk of 
approximately 0.095 percent that a teenager is involved in a traffic accident. Fourthly, 
risk can refer to the expected value of an unwanted event. This is the case when risk is 
expressed in terms of the expected number of deaths, for example in the hypothetical 
statement that the expected number of fatalities among South African road users 
resulting from traffic collisions in a certain year is approximately 17.000. And lastly, 
risk can refer to the fact that a decision is made under conditions of known probabilities. 
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This is what distinguishes risk from uncertainty, where there are no probabilities 
available for expressing possible future outcomes. 
1.2.2 The negative side of risk 
Bollig’s mentioning of hazard and Hansson’s definition of risk as an unwanted event 
already point in the direction of the common negative definition of risk. But there is 
more to risk than the classifications of the two authors. To give substance to this claim, 
let us take a look at how several distinguished scholars and research institutes have 
defined risk over the past 25 years. 
 - “Risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and 
insecurities induced and introduced by modernization [sic] itself. Risks, as 
opposed to older dangers, are consequences which relate to the threatening 
force of modernization and to its globalization [sic] of doubt” (Beck 1992: 
21). - “Risk is the characteristic of decisions that is defined here as the extent to 
which there is uncertainty about whether potentially significant and/or 
disappointing outcomes of decisions will be realized [sic]” (Sitkin & Pablo 
1992: 10). - ““Risk” is defined, by most of those who seek to measure it, as the product 
of the probability and utility of some future event” (Adams 1995: 30, 
original italics). - “Risk is a situation or event where something of human value (including 
humans themselves) has been put at stake and where the outcome is 
uncertain” (Rosa 1998: 28). - “Risk is widely recognised as a function of the probability and severity of an 
adverse effect/event occurring to man or the environment following 
exposure, under defined conditions, to a hazard” (European Commission 
2000: 18). - “[…] risk […] is increasingly associated with […] statistical and actuarial 
technologies and expert advice that render measurable the probabilistic 
calculation of future harms” (O’Malley 2000: 465). 
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- “[…] risk is commonly defined as […] the likelihood of harm occurring in 
the future” (Webb 2006: 71). - “[…] the term ‘risk’ denotes the possibility that an undesirable state of 
reality (adverse effects) may occur as a result of natural events or human 
activities” (Renn 2008: 21). - “[…] a risk is the chance, or the probability, of some loss or harm – the 
chance of mishap. […] a risk is represented by the probability of a loss or 
harm times the severity of its outcome” (Cranor 2009: 28). - “Risk refers to uncertainty about and severity of the events and 
consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that 
humans value” (Aven & Renn 2009: 6). - “Risk […] is not only a matter of decision, but of the predictability of 
outcomes; taking risks equates to deciding upon the reliability of forecasts, 
the controllability of events” (Pellizzoni 2010: 464). - Risk is “The combined answer to three questions that consider (1) what can 
go wrong, (2) how likely it is, and (3) what its consequences might be” 
(United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2017). 
  
Keywords in these definitions can be divided into five categories: knowledge, human 
agency, time, evaluation, and technical approach. Firstly, there are words that refer to 
knowledge, or the lack thereof, with regard to risk: insecurities, doubt, uncertain(ty), 
potentially, likelihood or likely, chance, and possibility. A risk is something that might 
happen, but there is insufficient knowledge to be certain that it will happen. Secondly, 
there are words that refer to agency, indicating the active role that humans play with 
regard to creating and managing risk: dealing, decisions or deciding, human activities, 
and controllability. Risk is always related to the choices people make: a risk is either 
created by persons through their actions, or is manageable by persons through their 
prioritisations. People create, take, or impose risks when they make choices in situations 
of uncertainty. Because risk is the result of some choice, action, or omission, the 
following words are also important in this context: consequence(s), outcome(s), effect, 
following, impact, result, and causes. Thirdly, there are words that refer to time, and 
that relate to the expectation of when risks might become reality: future, prediction, 
forecasts. Fourthly, there are words that refer to the evaluation of uncertain possibilities 
or risks: hazard(s), threatening, disappointing, at stake, adverse, harm(s), severity, 
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negative, undesirable, loss, mishap, bad, wrong. Important to note here is that this 
evaluation is always done by humans, since morality is an inherently human endeavour. 
The negative or undesirable outcome related to risk therefore always occurs to 
“something of human value (including humans themselves)”, or “with respect to 
something that humans value”, as Rosa (1998: 28) and Aven and Renn (2009: 6) rightly 
incorporate into their definitions. Fifthly, there are words that refer to the common 
technical approach to understanding and dealing with risk: systematic, measure or 
measurable, probability or probabilistic, statistical and actuarial technologies, expert 
advice, calculation or calculating, function or product. Speaking of risk then entails the 
subjection of uncertain future outcomes to calculation, measurement, and quantification, 
and the expression of possibilities in terms of chances, numbers, and probabilities. 
 
Bases on the previous paragraph, the following table gives an overview of the five 
characteristics of risk, their explanation, indicators, and keywords. 
 
 Characteristic Explanation  Indicators  Keywords 




Insecurity, doubt, uncertainty, chance, 
potential, possible, likely 
Uncertainty   
2. Human agency Active role of 
humans with 










3. Time  When a risk 
might realise 
Future, prediction, forecasts Future  




Hazard, threat, disappointment, harm, 
loss, mishap, negative, undesirable, 











Measurement, calculation, function, 
product, probability, statistics, 
technology, expert  
Probability 
Table 1: Overview of five characteristics of risk and their keywords. 
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The concept of risk has now been broken down into its rudimentary building blocks. 
These can be put together again to form a more exhaustive definition. A good starting 
point is the most basic definition of risk as the possibility of something bad, i.e. ‘a 
possible harm’. Alternatives for this basic definition are ‘a chance of loss’, or “an 
unwanted event that may or may not occur” (Hansson 2013: 8). Through the notions 
‘possible’, ‘chance’, and ‘may or may not’, as well as the notions ‘bad’, ‘harm’, ‘loss’, 
and ‘unwanted’, these basic definitions capture the characteristics of uncertainty and 
evaluation respectively. To stress the characteristic of time the basic definition can be 
extended to ‘a future possible harm’. The characteristic of human agency indicates that 
risks are always related to the choices people make: their choices either create the risk 
or influence its management. Incorporating this into the definition results in risk as ‘a 
future possible harm that is related to human choice’. This suffices as a colloquial 
definition of risk. In technical terms however, risk means that a future possible harm is 
expressed in terms of its probability. To involve this characteristic into the definition, a 
risk is then ‘the probability of a future possible harm that is related to human choice’. 
1.2.3 The positive side of risk 
In colloquial as well as technical language, risk generally has a negative connotation. In 
the next chapter I will elaborate further on value judgements in the context of risk, but 
for now I can state that it is clear that there are many indications that risk-taking is 
considered condemnable and risk-reduction praiseworthy. Society legislates against 
risky behaviour with speed limits, alcohol taxes and no-smoking signs; most 
organisations have risk managers; and citizens protect themselves against all kinds of 
risk with the aid of vaccinations, burglar alarms, and insurances. Less risk and more 
safety is the credo many people live by. But risk has an inherently positive side as well. 
For why would a government allow any transport into their country? Why would a 
university grant a student a bursary? Why would a patient choose to undergo surgery? 
There are risks related to all these actions: diseases and criminals could enter the 
country, the grant could be wasted on a student who fails to deliver, and the patient 
could die. However, it is the associated potential benefits that make these risks 
worthwhile: the country could profit from international exchange, the student could 
make a valuable academic contribution, and the patient could be cured. Risk can 
therefore not be wholly understood without relating it to benefit. 
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Some scholars have incorporated benefit as an integral part of risk into their definition. 
Risk has been described as “expected success or failure” (Cohen & Christensen 1970: 
101); “anything that has to do with situations where ‘bad’ (or ‘good’) things may, or 
may not, happen” (Spiegelhalter 2011: 17); and “an uncertain future outcome that can 
either improve or worsen our position” (Crickette et al. 2012: 2). These definitions hint 
at a neutral understanding of risk as both a future possible harm and a future possible 
benefit. However, I am convinced that the notion of risk always refers to something 
undesirable, such as a harm, injury, loss, or death, but that there are situations in which 
risk-taking or imposing can result in something desirable, such as obtaining a benefit, 
avoiding danger, preventing harm, and protecting life. Consider driving fast and its 
associated risks of speed tickets, car crashes, and insurance costs. A person who speeds 
takes these risks in an attempt to realise benefits, perhaps experiencing a thrill of 
excitement, or increasing mobility and shortening travel time. But especially in 
emergency situations driving fast can yield enormous benefits: think of an ambulance 
driver assisting in saving a patient’s life by speeding. Identifying, accepting, and 
engaging with risks as future possibilities of harm is therefore not only pleasurable, but 
often necessary in life (Everitt 2008: 123). I then agree with Anthony Giddens (Giddens 
& Pierson 1998: 209), who claims that “Essentially, ‘risk’ always has a negative 
connotation, since it refers to the chance of avoiding an unwanted outcome. But it can 
quite often be seen in a positive light, in terms of the taking of bold initiatives in the 
face of a problematic future”. It must be noted that taking or imposing risks to realise 
benefits can itself increase existing risks or create new risks. Ambulance drivers for 
example create accident risks for passengers and other road users because of their high 
travel speed (World Health Organization [sic] 2004, 2006). 
 
Taking, running, or imposing risk can have beneficial results in an informal as well as a 
formal setting. Examples are personal development and business respectively: these are 
two areas in which the beneficial results of risk are predominant, and which will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Identity forming and personal development 
Risk plays a vital role in early childhood development and identity forming (Little & 
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Wyver 2008; Wood 2013). Think of how children put things into their mouths, try to 
walk up straight, come too close to fire, and step onto the street without looking. By 
confronting dangerous circumstances children develop cognitively, psychologically and 
physically. It is important for children to be exposed to danger to a certain extent, for 
danger functions as a foundation for learning. If a baby is obsessively protected from 
any kind of threat, if a toddler never experiences fear in the face of uncertainty, if a 
child is not encouraged to sometimes jump into the unknown, new learning will seldom 
occur. In this context Søren Kierkegaard (2003: 192, original italics) observed: “During 
the first period of a man’s life the greatest danger is: not to take the risk”. But during the 
first period of a human life, not the child but the parents (or guardians or caretakers) 
make most decisions with regard to risk. In a standard family setting, an adult decides 
what a child eats, where it lives, whether it can play near a river, or go outside alone. 
Adults then take risks of exposing children to risks. Kierkegaard’s observation should 
then be adjusted to: ‘During the first period of a man’s life the greatest danger is: not to 
be exposed to risk’. As will be discussed in more detail later, knowledge is a 
prerequisite for risk and risk-awareness. This means that, in order to assess actions or 
events as risky for oneself or for others, and to be aware of taking or imposing risks, a 
person must be able to have some insight into the possible outcomes of those actions or 
events. In general, children lack the cognitive capacities to have any, or sufficient, 
insight into the effects of their actions, and therefore they are not risk-conscious. As 
children develop, they gradually acquire the ability to reflect on their actions and the 
risks involved. In this development process, the act of consciously taking or imposing 
risk, as well as the responsibility that accompanies this awareness, is transferred from 
parent to child. In many countries, when children reach the age of 16, 18, or 21, they are 
expected to be conscious of risks and are considered responsible for their decisions and 
actions made with regard to risks (Adams 1985, 1995, 1999). But throughout the 
process of coming of age, the beneficial potential for learning, developing, and forming 
an autonomous identity remains. Children should then not be taught to never take risks, 
but to take risks wisely. 
 
Being able to take risks wisely continues to be important throughout life, from birth till 
death. As John Adams (1995: 4) argues, not only children, but also “grown-up children 
[…] go about the business of life – eating, drinking, loving, hating, walking, driving, 
saving, investing, working, socializing – striving for health, wealth and happiness in a 
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world they know to be uncertain. The objective of these risk managers is to balance 
risks and rewards”. Human action will always entail or create risks, and therefore 
identifying, taking, imposing, and managing risks is a part of life. Risks cannot be 
avoided, and dealing with them effectively can even yield highly beneficial results. 
Therefore, one should not aim at completely avoiding or eradicating risk, but at 
adequately controlling instances of loss while promoting opportunities for gain. As 
Kierkegaard (2003: 192) continues: “once the risk has been really taken then the 
greatest danger is to risk too much”. Learning to take risks wisely therefore means 
learning to choose sensibly between alternative courses of actions, with their associated 
risks and benefits, available to a person. Life is an act of balance, weighing possibilities 
of failure against rewards of achievement. 
 
The benefits or gains obtained from risky actions can be practical, such as increasing 
one’s mobility by taking a plane or earning money through investments. Also, 
confronting risks has positive effects on personal development in life after childhood. 
Facing an uncertain world and understanding there is risk in every endeavour can be a 
very daunting, even paralysing, experience. Acknowledging the possibility of failure but 
managing to realise the possibility of success can then inspire powerful feelings of 
being in control. Obvious examples are experiences that are generally thought of as 
risky, such as adventurous travels, extreme sports, or changing professions. Performing 
such activities successfully inspires intense emotions of accomplishment, inspiration, 
flourishing, control, autonomy, authenticity, and selfhood. As Deborah Lupton (2013: 
636) remarks, it is about “acknowledging the presence of fear and seeking to exert 
mastery over this fear”. Because different people experience risk differently, activities 
that some consider less risky or not risky at all can have different effects on others who 
do deem them risky. For some speaking in front of an audience is a risk, for others it is 
petting a dog or asking someone out. All kinds of risks can unleash the positive 
emotions of mastering risk, and of voluntarily exploring and expanding one’s personal 
limits. What matters is that the risk-taker perceives something as a risk, and manages to 
confront it successfully. 
 
So even though risks are undesirable possible events or outcomes, they also provide 
opportunities for discovering, expressing, and strengthening the self. Moreover, facing 
risks is necessary for the development of a stable and resilient personality that can cope 
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with uncertainty, change, and danger. Conscious and wise risk-taking can then have 
positive effects on personal identity forming and development throughout a human life. 
Business and economic development 
Also in the more formal context of commerce, industry, and business in general risk can 
have beneficial corollaries. In a business context, pure risks or threats are even 
distinguished from business risks or opportunities. A pure risk or threat is a situation 
that, if it happens, will result in loss. A business risk or opportunity is a situation that, if 
it happens, can result in both loss and gain (Dobson & Dobson 2011: 102). Pure risks 
are for example fire in a building, an injured employee, or theft of stock or money: if 
these events occur and are not adequately dealt with, they signify only loss, harm or 
hindrance. Business risks have a potential upside, for they can have not only negative, 
but also positive effects on a business endeavour. Think of using new software in a 
company or materials in a production process, investing in the training of employees, or 
switching to new suppliers: such actions could turn out to be merely a waste of time or 
money, but could also significantly help a business project forward or succeed. 
 
The positive character of business risks lies in understanding these kinds of risks as 
bets: “bets can be used to speculate […], to try to earn a profit from predicting future 
events better than others can” (Stout 2011: 6). The story of John D. Rockefeller, 
allegedly the wealthiest and most successful businessman of all time, is a schoolbook 
example of how predicting the future successfully can yield enormous profits in terms 
of money, time, and reputation. In the fledging American oil industry of the second half 
of the 19th century, in which every business was just prospecting for crude oil, 
Rockefeller invested in oil refinement into kerosene. He based this decision on his 
identification of a great need for a cheap and general-purpose burning fuel that could be 
used in lamps. His prediction turned out to be correct, and after a couple of years 
Rockefeller’s kerosene was used to light up almost every household in America 
(Chernow 2004). He also bought into the construction and control of railways in order 
to fix transport costs and to extract huge discounts for his own company (Fridson 2001). 
Moreover, he invested in research on how to use, instead of discard, the by-products of 
the refining process. His company ended up producing lubricants, grease, paint, and 
petroleum next to kerosene, and made money out of waste. This innovative initiative 
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formed the forerunner of the ‘research and development’ branch of many present-day 
businesses (Beattie 2017). These strategically brilliant moves cannot simply be 
conceived as matters of luck: through careful planning and foresight Rockefeller indeed 
predicted the future to a certain extent, and made unbelievable profit out of betting on 
his expectations. 
 
Rockefeller continues to set an example for managing risk in all areas of business. In 
such contexts, the focus is so strongly on the beneficial potential of risk, that taking 
extreme risks is often considered justified and even praiseworthy. However, his success 
was not ensured by merely taking big risks, but by adequately managing them. He for 
example thought drilling for oil was an unpredictable and wasteful practice, and too 
much of a gamble: “he believes that while gamblers drill for oil, businessmen refine it” 
(History 2012, Rockefeller’s Standard Oil: 1:30 min.). Rockefeller clearly saw the 
difference between pure risks and business risks: he therefore did not blindly bet on the 
former, but insightfully saw opportunities in the latter. The importance of risk 
management is not only widely recognised for individual businesses, but also for the 
general economic and social development of countries. It is for example the topic of the 
2014 World Development Report issued by the World Bank, titled Risk and 
Opportunity: Managing Risks for Development. The main message of this report is that 
economic and social risks should not be avoided, but managed adequately in order to 
unleash new opportunities, foster resilience in the face of adverse consequences, enable 
progress, achieve prosperity, and further development in all areas of society (World 
Bank 2014).5 Consider the process of urbanisation in a rural setting. This is associated 
with risks such as the spread of diseases, social unrest, and environmental damage, but 
if a government manages this change adequately it can also bring opportunities for a 
faster growing and more innovative economy, job creation, and declining poverty. 
 
Risk then has a dual significance: it refers to something undesirable but entails the 
possibility of something desirable. An investigation into the history of the word might 
illuminate how this dual meaning came about. 
                                                
5  The Better Regulation Commission made a similar point in its 2006 advisory report to the UK 
government, titled Risk, Responsibility and Regulation - Whose risk is it anyway? 
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1.2.4 Etymology 
There is a great deal of scholarly disagreement on the origin of the word risk. Some 
argue it only came into use in the 16th century and had no root in any European 
language (Luhmann 1996). Others claim it has an older Greek and Latin origin (Cline 
2004). But the most plausible theory traces the origin of the word back to the Arabic 
language in Antiquity. The root of the word consists of the consonants r-z-q, and by 
adding vowels one forms a verb and a noun. The verb  َقَزَر or razaqa means “to provide 
with the means of sustenance, to bestow upon someone material or spiritual 
possessions, to endow someone, to bless someone” (Siddiqui 2010: 197). By adding a 
different vowel, the noun قْزِر or rizq is formed, which means “provision, livelihood, 
nourishment, possessions, wealth, and fortune” (ibid.). In its original use rizq could 
have as many as four meanings. Firstly, it could mean ‘bread’, having the literal 
connotation of practical nourishment. Secondly it could be understood in a more 
figurative sense as ‘daily provision or sustenance’, indicating a person’s income or 
salary (Éntrelle 2008: 62). This could be related to the fact that Arab troops used to get 
paid with grain, i.e. bread (Oxford English Dictionary 2014, s. v. ‘risk’). Thirdly and 
more generally it could mean prosperity, wealth, or fortune (Allen 2009; Siddiqui 
2010). Fourthly, it could be used in a religious context to refer to a “fortuitous and 
unexpected gift (from God)” (Mercantini 2015: 3). When one moves up the ladder of 
abstraction one sees that bread in a sense is a metaphor for actual or religious wealth. In 
any case, rizq in its original use meant something from which a person profits or obtains 
advantage (Oxford English Dictionary 2014, s. v. ‘risk’). 
 
When the word found its way into European languages at the end of the Middle Ages, 
approximately from the 12th century onwards, it lost its positive connotations of actual 
sustenance or prosperity, and came to refer predominantly to the loss of current or 
future wealth (Wilkinson 2001; Wilson & Rahman 2014). The meaning of risk became 
mainly nautical, as variations of the word were used in maritime contexts of seafaring, 
trading, transporting, and insuring merchandise and vessels. The loss of wealth denoted 
by risk was then primarily related to encountering dangers at sea and losing one’s 
possessions (Giddens 1993; Luhmann 1993, 1996; Hacking 2003). The Greek word 
ῥίζικον or rhizikon came from ῥίζα or rhiza and was Latinised into risicum, In the 13th 
and 14th centuries the Latin word transformed into the Italian risco, rischo, rischio, or 
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risico, the Old Occitan rezegue, the Catalan risc, and the Spanish riesgo, followed in the 
15th and 16th centuries by the Portuguese risco, the Middle French risicq, and the Dutch 
risico (Diez 1853: 291; Skeat 1888: 512; Aven 2014: 21). Meanings such as root, 
underwater rock, abrupt rock, reef, crag, ledge, ridge, or steep cliff have been 
mentioned. The original Latin word risicum can be traced back to resecāre, meaning 
‘that which has been cut off’ or ‘the one that cuts’. Seafarers used variations of the word 
as navigation terms that designated something that was cut off from the mainland, like a 
rock, reef, or cliff, and which could literally cut into the hull of ships. These were 
metaphors for dangers or difficulties to be avoided at sea. The words signified possible 
damage, harm, danger, or unpleasant consequences due to unpredictable circumstances 
or uncertain situations, most importantly the possibility of damage to or loss of 
merchandise that was transported by sea (Diez 1853; Skeat 1888; Helten 1994; Liuzzo 
et al. 2014; Aven 2014). Because damage to or loss of merchandise equalled financial 
loss for persons involved in sea trade, risk acquired a financial connotation related to 
maritime insurance policies. 
 
As the venture of transporting goods by sea was inherently perilous, the predominantly 
negative meaning of risk solidified. But the word continued to have an ambiguous 
character. If the venture of transporting goods was successful, they could be sold or 
traded and turned into profits. Risk therefore signified both the potential for loss and 
gain. This dual connotation is the most apparent in the words that originated in the 16th 
and 17th centuries, the Middle High German Rysigo and the French risque: in these 
languages, risk not only signified harm or danger, but also entailed a sense of attempt, 
trial, undertaking, daring, chance, and adventure (Cline 2004).6 In later use, the word 
lost its connection with nautical contexts. However, the maritime history of the word 
explains why risk is currently understood as something inherently negative, but risk-
taking as potentially positive.7 To transport one’s goods by sea was both a dangerous 
                                                
6 It must be noted that Preston Cline (2004) traces the word back to different lexical roots. He claims the 
origin of risk lies in the Greek verb πειραο or peirao, which is defined as to attempt, endeavour, trial, try 
one’s fortune, or make an attempt by sea. When Greek words were translated into Latin, peirao became 
periculum, retaining a connotation of attempt and trial, but also of danger and peril. Periculum then 
evolved into resicum or risicum around the 14th century, not only defined as danger or hazard, but also as 
(ad)venture or crisis. Both crisis and venture originally denoted a bold choice made in the face of 
uncertainty, and Cline’s research into risk’s medieval significance then incorporates notions of decision, 
attempt, uncertainty, fortune, and danger. His etymology also explains the positive–negative ambiguity in 
the connotation of risk. 
7 I am indebted to Andrea Hurst for pointing out that my discussion, and understanding, of the risk 
concept is overall slanted towards a negative interpretation, i.e. in terms of possible harm. My reason for 
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and courageous endeavour: it was a daring choice made under uncertain circumstances. 
The word risk retained the meaning of something that has to be simultaneously avoided 
and pursued. 
 
Here an important alternative to the presented etymology has to be mentioned. Eiríkr 
Magnússon (1874) refutes other etymological origins, and through the suffix –sk he 
traces the roots of risk back to the Islandic verb ráða and its reflexive variant ráðask, 
which mostly have military connotations. The former means to counsel, and the latter 
means “to counsel one’s self, to make up one’s mind, to betake one’s self, to venture, to 
risk. […] to risk a charge, to attack on the enemy, […] to counsel one’s self on (against) 
the enemy” (1874: 285). He claims the word found its way into Romance languages 
when seafaring people from the North, i.e. the present-day Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 
and Denmark, plundered the coasts of nations around the Mediterranean Sea, but also 
took land and settled there. To attack an enemy obviously entails the possibility of 
victory, increasing power, and accumulating wealth, but also the possibility of defeat, 
loss of influence and fortune, and even death. Magnússon’s etymology therefore also 
explains the dual connotation of risk. It signifies loss, but adequately responding to and 
managing risk can have beneficial consequences.8 
1.2.5 Modernity 
It is not surprising that most of the lexical changes described in the above took place in 
the last phase of the Middle Ages, when traditional European societies entered the early 
modern period. Explorers, merchants, and other adventurers set out to broaden their 
                                                                                                                                          
foregrounding harm in my conceptualisation of risk – and not benefit, or the double nature of risk – is 
because not all risks contain an element of benefit. Consider a driver who all of a sudden experiences an 
uncontrollable cramp in his leg, steps on the gas, and is unable to change the position of his foot on the 
accelerator. He now exposes other road users to an increased risk of an accident, without being in a 
position to benefit from that exposure. Risky actions are then always possibly harmful, but only 
sometimes possibly beneficial. 
8 The fact that my analysis of risk is Eurocentric can be explained by the Indo-European roots of the 
English word. Moreover, definitions and etymologies of words that signify risk in other language families 
have not been researched extensively. There is therefore no other academic literature available other than 
a Eurocentric one to explain the subtleties of the risk concept. Moreover, apart from the lack of academic 
sources, in my own preliminary research I found for example no dual connotation in some African 
languages. Risk-related terms mostly refer to danger, hazard, or threat: the Zulu ngozi means risk, danger, 
accident, injury, or catastrophe; the Yoruba ewu means risk, danger, or havoc; the Sesotho kotsi means 
risk, exposure to danger, or accident; the Somali khatarta means risk or threat. I only found a dual 
connotation in two Swahili words. Hatari means danger, but can also be used to describe something 
good, talented, or beautiful, such as a seductive or attractive girl (Landesman 2004: 135). Riziki means 
livelihood, derived from its Arabic origin (Kitula King’ei 1992: 95). 
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horizons and discover the world by crossing unknown or unpredictable seas. They could 
use a term like risk while discussing and arranging expeditions and business ventures 
(Luhmann 1996: 3; Hacking 2003: 25). But apart from its practical relevance the word 
also has a more emblematic meaning, which captures the dramatic change in how 
people in Europe in the early modern period of transition and transformation understood 
themselves and their place in the world. 
 
Human beings had always lived with and responded to dangers, opportunities, and 
uncertainty in the world around them. They have always made plans and acted 
purposefully in order to realise those plans in a future time. Because the chance of 
failure is an inescapable corollary of purposeful action, human beings have always 
engaged with risk. Moreover, attempts at predicting and controlling the future and 
anticipated possibilities of harm and benefit are also as old as humankind (Garland 
2003). Historical records of fortune-tellers, oracles, and prophecies, of rituals and 
sacrifices aimed at securing a desirable future, and of discovered patterns and cycles in 
seasons and other events support this claim. 
 
But in a traditional European context, confronting and trying to master risk was done 
within the religious or spiritual confinements of fate, destiny, and predestination. People 
had limited choices with regard to the course of their lives, and most future successes 
and adversities were ascribed to God, the goddess Fortuna, Nature, or other authorities 
(Giddens 1990; Luhmann 1996; Cline 2004). With overseas trade and exploration, the 
need for understanding, forecasting, and managing future events intensified 
enormously. This encouraged the realisation in the 16th century, the heyday of the 
transition from traditional or pre-modern to modern times, that unanticipated results 
could not merely be the result of spiritual powers: human beings themselves had to able 
to create and influence future outcomes through their own choices and actions 
(Bernstein 1996; Hacking 2003; Bollig 2006). Moreover, the human capacities to know, 
forecast, influence, and even control the future have in fact been revolutionised since 
the beginning of the modern time period through the discovery and development of 
probability theory. David Garland (2003: 72) writes: “What distinguishes modern 
society from its predecessors is not the attempt to master risk and to colonize [sic] the 
future, but the invention and widespread adoption of rational, systematic methods for 
formally and effectively doing so”. Human agency, with its related notions of choice, 
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influence, and control, as well as knowledge about an uncertain future through 
foresight, prudence, prediction and probability, are therefore of paramount importance 
for understanding risk, and will be discussed further in the next sections. 
 
Since the transition from traditional to modern times, conscious dealings with risk 
obtained a central place in human existence. Many scholars, mainly sociologists, have 
supported the claim that in a subsequent societal transitional period, from modernity to 
postmodernity, the awareness of risk in everyday life has increased even more: 
developed societies have been denoted ‘risk societies’, in which the central organising 
social principle is the control over, and management of, risk (Giddens 1990; Beck 1992; 
Lupton 1999b; Fox 2000). In the context of the relation between risk and modernity, 
many claims have been made: that modern, but especially postmodern individuals live 
and act in a context of risk; that risks today are different from dangers in pre-modern 
times and that their nature changes constantly; and that the amount of risk is growing 
exponentially. It is outside the scope and intent of this research to delve much deeper 
into all these claims, but in the next section a beginning will be made by investigating 
the transformation of human agency since modern times. 
 
At the basis of the abovementioned claims lies the argument that risk has become an 
increasingly central notion in modernity and postmodernity. This is illustrated by the 
fact that the word risk is being used more often than the words threat, danger, or hazard 
(Lupton 1999b: 9 – 10). A chart from the Google Ngram Viewer supports this. Ngram 
Viewer is a graphing tool developed by Google that searches through more than 5.2 
million books digitalised by Google up to 2008 for selected n-grams, i.e. combinations 
of letters. It displays these n-grams in a chart in terms of use per year, and such charts 
give an overview of how many times certain words have been recorded over the years. 
The following n-gram shows the use of the words risk, threat, danger, and hazard 
between 1900 and 2008 in the corpus of English books digitalised by Google. While the 
use of the last three words slowly increases, stagnates, or even declines, the use of the 
word risk increases (much more).9 
 
                                                
9 An ngram can obviously not provide proof, but is merely an illustration and partially representation at 
most, for it only displays uses of letter combinations recorded in books that Google digitalised. However, 
it offers an interesting visualisation of the main claim, namely, that risk has become an increasingly 
central notion in modernity and postmodernity. 
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Figure 1: Ngram chart of risk, threat, danger, and hazard [Google Ngram Viewer 28 March 2016]. 
1.2.6 Concluding remarks 
I started this section by breaking down the definition of risk into five characteristic 
aspects: knowledge, human agency, time, evaluation, and technical approach. I then 
built up a definition of risk that reflects these characteristics: a risk is a future possible 
harm that is related to human choice, or the probability of that harm. I nuanced this 
predominantly negative definition of risk by noting that even though risk mostly 
signifies something negative, it also has a potential positive connotation. This claim was 
supported by examples from personal development and identity forming of children and 
adults, and by examples from business contexts and economic development. The 
ambiguous meaning of risk was then further investigated by looking at the etymology of 
the word. The historical analysis showed that the first lexical ancestor of risk, the 
Arabic rizq, had a solely positive meaning of provision or fortune. When the word was 
adopted into Romance languages it referred negatively to the loss of wealth. Along the 
way risk came to signify a future possible loss or harm, but the positive connotation was 
preserved in the potential advantage of risk-taking, imposition, and management. The 
realisation that, by taking, imposing, and managing risks, human beings can create and 
control future outcomes themselves, instead of being surrendered to a higher authority, 
is a product of modern thinking. Risk therefore symbolises a fundamental change in 
how people perceive their personal influence on and knowledge about the future. 
1.3 Agency 
In the transition from pre-modern to modern times, spiritual authorities and the ideas of 
fate and predestination lost their monopoly on the future. As a result, human beings had 
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“no choice but to make choices about their self-identity, their relations with others and 
about how to plan and live their lives” (Ekberg 2007: 347). People took over the 
responsibility of shaping their own destiny. In later definitions of risk nouns such as 
attempt, trial, and adventure, and verbs like to undertake, to dare, and to chance, 
introduce elements of human agency and choice. These notions will be discussed in this 
section, as will the extent to which human beings can influence and control the 
consequences of their choices and actions. 
1.3.1 The capacity of choice 
Many things changed in the aforementioned transitional period, including the 
conceptions of choice itself. Zygmunt Bauman (1993) argues that in a traditional 
Western or European context choice was something condemnable. The laws of God and 
the Christian religion were paramount. Following His laws and living one’s life in 
accordance to His will were the right things to do. The content of the good was self-
evident, fixed, and non-negotiable. There was no choice involved in doing the right 
thing: this was to avoid choice and conform to, and comply with, the customary way of 
life. Choosing was considered synonymous with straying away from, or breaching, 
God’s commandments, and pre-modern persons could then only exercise their decision-
making capacity by making wrong choices. The biblical story of Adam and Eve, and 
their decision to eat fruit from the tree of knowledge, is an archetypical example of the 
pre-modern religious perspective on choice: choice misleads people and plunges them 
into a life of sin, danger, and anxiety. As the importance of this perspective gradually 
declined in increasingly secularised modern societies, the content of the good was no 
longer given but had to be chosen just like the content of the bad. A good life was now 
not only the life lived according to religious rules, but could be lived in many different 
ways. Now choice could also be exercised for the good, i.e. to make right decisions, and 
as a result the conception of choice changed dramatically (Bauman 1993). 
 
Making choices necessarily involves taking risks, and taking risks means acting in a 
context of uncertainty. Imagine Samuel: he is standing on a ten-metre-high bridge while 
his friends are swimming in the water below. He is aware of the fact he might harm 
himself if he jumps from the bridge into the water: he could land awkwardly, or there 
could be rocks in the water. If he nevertheless chooses to jump, “risk implies the 
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voluntary taking of a dangerous chance [he jumped at the risk of his life]” (Webster’s 
New World College Dictionary 1989, s. v. ‘risk’, original italics). Voluntary risks are 
the risks a person takes knowingly, or that one willingly exposes oneself to, assuming 
that one understands the dangers involved. Examples are the risks involved in flying, 
climbing a ladder, or eating junk food. Involuntary risks are the risks that are imposed 
on a person without the consent of that person: examples are the risks of getting 
mugged, breathing in polluted air, or passive smoking. The element of choice is 
obviously present in actions of voluntary risk-taking or risk exposure, such as Samuel 
jumping off the bridge. But choice can also be present in cases of involuntary risk 
imposition. Consider Samuel’s friends swimming in the water below the bridge. By 
jumping, Samuel imposes a risk of harm on his friends, as he might land on top of one 
of them. Even though the friends have no choice with regard to the occurrence of the 
risk, for Samuel chooses whether or not to jump, they have a choice with regard to their 
exposure to the risk. If they identify the risk they can model their behaviour in response 
to it: by swimming away they could mitigate their exposure to the possibility of harm. 
 
It is important not to overestimate the extent of personal choice in the context of risk, 
and to be precise about determining the locus of choice and responsibility. Consider the 
involuntary risk of a break-in. In the face of this risk a homeowner is not completely 
passive: he can make sure not to leave valuable things in sight, organise a 
neighbourhood watch, get a dog, install an anti-burglar alarm or a CCTV-camera, or 
even move to a safer area. These choices mitigate one’s exposure to risk, and can 
significantly lower the probability of a break-in. If one fails to act in such ways, does 
that mean that one contributes to the risk of a break-in, or even consents to it? Can 
making the wrong choices turn an involuntary risk imposition into a voluntary act of 
risk-taking? One should be cautious not to take the presence of individual choice in 
relation to risk to extremes, but understand it as being context-specific: it depends on 
the alternatives available to a person, and what choices he or she can be reasonably 
expected to make. Someone who is well off might be in the position to purchase anti-
burglar devices, whilst a less fortunate person lacks the means to do so.10 In the context 
of exposure to crime, choice is then present to varying degrees on a personal level. 
However, on a community level, other entities can be said to have a choice. The 
                                                
10 Someone who is well off might also have more (material) possessions to protect, and might therefore 
also have a stronger need of protection tools. 
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government, police forces, and social workers are in a better position to mitigate 
citizens’ exposure to crime: they bear a greater part of the burden of choice with regard 
to the existence and management of crime. This element of choice characterises 
involuntary exposure as risk, not danger. 
 
Danger is often used as a synonym for risk. Consider the following dictionary 
definitions: danger is “the possibility of harm or death to someone; the possibility that 
something bad will happen; something or someone that may harm you” (Cambridge 
Dictionary 2016, s. v. ‘danger’); risk is “the possibility of something bad happening [or] 
something bad that might happen” (Cambridge Dictionary 2016, s. v. ‘risk’). Even 
though the meanings of both words share the element of potential harm, or the 
possibility of something bad happening, they do not have exactly similar significations. 
Niklas Luhmann (1993) proposes to differentiate between risks and dangers on the basis 
of decision: he argues that only if the possibility of a negative event is linked to a choice 
one should call it risk, otherwise one can only speak of danger. Elísio Macamo (2012: 
267) makes a similar point when he states that “Hazard refers to phenomena which 
occur without conscious human agency, whereas risk involves a decision on the part of 
social actors”. The risks of radiation from cell phones, driving a car, or eating 
genetically manipulated food are obvious examples of manufactured risks, i.e. risks that 
are created by humans. But evidently not every risk finds its origin in human choices. 
Consider the risks of natural disasters and contagious diseases: earthquakes and 
tsunamis occur, and bacteria and viruses exist in the world independent of human 
interventions. If one follows Luhmann and Macamo in their claim that risks are 
negative events whose occurrence is related to human choices, natural disasters and 
diseases cannot be considered risks. 
 
I however argue that even though the occurrence of natural disasters or diseases is 
beyond the scope of human influence, there is again an element of choice present in the 
level of exposure to, and management of, them. This element of choice can be found at 
different levels of agency. Individuals could for example decide against living in an 
earthquake-prone area or they could choose to be vaccinated. Construction companies 
could insist on building earthquake-proof buildings and health care organisations could 
participate in providing medical aid. Local and international governments can prioritise, 
subsidise, or sponsor safe building practices and health care programs. In the context of 
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natural hazards or diseases human choice influences the extent to which persons expose 
themselves or others to risk. Choice then differentiates dangers from some risk, but 
where only some risks are the direct consequence of decisions, all risks are at least 
potentially manageable (Bollig 2006: 7). Again, different people might have different 
alternatives available to them when it comes to mitigating their risk exposure, and for 
some people natural hazards or diseases are more dangers than they are risks. But 
according to the terminology presented here, the fact that they are potentially 
manageable – perhaps not by those exposed but by others agents – qualifies them as 
risks. If there is no element of choice in the creation or occurrence of risk, in the 
exposure or response to risk, or in the control or management of risk, and every 
stakeholder is truly passive in the face of it, such a potential harm constitutes a danger, 
not a risk. 
1.3.2 The extent of influence and control 
Risk then refers to all possibilities of loss that human beings either bring about or can 
manage in some way or another. Something that is a danger for one person can be a 
manageable risk for another. This invites the question of how power relations are 
distributed. Who is in the position to make choices about risk creation or management? 
And who has the information and the capacities to assess, impose, or react to risks? But 
also, does this make the term danger superfluous? The discovery and widespread 
implementation of statistical techniques have enabled people to rationally and 
systematically predict the future (Garland 2003: 72). Modern scientific and 
technological developments enable people to increasingly influence and manipulate the 
outcomes of their actions. With the human endeavour to understand and control the 
state of the world in mind, Luigi Pellizzoni (2005: 570) argues, “as we attempt to extend 
our control over nature (and society), we transform dangers into risks”. By drawing the 
world into the human sphere of influence, facts are turned into choices and thus 
dangers, threats, or hazards into risks. Examples of this change are artificial human 
enhancement technologies, such as gene therapy and embryo selection, which aim at 
“temporarily or permanently overcoming current limitations of the human body” 
(Nouvel 2015: 103). However, modifications to the human body can have risky side-
effects, and such new risks seem to be the price of progress. But then again, because 
almost every activity is conceived as entailing a decision on some level of agency, most 
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potentially harmful outcomes are considered potentially controllable or manageable. 
This explains why the concept of being at risk is used to refer to health threats, 
technological hazards, governmental distrust, and societal fears (Wilkinson 2001: 6). It 
also explains why risk management is such a buzzword in today’s world. 
 
This development is not so surprising if one considers that since the Industrial 
Revolution the human capacity to have an effect on the state of the world and on other 
people has changed fundamentally. Many risks today are therefore no longer merely 
external to human beings or by-products of the way in which they are subjected to 
nature, but are manufactured or created by humans. One can think of big risks such as 
nuclear wars or ecological disasters, but also of everyday risks such as the risks 
involved in drinking soft drinks or taking medicines. Scientific knowledge and 
technological power might make human lives easier, more comfortable, even better. But 
they also carry the potential for unwanted side effects and repercussions, for example 
the unforeseen negative health effects of medicines. They also entail new possibilities 
for misuse of that knowledge and power: consider the fact that cyber wars would never 
have been a real threat if the internet had never been invented, or creating ‘designer 
babies’ would never have been an issue if gene selection was not scientifically possible. 
New risks are “the inevitable price of the benefits of progress in an advanced industrial 
society” (Bazelon 1979: 1066). 
 
Even though human influence on the world and the future is increasing, i.e. risk 
creation, human control does not necessarily increase with it, i.e. risk management. This 
is the result of the fact that the temporal and geographical scope of human actions and 
their consequences continues to widen. And as interconnectedness and interdependency 
between people intensifies, the world becomes ever more complex. Consider for 
example the seemingly simple act of constructing a building in a city. To come from an 
initial design to an actual building, a complex array of multiple production chains, 
transport and delivery services, safety and quality standards, materials from different 
parts of the world, engineers and builders have to be brought together and managed. In 
such complex and interdependent contexts, it can be difficult, even impossible, to 
foresee and control all the consequences of human actions. This is complicated by the 
fact that one mistake, however small, can have a vast impact and far reaching 
consequences in interconnected systems. A prime example is the 2008 economic crisis, 
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when a crash in one sector led to multiple others through a domino effect that eventually 
led to a breakdown of the whole system. Moreover, consequences might lie so far in the 
future that one cannot envision how a present risk will then be perceived. Consider the 
storage of nuclear waste and an inevitable leak: people in future times and places will be 
exposed to these negative consequences, but in present times one does not know how 
they will be affected and whether they will be able to deal with such risks. 
 
Negotiating the future in term of risk implies “a willingness to place trust in the powers 
of reason and a confidence in our technological mastery of nature” (Wilkinson 2001: 5). 
In the ’70’s of the last century however, Hans Jonas (1979, 1984) already warned 
against the uncontained extension of the human sphere of influence through 
technological developments and practices. To think that people can completely control 
the outcomes of their actions and shape the state of the world by means of technology 
exhibits an attitude of hubris and recklessness. 
1.3.3 To live is to confront risks 
In this section I have discussed the importance of human agency in the context of risk. I 
found that if human beings are completely passive in the face of possible harms, they 
cannot be called risks but should be considered dangers. One can speak of risks when 
on some level of human agency there is an individual or collective agent with some 
influence on the possible harm. This influence can entail either the capacity to create the 
risk, or manage it. The human capacity to create risks has increased since the Industrial 
Revolution: risks related to nuclear power, radiation from technical devices, genetic 
modification, cyber space, and modern transport and medicine are examples of risks 
that are manufactured through human intervention. The human capacity to influence the 
future and control risks has also increased, mainly through scientific knowledge, 
technological power, and the invention and development of mathematical and statistical 
forecasting techniques. However, increasing interconnectedness and interdependency 
between people results in a growing complexity in the world, and this complicates the 
human capacity to predict and control the consequences of their choices and actions. 
Human agency then seems to create risks, but also problematises the possibility of 
managing them. 
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I also critiqued the idea of ultimate control over uncertainty: there will always be an 
element of uncertainty and indeterminacy in human life. If the future were certain, there 
would no need for judgement or to make choices. When making choices in the face of 
uncertainty, one also faces the possibility of loss, harm, or failure. To live is to make 
choices, and to make choices is to confront risks. 
1.4 Knowledge 
Another prerequisite for speaking about risks is the human ability to know about risks. 
To know about risks means to anticipate and foresee what could happen, to predict the 
future to a certain extent, to be not completely ignorant or uncertain about the 
consequences of one’s own actions or those of others. This section will focus on the 
background and importance of these notions. 
1.4.1 Foresight and prudence 
In order to make good choices in one’s personal dealings with risk and uncertainty, and 
to not serve randomness and trivialities, one must be able to have some insight into how 
one’s action will unfold in the future. This capacity of foresight is captured by the 
ancient virtue of prudentia, which derives from the Latin pro-uidere or providere: 
seeing before, or seeing ahead (Santangelo 2013: 57). An instructive definition of 
prudentia is provided by Cicero (1949: 159 – 160): 
 
Wisdom [prudentia] is the knowledge of what is good, what is bad, and 
what is neither good nor bad. Its parts are memory, intelligence and 
foresight. Memory is the faculty by which the mind recalls what has 
happened. Intelligence is the faculty by which it ascertains what is. 
Foresight is the faculty by which it is seen that something is going to 
occur before it occurs. 
 
According to this definition, prudentia entails more than foresight: hindsight and 
understanding of the present are also important. A prudent person then has knowledge 
about the past, present, and future. 
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In Cicero’s time, the future was the realm of deities and religious authorities. To “see 
something is going to occur before it occurs” (ibid.) then meant reading the plans of the 
gods, making appropriate religious choices in an attempt to appease the gods, and alter 
or positively influence their plans. However, prudent action was seen as strictly opposed 
to divination, or the prediction of the future through spiritual signs and rituals. Prudence 
was the ability to make intelligent, sensible, and informed decisions by being aware of 
one’s own actions and foreseeing their possible consequences (Santangelo 2013: 56–
68). Risking an anachronistic comparison, the Greek philosopher Thales of Miletus 
could be described as prudent. He foresaw that the olive harvest of a particular year 
would be bountiful. For a small deposit, he secured the use of all olive presses in the 
area nine months before the harvest, and when his prediction turned out to be correct, 
sold his claims to use the presses against great profits (Aristotle 2013: 20). 
 
However, Thales was said to have made his prediction on the basis of his knowledge of 
astronomy, and in Ancient Greece astronomy was strongly connected to the gods: the 
planets, stars, and constellations had mythological significance (Seznec 1981: 38). For 
centuries, predicting the future and making prudent choices, either through astronomy 
or other intellectual activities, retained a connection with the divine. Much later, in the 
emerging commercial societies of 16th century Europe, prudence lost its godly relation 
to destiny and became more strongly connected to reason. It now was the capacity to 
choose wisely between alternatives that can be reasonably expected and that are 
contingent on the choices of others (Luhmann 1996; Aradau & Munster 2007). The 
focus shifted predominantly to the ability to know and predict the future on worldly 
grounds, as prudence was “the moral duty of attending to the future, of saving for a 
rainy day, the virtue of foresight” (Hacking 2003: 25 – 26). 
1.4.2 Prediction and probability 
Predicting the future and making prudent choices was eased by an important 
development that fundamentally shaped the understanding of risk today: the invention 
and widespread application of probability. Probability is the measure of likeliness that a 
certain event will occur, and as such it is the quantitative or numerical expression of 
chance. Moreover, “Probabilities are epistemic facts. They describe what is known or 
knowable about future consequences as of the particular point in the life of a (potential) 
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action at which we assess them” (Fried 2012b: 52). Even though ideas of likeliness and 
chance were already used in earlier times, the quantification of these ideas only became 
properly established in the 17th century, when scientists and mathematicians Blaise 
Pascal and Pierre de Fermat discussed how to divide the stakes in a game of chance that 
was suddenly interrupted (Gigerenzer et al. 1989; Bernstein 1996; Hacking 2003; 
Everitt 2006). By studying chance as a mathematical subject, they quantified possible 
future outcomes, and as such possibilities became probabilities. Probability is a tool that 
enables one to predict the future by estimating the likeliness of alternative outcomes, 
under the basic assumption that historical and present events determine the future to a 
certain extent. Consider the statement that the lifetime risk of cancer for British people 
born after 1960 is larger than 50%, meaning that at least 1 in 2 persons in the UK will in 
the course of their lives be diagnosed with some form of cancer (Ahmad, Ormiston-
Smith & Sasieni 2015). This future risk is presented as a probability estimate, i.e. 50% 
or 1 in 2, which is based on prior and present evidence of cancer in the UK population. 
 
Recall that Hansson (2013) defines risk as an unwanted event; the cause of an unwanted 
event; the probability of an unwanted event; the expectation value of an unwanted 
event; and the fact that a decision is made under conditions of known probabilities. 
These definitions can now be divided into different understandings. The first two 
definitions are part of a colloquial understanding of risk: the possibility of an unwanted 
event. The last three definitions are part of a technical understanding: the probability of 
an unwanted event. The technical understanding of risk as probability of harm, or 
another unwanted outcome, has become widely used in disciplines and systems of 
decision-making and risk-management, such as probabilistic risk analysis and cost-
benefit analysis. In these and other contexts risk is often defined as probability times 
severity of consequences (Adams 1995; European Commission 2000; Institute of Risk 
Management 2002; Cranor 2009).  
 
It is also generally accepted that the potential to assign probability estimates to possible 
outcomes is what distinguishes decisions made under risk from decisions made with 
certainty or under uncertainty (Luce & Raiffa 1957). When a decision is made with 
certainty, one is sure that an action will lead to a specific outcome. When a decision is 
made under uncertainty, one might or might not know the possible outcomes of an 
action, but in any case, the probabilities of these outcomes are unknown or cannot be 
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meaningfully estimated. When a decision is made under risk, one might not know what 
the outcome will be, but one knows the range of possible outcomes and the distribution 
of their probabilities. This means that to understand risk in terms of probability is to 
assume that adverse causes and effects, or events and their possible negative 
consequences, can be known in advance, and are objectively quantifiable (Slovic 2000). 
 
But to what extent can people know the possible consequences of their actions, and to 
what extent do history and present determine the future? How can one be certain of 
having taken all relevant possibilities into account, which is necessary to calculate their 
probability correctly? If there is uncertainty about the validity of probabilities, should 
decision-makers and risk-managers venture to reason upon them? As the French 
mathematician Henri Poincaré (1952 [1905]: 184) said more than a century ago: “The 
very name of the calculus of probabilities is a paradox. Probability as opposed to 
certainty is what one does not know, and how can we calculate the unknown?” Even 
though probability calculus has developed tremendously since Poincaré, his question is 
still relevant. In this context, a statement made in 2002 by Donald Rumsfeld, the former 
US Secretary of Defence, is illuminating. In reply to a question about there being 
insufficient evidence to hold the government of Iraq responsible for supplying weapons 
of mass destruction to terrorists, he stated: 
 
Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to 
me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we 
know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say 
we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know we don't know. (Rumsfeld 
in Couto 2010: 956) 
 
‘Known knowns’ are events that have already occurred or are certain to happen in the 
future. ‘Known unknowns’ are risks, identified possibilities with known probabilities, 
i.e. the calculated, or calculable, unknown. ‘Unknown unknowns’ are surprises, or 
possible events of which one is ignorant until they occur. 
 
The relevancy of Poincaré’s question lies in the practical irrelevancy of probability 
estimates for general decision-making. In order to determine the probability of a certain 
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event or outcome, one must know the set of possible alternatives of which it forms a 
part. For such a list to be available and for a probability estimate to truly represent the 
likeliness of an outcome, one has to think through every possibility that might happen. 
For an average layperson in a complex and interconnected reality this is close to 
impossible, and one can question whether humans have the practical ability to 
adequately estimate the probabilities of possible outcomes. Standard probability theory 
assumes that human beings are rational, objective, and calculating decision-makers, but 
in fact most people do not involve probabilities in their decisions (Douglas & 
Wildavsky 1983). Psychologist and Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman (2011) 
argues that the human mind makes decisions and judgments based on known knowns: 
things it has previously observed, identified, and dealt with. The mind rarely pays 
attention to known unknowns, risks, or probabilities. The average mind might know 
these phenomena to be relevant, but it is not a good judge of rational calculations and 
therefore chooses to ignore them. Moreover, the mind appears ignorant or completely 
oblivious about the possibility of surprises, unknown unknowns, or unknown 
possibilities with unknown relevance. Kahneman calls this the ‘What You See Is All 
There Is’ mental bias (Kahneman 2011; see also Taleb 2007). 
 
The mathematical perspective of probability theory has come to dominate approaches to 
risk. Dealings with risk based on trust, emotion, intuition, or fate, are often dismissed as 
unfounded, irrational, superstitious, and plainly false. It cannot be denied that 
quantifying uncertainty makes the future better manageable and eases decision-making. 
But to characterise the distribution of possible consequences as objectively quantifiable 
is not only incomplete, but also misleading (Bolatito Asiata 2010: 309). As Kahneman 
(ibid.) shows, in everyday decision-making situations under uncertainty human beings 
do not base their choices on rational calculations of probability estimates. Not only 
because many lack the mathematical intellect to do so, but also because in most 
decision-making situations in real, intricate, and interconnected life, probabilities of 
possible outcomes are simply not known. As Hansson (2009: 423, original italics) 
expressively describes: 
 
Life is usually more like an expedition into an unknown jungle than a 
visit to the casino. […] Nevertheless, it is common in decision-
supporting disciplines to proceed as if reasonably reliable probability 
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estimates were available for all possible outcomes, i.e. as if the 
prevailing epistemic conditions were analogous to those of gambling at 
the roulette table. This mistake can be called the tuxedo fallacy. 
 
The illusion that the future can be always understood and managed in terms of 
possibilities with known probabilities leads Hansson to refute the idea that most 
decisions are made under risk: instead, he argues, most decisions are made under 
uncertainty. I however argue that one can still state that most decisions are made under 
conditions of risk, if one understands risk as a future possibility – and not necessarily a 
probability – of harm. This colloquial understanding of risk is generally more 
acceptable and tenable than the technical understanding. It captures the endeavour of 
facing an uncertain future by thinking through possible courses of action, without 
necessarily quantifying the alternatives. 
1.4.3 Uncertainty and ignorance 
As stated in the above, risk is a way of dealing with an uncertain future by predicting it. 
Even though predictions might turn out to be extremely accurate, at the time of 
forecasting it is still a prediction, not a certainty. This is because no event is identical to 
a previous one: there are always discontinuities, irregularities, and variations in the way 
past and present determine the future (Bernstein 1996). As Gilbert Chesterton (1909: 
146) remarked, the world is “nearly reasonable, but not quite”. This results in an 
irresolvable tension between history and future, certainty and uncertainty, knowledge 
and shortage of knowledge. Knowledge about the future always remains incomplete to 
an extent: otherwise it would not be the future, but the past or present. And even in the 
present there are many things one does not know or does not have full information 
about: “Uncertainty is everywhere and you cannot escape it” (Lindley 2006: xi). 
 
However, being uncertain is not the same as having no information whatsoever: 
uncertainty is not an unknown unknown. Uncertainty must be placed somewhere on the 
continuum of knowledge about future events. This continuum ranges from complete 
absence of knowledge to full knowledge: from the unknown, unforeseen, and 
unpredictable to the known, foreseen, and certain (Emblemsvåg 2003; Caron 2013). 
Because one does not possess any knowledge about unknown events, they escape one’s 
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analytical capacities and cannot be predicted. About known events full information is 
available and they can then be predicted with complete accuracy: in reality, no future 
event is a known event according to this description. Uncertain events lie somewhere in 
the middle of unpredictability and certainty. One lacks certainty about such events, but 
there is not a complete lack of knowledge: information might be incomplete but at least 
to an extent present, and uncertain events can therefore be anticipated in varying 
degrees. Within the class of uncertain events a distinction has to be made between 
events that are quantified and those that are not. The latter are possibilities about which 
so little information is available to the person assessing the situation that the distribution 
of their probabilities cannot be estimated. The former are possibilities about which the 
decision-maker has enough information to express them in terms of probabilities. Some 
have argued that an uncertainty one can measure is so unlike an immeasurable one that 
in essence it is no uncertainty at all (Knight 1921). I see more value in understanding 
both risk and uncertainty as either quantifiable or unquantifiable, as consisting of 
possible and probable events: risks are then expressions of uncertainty. 
 
If enough information becomes available, unpredictable events can be reduced to 
uncertain events (Emblemsvåg 2003: 62). In turn, future uncertain events can transform 
from possible into probable, and eventually become certain in hindsight. It seems as if 
technological developments and scientific discoveries enable people to also make future 
events certain in foresight, by calculating and predicting the future in extremely 
accurate ways. One can estimate how late a train will arrive, forecast the weather in two 
weeks’ time, speculate about the outcome of elections, make a prognosis about the 
healing time of an injury and come up with predictions about which products consumers 
will buy. However, these calculations will remain estimations, forecasts, prognoses, and 
predictions: to speak of certainty about future events is a logical impossibility. It is 
therefore not the case that if one acquires more knowledge, all uncertainty can be 
drained from risks and future events can be made certain. As was discussed in the 
previous section, one can never be sure to have taken all relevant possibilities into 
account, and to have estimated their probabilities free from mental biases. 
 
Moreover, the accelerating pace of change and increasing interconnectedness and 
complexity of modern life seems to intensify uncertainty. With science and technology, 
mathematical tools are developed with which to calculate probabilities, which in turn 
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enable one to manage uncertainty and provide stable, liveable conditions within a 
context of constant flux (Giddens 1990; Luhmann 1993). Examples of such tools are 
calculators used in predicting the weather, choosing an insurance policy, planning the 
layout of a city, organising a social event, deciding to invest in a business, and 
determining a sport tactic. However, quantifying uncertainty does not eradicate it 
altogether, it only makes it better manageable. Moreover, insights into probability 
theory continuously change and develop, and so do the tools one uses to calculate, 
measure, and predict, as well as the information they provide. Knowledge about risk is 
in fact knowledge about the lack of knowledge (Hansson 2014). 
1.4.4 Risky knowledge 
This section delved into the notions of foresight, predicting the future by calculating 
probable events, and the difference between uncertainty and ignorance. I found that the 
technical definition of risk in terms of probability has become standard in decision-
making and risk-management disciplines, but that probability theory is not free from 
criticism. The primary criticism is that general, normal, everyday decision-making is 
not made on the basis of probability estimates. Moreover, psychological research 
suggests that emotions, personal differences, and value-laden perceptions are as 
important for effective dealings with risk as accurate probability estimates. I therefore 
argued for the colloquial understanding of risk as a future possibility of harm: this 
definition captures the act of facing an uncertain future by thinking through possible 
courses of action, without needing to quantify them. 
 
In the investigation into the difference between certainty, uncertainty, and ignorance, I 
argued that both the quantified and unquantified variant of risk, i.e. probability and 
possibility of harm, are both part of uncertainty. One knows everything about what is 
certain, and one knows nothing about things that cannot be predicted, or about one is 
ignorant. About uncertain events one possesses some, but incomplete knowledge. This 
knowledge can sometimes be expressed in terms of probability and other times it 
cannot, but in both instances, one can speak of risk. Quantified uncertainty, i.e. 
uncertainty expressed in terms of calculated chance, does not eradicate uncertainty but 
only makes it more manageable. Probability estimates can aid human beings to cope 
with constantly changing situations, and in this respect, they are very useful. 
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However, one must acknowledge that there are many things one does not know, cannot 
predict, or assign meaningful probability estimates to. The belief that one can rationally 
know or control everything is not only illusory: it can also be very dangerous, as it 
nurtures hubris, recklessness, and carelessness (Jonas 1979, 1984). Moreover, it feeds 
thoughtlessness, as people might hide behind numerical calculations instead of using 
their own judgement. In a 1968 court case, the Supreme Court of California (The People 
vs. Collins 1968, 68 Cal.2d 319; 438 P.2d 33; 66 Cal. Rptr. 497; 36 A.L.R.3d 1176, as 
cited in Kadane 2008: 413) warned that “Mathematics, a veritable sorcerer in our 
computerized [sic] society, while assisting the trier of fact in the search for truth, must 
not cast a spell over him”. Probability estimates are not a panacea for uncertainty, and 
they should not overshadow one’s moral intuitions11 and judgments about the future and 
how one should approach it. 
1.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I broke down the concept of risk into characteristic aspects, which 
formed the basis for defining risk as the future possibility, sometimes quantified as 
probability, of harm related to human choice. In the investigation into the dual 
connotation of risk as potentially harmful and potentially beneficial, the development of 
the word was followed from ancient times to postmodernity. This historical expedition 
gave the impetus for further investigating the importance of human agency and 
knowledge. The human capacity to choose, as well as the ability to influence and 
control the future, was explained and delimited. The same was done for the capacity to 
know and the ability to predict the future. As such, the first step toward a more thorough 
understanding of risk has been taken in this chapter. The next chapter will focus on 
ethical concepts related to risk, which reveal that risk and morality stand in some kind 
of relation to one another. Understanding the morality of risk is necessary to approach 
risk from the perspective of ethical theories in later chapters. 
                                                
11  I acknowledge that moral intuitions, while psychologically compelling, are not always rationally 
convincing, and therefore should not be taken as the sole decisive factor in determining one’s moral 
attitudes and judgements (I thank Susan Hall for pointing out this assumption). However, I think 
intuitions can indicate what one values, deems important, and wants to protect. To simply discard them as 
irrational would be to miss out on their potential for moral guidance. Moreover, intuitions can be helpful 
in making ethically justifiable decisions, especially if they are developed through experiences – I will 
return to this point in Chapter 8. I argue then, that predominantly emotional factors, like intuitions, as 
well as predominantly rational factors, like probabilities, should influence how one manages the future. 
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2. THE MORALITY OF RISK 
2.1 Introduction 
Why is risk an interesting discussion and research topic from an ethical perspective? 
There are two main reasons. Firstly, risk is a thoroughly moral concept, as it has to do 
with what human beings consider to be good and bad. Secondly, risk impositions can by 
definition have negative effects on other persons, and therefore demand justification. In 
this chapter I will focus on the first reason, and analyse the morality of the notion of risk 
itself. In the following chapters I will take on the second reason, and evaluate how 
various ethical theories could answer the question as to when it is acceptable to expose 
other persons to risk. 
2.1.1 Facts and values 
In the previous chapter risk was defined as the future possibility, sometimes quantified 
as probability, of harm related to human choice. More generally, a risk is an undesirable 
possible future event, created or manageable by humans, and is often taken, run, or 
imposed to realise an associated benefit. The specific mentioning of human choices, as 
well as their potential positive and negative consequences, already hints at the 
(inter)personal and moral character of risk. Since the last decades of the previous 
century there is a growing interest, especially from sociological and psychological 
perspectives, in how people perceive risks and what cultural values underlie that 
perception (cultural values: Douglas & Wildavsky 1983; Lupton 1999a, 1999b; risk 
perception: Slovic 2000). In most sciences however, such as economics and business, 
health and medicine, and many of the social sciences, a purely technocratic and 
scientific definition of risk (risk = probability x magnitude) remains dominant. This 
empirical approach sees risks as something measurable that can be directly and 
objectively perceived in the world, and of which the extent and likeliness can be 
statistically calculated. Examples are technologies, toxic exposure, radiation, global 
warming, terrorism, or smoking. Riskiness is then a characteristic of something, 
independent of who perceives it. The subject who perceives risk or riskiness is mostly 
excluded, and there is little or no focus on the values that influence or even determine 
its perception. People are assumed to be calculative, risk averse, and self-interested 
beings, who will make similar and rational choices once provided with the correct 
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information. Laymen can only understand most risks through technical assessments 
devised by professionals with expert knowledge. 
 
This view has been heavily criticised for the fact that it neglects values and contexts that 
influence human decision-making: “of course human beings are not disembodied, 
rational calculators; they are complex beings radically situated in nature, culture and 
history” (Grove-White & Szerszynksi 1992: 288; a similar point is made by Fay 1987: 
143ff; as well as by Ledilow & Car 1997: 30). In an attempt to acknowledge the 
influence of value-laden contexts on the understanding of risk, the technocratic 
approach has distinguished between risk assessment and risk management. The former 
refers to the scientific process of objectively gathering and assessing information about 
risks, whereas the latter denotes the non-scientific undertaking of evaluating, 
responding to, and regulating risks. From a technocratic perspective values are 
important in risk management, but risk assessment is (or should be) a value-free 
undertaking (National Research Council 1983). 
 
However, this distinction does not acknowledge that scientific knowledge itself is not 
free from normative convictions: it is influenced, based on, or even constituted by 
values. Risk is neither completely objective nor directly observable but: 
 
[…] a multidimensional construct. ‘Risk’ exists as an intuitive concept, 
which for most people means more than the ‘expected number of future 
damage’. Its mental presentations are shaped by knowledge on the 
subject matter, by characteristics of the cognitive and motivational 
system and finally by social reality with its inherent interests and values. 
(Jungermann & Slovic 1993: 201, translated by Bollig 2012: 111 – 112) 
 
Scientific facts are only one component of risk, next to the value-laden background of 
the individual assessing that risk, formed by his or her personal and social 
characteristics. 
 
To understand that risks generally have a factual and a value-laden component, consider 
the simple statement that ‘a risk of being bitten by a puff adder is severe muscle 
damage’. The factual component consists in the knowledge that a puff adder bite can 
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lead to severe muscle damage when left untreated. The value-laden component consists 
in the judgement of reduced muscle tissue as ‘damage’, as something undesirable and 
unwanted. This value-laden and therefore moral component of risk is often overlooked 
because risk is mostly used in the context of things that most people find undesirable, 
such as reduced muscle tissue or other physical conditions, diseases, environmental 
destruction, and death. But as Hansson (2009: 424) points out: “from a philosophical 
point of view, it is important not to confuse uncontroversial values with no values at 
all”. 
 
There are some risk researchers who have specifically argued that risk discourses 
promote, at least implicitly, moral ideas of right and wrong (Douglas & Wildavsky 
1983; Beck 1987, 1992, 2006; Douglas 1992; Lupton 1999b; Garland 2003; Hacking 
2003; Hunt 2003; Hansson 2004, 2013). Ulrich Beck (1987, as cited in Beck 2006: 
333), who together with Anthony Giddens founded the sociological concept of the ‘risk 
society’, already in his first publication on this topic points out that “even the most 
restrained and moderate-objectivist account of risk implications involves a hidden 
politics, ethics and morality”. In a later publication, he adds that “risks lie across the 
distinction […] between value and fact” (Beck 1992: 70 – 71; a similar point is made by 
Hacking 2003: 26). Risks therefore also lie across the distinction between morality and 
science, between what ought to be and what is. An often-heard argument in 
philosophical debate is that of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’, which refers to the logical error 
of basing normative statements on objective descriptions: what ought to be cannot, or 
should not, be deduced from what is. However, “no less fallacious is the assumption 
that the ‘is’ could be a value-neutral description, free from normative models of reality. 
Any descriptive account – even of uncertainty – has an implicit link between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’” (Ledilow & Carr 1997: 41, note 1). 
2.2 Harm and benefit 
Identifying something factual as risky entails a value judgement about the state of the 
world, and the dangers and possibilities in it. Actions, persons, outcomes, or situations 
are judged as harmful, i.e. bad, or beneficial, i.e. good, from the perspective of an 
individual or a group of people. The thoroughly moral terms of harm and benefit then 
constitute the conceptual basis of the notion of risk. 
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2.2.1 Focus on harm 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the focus in risk definitions is on harm. Recall 
the basic dictionary definition of risk as “the possibility of something bad happening 
[or] something bad that might happen” (Cambridge Dictionary 2016, s. v. ‘risk’). This 
‘something bad’ or undesirable possibility is often interpreted as damage, loss, injury, or 
adversity, but most generally as harm. Dictionaries define harm as injury or damage to a 
person’s physical or mental state, caused by the actions of others or by an event 
(Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English 2016, s. v. ‘harm’); or “something that 
causes someone or something to be hurt, broken, made less valuable or successful, etc.” 
(Merriam-Webster 2016, s. v. ‘harm’). Being harmed or suffering harm is then being in 
a worse situation then one was before, or could have been in: one is set back in one’s 
interests, made worse off, or “put into (or is perhaps simply [being] in) a certain sort of 
bad state or condition” (Hasner 2008: 421; a similar point is made by Feinberg 1984; as 
well as by Hall 2012). With regard to risk, harm has to be understood in the broadest 
sense of the word: a person suffers harm not only when he is physically injured or 
psychologically damaged, but also when he experiences adverse effects on his projects 
or goals. A person takes a risk when he exposes himself to the possibility of suffering 
harm, and has risk imposed on him when someone else exposes him to this possibility. 
2.2.2 Harm and morality 
Harm is also defined as the “immoral or unjust effects” of an action (American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 2016, s. v. ‘harm’). This shows the moral character 
of harm: it is something people deem undesirable, want to avoid, and should not have 
inflicted on them without their consent or without justification.12 This is captured in the 
ethical principle of non-maleficence, which demands that one ought not to perform 
actions that are harmful to others without qualification (Beauchamp & Childress 2009: 
149). Harm in fact functions as a basis for morality, meaning that things, actions, or 
people are judged to be immoral or wrong because they cause harm. The connection 
between harm and morality was properly established during the nineteenth century, and 
ethically solidified in the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. 
                                                
12 Harm is sometimes straightforwardly justified by reference to beneficial outcomes: one can reprimand 
a child in order to teach it a valuable lesson, or perform an operation in order to save a life. But what 
justifies harm is a topic of much debate: does self-defence for example justify harming or killing an 
attacker? And what principles make abortion and euthanasia acceptable? 
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Utilitarianism is based on the idea that harm is bad, and that it is therefore wrong to 
cause a person to suffer harm. Bentham phrases harm’s opposite as pleasure, but it can 
also be interpreted as advantage, profit, or more generally as benefit. Benefit is seen as 
something good, and it can be considered obligatory or praiseworthy to help others 
attain a benefit. “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well 
as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on 
the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne” (Bentham [1832] 
1970: 11). Harm and benefit, or pain and pleasure, as synonyms for bad and good are 
the cornerstones of utilitarianism. Even though other normative theories do not 
necessarily place emphasis on benefit as an expression of the good, many share harm as 
an expression of the bad as ethical common ground. 
 
A distinction is sometimes made between non-moral and moral concepts of harm in 
terms of wrongfulness. Harm in a non-moral sense simply refers to a setback of 
interests, whereas harm in a moral sense is a wrongful setback of interests (Feinberg 
1984). The distinction assumes that not all setbacks of interests are morally wrong. 
Consider scoring a goal in a soccer match, or opening a new bakery in a village: the 
opponent as well as the baker are set back in their interests, but they are not wronged.13 
However, I suggest to slightly alter this distinction. Instead of stating that not all 
setbacks of interests, i.e. instances of harm, are morally wrong, I argue that they are 
always moral, but not always wrong. Instances of harm are by definition open to moral 
evaluation, but whether they are wrong, depends on their justifiability. The fact that 
neither the opponent nor the baker suffers a wrongful setback of interest, is because 
such setbacks are part of the game they play – whether it is the game of soccer or the 
game of free market enterprise. By playing, by entering into a sphere of competition 
with others, sportsmen and businessmen accept the possibility of harm, and their 
consent – albeit implicit – justifies the harm they suffer. This might be obvious, but 
even when harm can be straightforwardly justified, it still requires justification. Harm 
remains something that people should not have inflicted on them without their consent 
or without justification. Recall Hansson’s argument that uncontroversial values are still 
                                                
13 I thank Marcel Verweij for providing me with this example, and pointing out the distinction between 
moral and non-moral harm.  
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values: similarly, obvious justifications of harm are still justifications, and as such, 
moral expressions. 
 
Since the end of the twentieth century morality has not only centred on actual harm, but 
also on the possibility of suffering harm, i.e. risk. This means that morality is 
increasingly expressed through the discourse of risk (Hunt 2003: 165 – 192). Exposing 
others to risk, without their consent or without adequate justification, as well as not 
attempting to avoid or minimise risks, are intuitively judged as wrong and morally 
condemnable. As John Oberdiek (2012: 342 – 343) argues, harming another person “is 
clearly morally significant, plainly requiring justification. Linking the moral 
significance of risking to harming therefore holds out the hope of transferring the 
obvious moral significance of the latter to the former”. But the wrongness of risk is not 
so straightforward or obvious as one might think. Risks are a part of life, and people 
expose others to risks on a daily basis. Is it wrong to serve one’s guests pasta, even 
though eating pasta allegedly increases the risk of Alzheimer’s? Is it wrong to drive a 
car, because one directly exposes other road users to the risks of a collision? Is it wrong 
to use a mobile phone, because one indirectly supports the mineral mining industry that 
imposes risks of violence, abuse, poverty, and bad health on Congolese citizens?14 The 
wrongness of risk impositions is determined by how one understands harm and the 
relation between cause and effect, as well as where one draws the line between merely 
possible and certain or actual harm. Just as with actual harm, the wrongness of possible 
harm depends on the extent to which it can be justified. 
2.2.3 Does a risk imposition constitute harm? 
It is sometimes argued that the moral significance of harm equals the moral significance 
of risk, in the sense that to be exposed to risk is in fact to suffer harm. Claire Finkelstein 
for example makes the claim that just as the chance of benefit can be a real benefit, the 
possibility of harm can be a real harm. Think of two persons, Annie and Nomsa, of 
whom only Annie has the opportunity to study. Annie decides not to study, which puts 
both Annie and Nomsa in the same position of not being academically educated. Most 
people would still consider Annie better off than Nomsa, merely for having had the 
                                                
14 Congolese mines – and mineworkers – are exploited for their rich resources of the mineral coltan, 
indispensable for the circuitry of cell phones, computers, and other electronics (Eichstaedt 2011: 1). 
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opportunity to benefit from academic education. Finkelstein deems risky situations 
analogous to potentially beneficial ones. Imagine that Nomsa lives in an extremely 
unsafe area, whereas Annie never has to worry about her safety. Even if Nomsa is never 
attacked or mugged, the fact that she is exposed to such risks everyday could inflict 
actual harm on her: the situation could make her anxious and fearful, and might affect 
her financially because she has to take security measures. Moreover, even if one does 
not compare the girls’ situations, one can still think of Nomsa as worse off by 
comparing her actual state to a state she could have been in if she was not exposed to 
risk. If she would not be exposed to risk she would not feel unsafe, and feeling unsafe is 
less preferable than feeling safe: Nomsa is then set back in her interests, i.e. harmed.15 
The heart of Finkelstein’s (2003: 996) argument is that “agents have a legitimate 
interest in avoiding unwanted risks. A person, who inflicts a risk of harm on another, 
damages that interest, thus lowering the victim's baseline welfare”. Understanding risk 
of harm as harm explains general moral attitudes to for example reckless driving or 
attempts at murder: even if no actual harm results from those actions, one considers 
them wrong and the persons who are subjected to the risks as wronged. 
 
However, even though every risk imposition to some extent sets a person back in his or 
her interests, it is not the case that every risk imposition constitutes harm. Just as not all 
instances of harm are condemnable, not all risk impositions are wrong. For example, 
there is a small risk of a gas explosion if Nigella uses her stove. But it would be too 
strong to claim that by using her stove she harms and wrongs other people in the house, 
say, her husband. It would not make sense if her husband demanded that she not use the 
stove, and it would be equally strange to state that Nigella acted wrongly by using it. 
The difference between this and the previous case partly lies in the likeliness of harm 
that will result from the risk exposure: whereas Nomsa will most likely experience 
harm, Nigella’s husband will most likely not. As these examples indicate, there are 
levels of risk, kinds of risk, or risky situations, that are acceptable. To live and to act is 
to expose ourselves and others to risk, but the question remains: what is it that makes 
certain risk impositions acceptable? 
                                                
15 Muggers, rapists, or vandals expose Nomsa to actual safety risks. But her community, as well as the 
local and national government, also carry responsibility for the harm she is exposed to. 
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2.3 Safety and security 
Risk’s antonyms are safety and security. Safety is a state in which, or a place where, a 
person is “not in danger or at risk” (Cambridge Dictionary 2016, s. v. ‘safety’); meaning 
that one is “protected from or guarded against hurt or injury [or] danger” (Oxford 
Dictionary 2016, s. v. ‘safety’). Security can similarly mean a “state or condition of 
being protected from or not exposed to danger” (Oxford Dictionary 2016, s. v. 
‘security’); however, it often signifies a more institutionalised form of safety, referring 
to the “protection of a person, building, organization, or country against threats such as 
crime or attacks by foreign countries” (Cambridge Dictionary 2016, s. v. ‘security’). 
2.3.1 The paradox of being too safe 
In the previous chapter I noted that risk is mainly defined in negative terms. As its 
antonyms, it is not surprising that safety and security are generally seen in a more 
positive light. Most people value a safe living and working environment, safe drinking 
water, roadworthy cars, tested pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, secure train stations and 
airports, trustworthy police officers, transparent institutions, etc. To live a good and free 
life, safety and security are indispensable. Thomas Hobbes (2003 [1651]) points out 
that, to establish safety and security and subsequently enable and protect basic human 
freedoms, certain societal structures are necessary. To live outside of society would 
mean to live in “continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, 
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short (ibid.: 89). Safety and security are therefore 
some of the most important motivators for national and international politics. In fact, 
contemporary societies attach such value to being free from internal and external threats 
that they have been accused of being obsessively, even neurotically, preoccupied with 
the pursuit of safety and security (Bauman 1993: 235; Wilkinson 2001: 6). The 
downside of striving towards complete freedom from threats is that it entails a trade-off 
with, or limitation of, other liberties. A paradox then arises: one needs to be safe in 
order to be free, but one is less free because one is safe. The 18th century American 
statesman Alexander Hamilton (1787) already foresaw this paradox when he stated that 
“To be more safe, [nations] at length become willing to run the risk of being less free”. 
Rights of freedom of expression, movement, and organisation are curtailed, and local 
government, police, and international institutions closely monitor citizens, in an attempt 
to minimise or eliminate threats to individual safety and national security. Camera 
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surveillance, speed limits, no-smoking signs, obligatory vaccination programmes, and 
taxes on consumer products that are considered a threat to health, are also examples of 
ways in which governments restrict individual liberty for the sake of protecting their 
safety and wellbeing. 
2.3.2 Undesirable and impossible 
It might seem contradictory at first, but attaining absolute safety, or zero risk, is not 
truly desirable. People simultaneously have an elementary need for security and for 
breathing space from security (J. Hamilton 2015). Striving to eliminate all threats 
constrains individual liberties, but also ignores the potential upside of risk. As was 
touched upon in the previous chapter, successfully managed risks can have significant 
positive consequences. If one would succeed in minimising risks, one would miss out 
on the many benefits risky behaviour can yield: for example, eliminating all the risks 
associated with driving essentially entails relinquishing the benefits of being mobile.  
Attaining safety and security should therefore not function as the sole guiding principle 
for individual and interpersonal conduct. Such a focus could inspire a patronising 
inhibition of change, development, and improvement. As David Bazelon (1979: 1067) 
wrote: “regulators are accused of stifling creativity and innovation in the name of the 
false gods of safety”. Moreover, attaining absolute safety and eliminating risk is 
impossible. For “The universe is so constructed that complete safety is a metaphysical 
impossibility. To succeed in securing complete safety is to deny reality” (Miles & Priest 
1990 as cited in Cline 2003: 23; a similar point is made by Luhmann 1996: 6; 1993: 19). 
Risks are a part of life: one can strive towards successfully managing risks, but cannot 
reasonably expect to prevent all possible harms from realising. In real life, safety 
therefore does not necessarily imply the absence of actual or possible harm, loss, and 
other adversities, but the control over these things. At any moment in time one then 
finds oneself on a continuum from danger to safety in which one aims for what one 
experiences as a comfortable balance between risks and rewards, between acceptable 
danger and desirable safety.16 
                                                
16 This balance loosely corresponds with what Gerald J. S. Wilde (1998) has coined the ‘target level of 
risk’. However, I do not agree with Wilde’s argument that the balancing process is homeostatic, meaning 
that trade-offs between safety and risks always settle into some sort of equilibrium. 
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2.3.3 Nothing ventured, nothing gained 
Danger and risk are often associated with uncertainty and the unknown, whereas safety 
and security are associated with certainty and surety. However, to realise the potential 
upside of risk one has to successfully engage with possible dangers and an uncertain 
future. One has to venture out into the unknown and familiarise oneself with it. Recall 
the example of risk-taking in the context of personality development: only when a child 
ventures out into the world does it truly learn that one should not come too close to the 
fire, cannot put everything into one’s mouth, and has to look left and right before 
crossing the street. The positive potential of trying and venturing out is captured in the 
saying ‘nothing ventured, nothing gained’, which implies that in order to obtain 
something worthwhile or desirable, one has to take risks (Cambridge Dictionary 2016, 
s. v. ‘nothing ventured, nothing gained’). 
 
The noun ‘adventure’ is made up from the Latin words ad and venire, respectively 
meaning ‘to’ and ‘come’: in Latin, adventura meant ‘a thing about to happen’. As the 
word found its way into other European languages, it acquired the passive connotation 
of ‘that which happens by chance, fortune, or luck’, and the purposeful connotation of 
‘a trial of one’s chances’ and ‘a perilous undertaking’ (Etymology Dictionary 2016, s. v. 
‘adventure’; Oxford Dictionary 2016, s. v. ‘adventure’). The latter, active meaning is 
present in modern usage of the word: “an unusual, exciting, and possibly dangerous 
activity” (Cambridge Dictionary 2016, s. v. ‘adventure’); “the encountering of risks; an 
exciting or remarkable experience” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2016, s. v. 
‘adventure’); “a perilous or audacious undertaking the outcome of which is unknown” 
(Oxford Dictionary 2016, s. v. ‘adventure’). Throughout the history of the word, 
adventure has maintained a positive connotation, signifying something new, 
challenging, and exciting such as wonder, miracle, or marvel, and extraordinary thing or 
novel incident (Etymology Dictionary 2016, s. v. ‘adventure’; Oxford Dictionary 2016, 
s. v. ‘adventure’). These significations capture the idea that embarking on an adventure 
is possibly dangerous, but that encountering risks entails the possibility of positive 
outcomes. When one actively confronts unknown situations and navigates uncertainty, 
one reaches out towards the world in order to make something happen, to arrive 
somewhere, to experience, and to learn. As the German lyric poet and philosopher 
Friedrich Hölderlin (Hölderlin in Mitchell 2007: 70 – 71) phrases it: “Wo aber Gefahr 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 55 
ist, wächst / Das Rettende auch […] But where there is danger, a rescuing element 
grows as well.” 
2.4 Moral judgements, emotions, and values 
The general moral stance towards risky things and actions is the conviction that 
potential harmful outcomes should be avoided, controlled, or minimised, whereas 
potential beneficial outcomes should be realised and maximised. Because the ethical 
notions of right and wrong, good and bad, harm and benefit, danger and safety, are so 
central to the definition of risk, actions of risk-taking and imposition are readily 
subjected to moral scrutiny. 
2.4.1 Blame 
Perceiving something as risky evokes moral judgements and reactions. A common 
reaction when risks are imposed, and especially when they materialise into harm, is to 
ask who is to blame. Somebody was harmed or exposed to danger, so somewhere 
something went wrong, and someone is to blame for that mistake. For example, the fact 
that smoking during pregnancy exposes an unborn child to health risks asks for a choice 
on the side of the mother to be: will she smoke and expose her baby to those risks? A 
pregnant woman who continues to smoke, even though the text ‘Smoking during 
pregnancy harms your baby’ is printed on every packet of cigarettes she buys, is judged 
as, and blamed for being, oblivious, egoistic, careless, or irresponsible. 
 
For someone to be to blame for a (materialised) risk, she needs to fulfil at least three 
conditions: she needs to be an agent i.e. have the capacity to act, do something, cause, 
influence, or control; she must have done something wrong; and she must have caused 
the dangerous or harmful event (Johnson 2005: 1617). So, for blame to be rightfully 
cast an agent must not only have created or imposed a risk, but also have done so by 
knowingly doing something wrong. If risks are created or imposed despite responsible 
conduct, because of honest mistakes, or without being able to be conscious or aware of 
it, it would seem unjust to blame someone for them. 
 
One could however ask whether the agent did not actively try to endanger others, could 
have avoided the risks, should have known about or anticipated them, or should not 
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have made mistakes that had negative consequences. In those cases, risks are the result 
of respectively malice, recklessness, negligence, and incompetence. As Jonathan Wolff 
(2006: 418 – 419) defines the terms in the context of harm and risk: 
 
Malice is to set out a course of action with the deliberate aim of 
imposing harm or risks to people. Recklessness is to act knowing that it 
could cause harm or risk, but not taking this properly into account in 
deciding whether to act. Negligence is to fail to consider whether or not 
your action carries risks to others, when such risks were reasonably 
foreseeable. Incompetence, in this context, is to carry out a proper risk 
assessment and decide to take appropriate action, but fail to do so. 
 
If agents create or impose risks on others due to malice, recklessness, negligence, or 
incompetence, they can be justly blamed for their actions and their consequences. 
Blaming is often an emotional process, involving emotions such as shame, guilt, or 
humiliation on the side of the blamed, and of contempt, disgust, and indignation on the 
side of the blaming. Blaming can have positive effects, as the fear of being blamed, 
named, and shamed might inspire people to act responsibly so as to avoid blame. 
However, playing ‘the blame game’, i.e. looking to find fault, and the fear of doing 
something wrong can also negatively restrain people in their actions. Moreover, blame 
can only be cast after a wrongful event has occurred – after a risk has been wrongfully 
imposed or harm has materialised – and therefore necessarily entails a backward-
looking perspective. This is not necessarily a bad thing, for one can work on a better 
future by learning from the past. However, after the wrong fact has been established and 
blame has been justly cast, one should turn towards the future and focus on how to 
prevent such wrongs from happening again. 
2.4.2 (Ab)normal and (un)natural 
The fact that the expectant mother’s choice to smoke in the previous example is found 
condemnable shows that identifications of risk convey an underlying idea of what is 
normal and natural, and therefore good. If the baby’s physiological make-up changes as 
a result of the mother smoking, this is deemed ‘malfunctioning’ and ‘not normal’. Other 
examples of risks as threatening the normal and natural status quo are anthropogenic 
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climate change or genetically modified organisms (GMO’s). The risks of climate 
change caused by human activities are often illustrated by examples of ‘freak’ or 
‘extreme’ weather events such as sweltering heat waves or extremely cold winters. 
These events deviate from a state of the weather or climate that is conceived as normal, 
and are therefore perceived as weather anomalies or unnatural weather phenomena. 
 
Now consider GMOs: plants (or animals) of which the genetic material has been altered 
to create desirable traits such as a longer shelf-life, convenient size, and lower water 
requirement. GMO foods cannot be found in nature or are not produced by natural 
processes such as traditional crossbreeding, and are therefore understood as unnatural. 
The term ‘manipulated’ already signifies that things are different from what one would 
‘normally’ encounter. In risk assessments of anthropogenic climate change as well as of 
GMO consumption, references to their unnaturalness are sometimes presented as 
objective or value-free. However, they are often implicit value statements that stem 
from the conviction that ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ neatly map onto ‘good’ and ‘bad’. 
Similarly, the current food trend to consume so-called ‘superfoods’, like chia seeds and 
coconut water, is based on the idea that such foods have natural traits that improve 
physical and mental fitness, fight diseases and aging, and overall fit into a healthy diet. 
Even though such effects can surely be proven to a certain extent, one must be careful 
not to equate naturalness with goodness too easily: naturalness is a value-laden concept 
that is difficult to define in a consistent manner. At the very least, one should 
acknowledge that naturalness is indeed a value-laden concept. 
2.4.3 Rational experts, irrational laymen 
A starting point for scrutinising implicit value judgements in risk assessments is the 
emotional reaction triggered by taking and imposing risks. If one has the option to take 
risks, or operates in a context in which risk-taking is necessary, one can feel excited and 
challenged, but also overwhelmed, overly responsible, stressed, scared, and precautious. 
A situation in which one is exposed to risks, or is aware of the fact that others are being 
exposed to risk, can trigger feelings of powerlessness, vulnerability, indignation, 
sympathy, compassion, care, fear, anxiety, dread, and disgust. 
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In academic, scientific, or political perspectives, emotions are often displayed as 
irrational, and therefore deemed unfit as tools for decision-making. In fact, since the 
Enlightenment the distinction between emotions and reasons has become deeply 
ingrained in, mainly Western and globalised, modes of thought. The Cartesian split 
between body and mind, or body-mind dualism, associates emotions with the body and 
the heart, whereas reasons are associated with the brain, mind, or soul. This nurtures the 
assumption that rational, logical, and therefore sustainable, justifiable, and good 
decision-making is done by and with the brain, through informed, conscious, and 
deliberate reasoning (Macquarrie 1973: 154 – 160; Bortolotti 2015). 
 
It is then not surprising that in the technocratic risk perspective of most experts, which 
defines risk as the probability of an unwanted event, the value-laden component of, and 
emotional reactions to, risk are often ignored, not acknowledged, or downplayed in 
favour of the factual component. Moreover, there is a tendency to view laymen’s 
understanding of or reactions to risk as wrong, contradictory, and overly emotional. The 
public for example overestimates the risks associated with nuclear power plants in 
comparison to the risks of driving, while the risk of dying in a car accident is many 
times higher than the risk of being the victim of a nuclear disaster. Some scientists 
therefore “question the wisdom of leaving risk regulation to the scientifically untutored. 
[…] should [the public] be permitted to make decisions for society when it cannot 
understand the complex scientific questions that underlie the decision” (Bazelon 1979: 
1067). These experts can be tempted to suppress the seriousness of possible threats in 
their communication to the general public, in an attempt to avoid spreading unnecessary 
panic and fear, or because they want to keep the stifling interference of regulation and 
too much political accountability at bay. 
 
However, findings from cognitive psychological and neural scientific research refute the 
dichotomy between emotions and reasons (Damásio 1994; Goleman 1996; Servan-
Schreiber 2011; Kahneman 2011; Kandel & Schwartz 2013). To understand why this is 
so, consider the evolution of the human brain.17 At the top of the spinal cord one finds 
the brain stem: this is the most primitive part of the brain that humans share with all 
                                                
17 The brain is the most complex organ in the human body, and a thorough elaboration falls outside the 
scope of this research, and my capacities as a philosopher. For my purposes, this simplified description 
suffices. 
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species that have a basic nervous system – like reptiles. It regulates metabolism, 
breathing, heart rate, blood pressure, sleep cycles, hormone secretion, and other bodily 
functions needed to keep the body alive and functioning. Around the brainstem one 
finds the limbic brain, also called the emotional brain. This part regulates drives, 
impulses, emotions, and feelings. The limbic brain comprises a thin cortex made up of 
two layers, which respectively enable one to learn and memorise. This cortex lies at the 
basis of the neo-cortex: the rope-like and convoluted part that one sees on standard 
images of the brain. The neo-cortex, or the thinking brain, manages language, attention, 
thought, awareness, strategizing, long-term planning, problem-solving, and conscious 
deliberation (Kandel & Schwartz 2013). The fact that the thinking brain has evolved 
around the emotional brain indicates that, even though these different parts of the brain 
have their own properties, they work together: emotions and reasoning are very much 
intertwined. Emotions play a vital role in human rationality, as they influence and guide 
one’s thinking and decision-making. Both emotions and reasons are then indispensable 
for human intelligence (Goleman 1996). 
 
The emotional and thinking brain correspond with two systems of thinking, enabling 
different forms of decision-making, as elaborated by Kahneman (2011). System one is 
unconscious, immediate, spontaneous, and automatic reasoning that makes it possible 
for us to operate smoothly and quickly in a complex and dynamic world. It is an 
affective system based on emotions and intuitions. System two is conscious, slow, 
deliberate, and controlled reasoning that helps one to reliably understand and make 
sense of one’s being and experiences. It is an analytic system based on reasons and 
abstractions. Emotions are then not opposed to reasons, but are the source of a distinct 
form of reasoning. They enable contextualised and practical decision-making that is just 
as vital to human functioning and flourishing as abstract and theoretical thinking is 
(ibid.). 
 
When people then identify, weigh, assess, react to, or in general make judgements about 
risks, they use their emotional as well as their thinking brain. Contemporary 
psychologists and normative philosophers have taken up these findings to argue that 
emotions should not be shunned from moral justification in decision-making about risk. 
In fact, emotions show people what they care about, what concerns them, and what they 
value (Slovic et al. 2004; Roeser 2012; Lupton 2013). Over the course of several 
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decades of research, risk perception psychologist Paul Slovic (2000; cf. Roeser 2012: 
821) discovered that laymen should not be considered to have a wrong, but an 
alternative perception of risk. In their judgements on what determines the acceptability 
of the creation and imposition of risks, laypeople tend to include many more 
considerations than the technocratic definition of risk – as the product of probability and 
magnitude of harm – allows for. Based on their emotions, they consider for example 
voluntariness, autonomy, and fair distribution of harms and benefits, which shows that 
laymen’s perception of risk is ethically much richer than the technocratic perception of 
scientific experts. 
2.4.4 Valuable emotions 
There is a general tendency to feel anxious, worried, fearful, and cautious when 
confronted with things one is uncertain about. Uncertainty puts in motion innate defence 
mechanisms that warn one against possible dangers and harms. For example, the call for 
precaution in matters of climate change is inspired by scientific uncertainty about the 
workings of causes and effects in the Earth’s natural systems. The fact that many people 
consider precaution to be an appropriate reaction to the uncertainty that clouds the topic 
of climate change shows that they value and want to preserve natural biodiversity – 
perhaps for its own sake, or because it enables them, and future generations, to live the 
way they do now. If those things did not matter, people would not be bothered if they 
were affected by changes in the Earth’s natural systems. Other emotions that are 
common in climate issues are indignation and outrage. Consider that the world’s richest 
countries have not only become rich through industrialisation, but also remain high on 
the list of the biggest contributors to global greenhouse gasses emissions, and are in a 
position to adequately deal with, and recover quickly from, changes in the climate. The 
world’s poorest citizens on the other hand are the most vulnerable to climatic shocks 
and benefit the least from industrial developments (Althor, Watson & Fuller 2015). This 
prompts questions of fairness and justice, of equitable social systems and equal 
distributions. 
 
Other examples of emotions exposing values are the resentment and repugnance most 
people feel against the use of human subjects in scientific experiments, or the aversion, 
disgust, and feelings of abnormality, weirdness, or creepiness triggered by cloned 
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beings, cyborgs, and hybrids between humans and animals (Hurlbut 2011: 162; Ball 
2011: 289; Roeser 2012: 825). Ethicist Sabine Roeser (2012), who has made a 
convincing claim for acknowledging the guiding moral function of emotions, points out 
that such negative emotions do not necessarily dictate that such actions are wrong. 
However, they should be taken seriously as signs of warning, and can make one aware 
of, and reflect on, the morally important features of risky activities, policies, or 
technologies that are often overlooked in the dominant techno-scientific risk 
perspective. In the case of experiments on human subjects, morally important questions 
concern voluntariness, autonomy, and dignity; in cases of human-animal or human-
machine hybridisation they concern tampering with nature, control, and responsibility. 
 
Emotions then enable practical reasoning and can enrich theoretical reasoning. 
However, the suspicion that emotions undermine rationality is not completely mistaken, 
for they can indeed be misleading when they are based on a wrong understanding or 
representation of facts, which is the case with phobias, stereotypes, and biases. Overly 
focusing on small or improbable risks, like the risk of being pecked by a chicken or 
being attacked by aliens, can lead to unjustifiable decision-making with regard to risks, 
such as demanding the extermination of all chickens or spending the whole national 
military budget on building a defence wall in outer space. But, as Roeser (2012: 285) 
states, this should not be taken as an argument against the capacity of emotions to guide 
practical decision-making: instead, it calls for educating individuals out of unwarranted 
beliefs through presenting factual information in an emotionally accessible way. 
Emotions, irrational or educated, are real and should be genuinely acknowledged. In a 
similar vein neurobiologist William Hurlbut (2011: 162) argues that moral emotions 
“are telling us something. Nonetheless, we should seek coherent, consistent, and 
broadly accessible reasons for our ethical judgements”. Having the opportunity to 
express one’s emotions in dialogue with others can first of all reveal irrationalities, 
which can then be addressed by presenting counterfactual information. Secondly, such a 
space is receptive to an honest, respectful, balanced, and open dialogue that nurtures 
well-placed trust and the willingness to discuss, explain, understand, and sympathise 
with issues concerning risk and danger. 
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2.5 Trust and responsibility 
The last two morally salient notions in the context of risks themselves, as well as 
actions of risk-taking and imposition, are trust and responsibility. Moral emotions and 
values are at the basis of considerations of trust and responsibility. For example, if one 
feels aversion to testing pharmaceuticals on human subjects without their consent, 
because one values voluntariness and autonomy, one will mistrust and deem 
irresponsible a pharmaceutical company that is involved in such risk impositions. 
2.5.1 To trust or not to trust 
Trust can have different meanings, but it is relevant for my investigation in the sense of 
a “Firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something” (Oxford 
Living English Dictionary 2016, s. v. ‘trust’). Trust should be distinguished from 
confidence (Giddens 1990; Luhmann 1979, 2000; Uslaner 2001; Earle, Siegrist & 
Gutscher 2007; Nickel & Vaesen 2012). Confidence is a cognitive attitude that things 
will turn out the way one expected, where this expectation is based on past experience 
or evidence: one can be confident that the sun will rise tomorrow, that the letter one 
posted will be delivered, or that one will not be killed by a piano falling from the sky. 
Trust on the other hand is a social commitment to make oneself vulnerable to others, 
where this willingness to expose oneself is based on the ethical judgement of shared 
values or a similarity of intentions: one trusts one’s partner not to cheat, the pharmacist 
to deliver the right medicine, and the owner of the local grocery store to sell good 
produce. 
 
People engage in trust on different levels, extending it in different social circles: to 
personal relations like friends, family, or acquaintances; to more distant ones like 
scientists, politicians, government representatives, professionals, or experts of some 
sort; and even to abstract entities like ‘the medical practice’ or ‘the economy’. The trust 
extended to the latter two levels (of experts and abstract systems) is deeply ingrained in 
modern life. In fact, trust has become a necessary precondition of daily activities in 
modern societies (Giddens 1990). Switching on a light, using a coffee machine, making 
a call, riding a bus, drawing money at an ATM, getting insurance, having an operation, 
or flying in an airplane: all these activities and routines presuppose trust in the 
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knowledge and expertise of others, on whole systems of knowledge and expertise of 
others. 
 
Placing trust in systems of knowledge and expertise helps one to live a normal and 
comfortable life in a complex and dynamic world. Confronted with options, and the 
benefits and risks associated with them, trust in others mitigates the necessity to 
constantly support one’s choices to act in a certain way. For example, one lets one’s 
children be vaccinated because one trusts medical research and practice in the country 
one lives in, and one casts a vote for a representative of a political party because one 
trusts they can make a difference. If people did not have or extend this trust, they would 
feel anxious, insecure, and vulnerable more often. Not only would they live a frightened 
life without trust, people would have a hard time living at all, for the “total inability to 
place trust would produce total paralysis of action, and is untenable in practice” 
(O’Neill 2002: 12). 
 
Trust not only influences how one operates in the world, but also how one perceives 
dangers in it. First of all, what one considers as risky is often based on trust in others. 
For example, does one trust scientists who argue that tipping points in the climate will 
be reached in less than twenty years and runaway climate change will then uproot the 
current way of life? Does one trust those who say one should not be too worried about 
climate extremes and changes, for fluctuations have occurred as long as the Earth 
exists? Or does one trust those who claim that the climate is not changing at all? 
 
Moreover, trust in others determines how one personally acts with regard to risks. To 
continue with the same example, if one believes that the Earth’s climate is actually 
changing and something should be done about it, one trusts others in providing 
information about what activities do not contribute, or contribute less, to the warming of 
the Earth, such as recycling plastics, taking shorter showers, and using public transport. 
Most people do not have the time, opportunities, means, or talents to do scientific 
research themselves, and therefore rely on, and trust in, information provided by others 
who have. The problem individuals face is how to evaluate and judge different and 
conflicting knowledge claims, and who to trust and involve in their decision-making in 
the context of risks. In other words, who can be trusted to provide truthful information 
about risks and personal responsibilities in dealing with those risks? As information 
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becomes more specialised and technical, the gap between inexpert individuals and 
expert professionals gets wider, which makes it more difficult for the former to judge 
the knowledge claims of the latter.18 
 
Moreover, information is often passed on through different channels, minds, and 
mouths before it reaches the person who uses it in his decision-making, and might have 
become distorted in the process. People make decisions based on unchecked, probably 
imperfect, or possibly even wrong information all the time: trusting a friend who read 
an article on foods that heighten the risk of developing cancer, trusting a television 
commercial or a supermarket sign promoting breakfast cereals as healthy, or trusting a 
politician claiming that immigrants are stealing local jobs. The process of distortion of 
information can lead to misplaced trust and eventual mistrust, as well as unclear 
responsibilities. Communication is then vital for placing trust well: 
 
Our ability to live together in communities depends on our ability to 
communicate. […] for these [social] exchanges to work, we must be able 
to rely on one another to speak honestly. Moreover, when we take people 
at their words, we make ourselves vulnerable to them. By accepting what 
they say and modifying our beliefs and actions accordingly, we place our 
welfare in their hands. If they speak truthfully, all is well. But if they lie, 
we end up with false beliefs; and if we act on those beliefs, we end up 
doing foolish things. We trusted them, and they let us down. This 
explains why lying is offensive. It is at bottom a violation of trust. 
(Rachels & Rachels 2010: 164) 
 
If information about risks is miscommunicated or misunderstood, who shoulders blame 
or responsibility for harmful outcomes? Professionals have the obligation to 
communicate risks in ways that are as understandable and accessible as possible, but 
individuals share in the responsibility of making an effort to understand the information 
handed to them, and critically discuss it in the public domain. Only then can their trust 
be genuine. 
                                                
18 But, as was discussed in the previous paragraphs, the distinction between expert and inexpert does not 
map directly onto the distinction between rational and irrational. Arguing that laymen do not have the 
ability to assess the validity of scientific claims about risks does not necessarily mean that their judgments 
and decisions about risks are irrational or wrong. 
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Consider a person who trusts a certain statement to be true, but makes no effort to 
understand or check the information on which he bases his commitment: his trust might 
not be betrayed and even be accidently well placed, but it cannot be genuine. This leads 
Onora O’Neill (2012) to focus on autonomy, understood as the moral maturity to 
choose and criticise rules, as a necessary precondition for trust. Being able to make 
morally mature choices with regard to risk then entails making an autonomous choice to 
trust, but does not necessarily entail cognitively understanding comprehensive, detailed, 
or technical information about risk. Firstly, most inexpert individuals lack the capacities 
to fully grasp such information. Secondly, such information cannot always be retrieved, 
as is the case with unforeseen risks, or adequately communicated, as is the case with big 
or complex risks. I argue that in such cases genuine trust can still be extended: trust is 
then not based on an evaluation of risks, for this is either difficult or impossible for the 
individual extending trust, but on an autonomous determination of trustworthiness of 
the agent in whom trust is placed. When one trusts an accountant who gives financial 
advice, an electrician who works on the wiring in one’s house, a government approving 
the construction of a nuclear waste management facility, or a research institute 
conducting social experiments, one bases one’s trust on the trustworthiness of the 
respective agents (unless one has expert knowledge on any of these topics). 
 
When extending trust based on trustworthiness, an individual exercises its autonomy by 
not just acting on a leap of faith, free-floating, or blind trust, but by forming an 
informed judgement based on particular evidence of trustworthiness. Such evidence 
could comprise past experience, reputation, and competence; transparency and adequate 
communication of decisions and actions; integrity, honesty, and reliability; a clear 
explication of values, goals, intentions, and motivations; or a combination of these. It is 
then not merely a belief in the benevolence of the agent who is trusted, but consists of a 
conviction that this agent will treat them as was assured or promised, and will respond 
adequately when harm materialises, by for example showing remorse and changing 
one’s course of action to minimise or avoid further harm.19 
 
                                                
19 For a more thorough analysis of the possibility to extend trust based on trustworthiness (in the context 
of informed consent), see the article by Annemarie Bijloos (2015): Unknown Risks, Consent and Trust: 
Making Informed Consent Possible under Uncertainty (unpublished paper: available on request). 
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There is always the possibility of misplacing one’s trust: one can misunderstand or 
misinterpret information about risks or the agents one trusts, or one can be coerced, 
deceived, misled, or betrayed by those agents. But apart from unjustified or misplaced 
trust there can also be unjustified or misplaced mistrust (Montpetit 2003; Kydd 2005; 
O’Neill 2012). Examples of misplaced mistrust are the xenophobic perception that all 
foreigners and refugees are risks to one’s current way of living, and the paranoid worry 
that all experts, governments, media, and businesses are untrustworthy. To find well-
placed trust between misplaced trust and misplaced mistrust is a difficult, but necessary 
task. As I remarked, to live normal and comfortable lives in a complex and dynamic 
world, it is practically indispensable to – to an extent – trust agents, institutions, and 
systems shaping and managing society. 
 
The question then is how one can place and refuse trust intelligently when one is faced 
with incomplete evidence (O’Neill 2015). This is not only the responsibility of the 
trusting individual. Individuals should make an honest attempt, in line with their 
abilities, at understanding information about risks, be sensitive to the trustworthiness of 
other agents, and place their trust intelligently. Experts conveying information about 
risks should be transparent about, and communicate clearly, what they do and do not 
know. Also, the context in which both inexpert individuals and experts operate should 
be circumscribed by just legislation, good policies, honest enforcement, ethical 
obligations, and professional conduct. Inspiring and maintaining trust is therefore a 
collective effort, the result of which is built up slowly, but destroyed easily. 
2.5.2 Responsibility 
To be responsible is, as the word already indicates, to respond, to answer for one’s 
actions: I therefore understand responsibility as answerability. In Chapter 8 I will 
discuss responsibility as answerability in much more depth, but for now it suffices to 
say that one of the ways to be responsible for a risk imposition is to be in a position 
where one can rightly be asked to answer for one’s actions. One then has to justify the 
risk exposure and the harm that possibly results from it by providing reasons for one’s 
actions. Crudely stated, this kind of responsibility entails that one thinks before one 
acts, and reflects on whether one can justify the negative outcomes that one foresees 
resulting from one’s actions to those who might be affected by them. So, if one is asked 
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why one chooses to have one’s child vaccinated with the MMR vaccine (against 
measles, mumps, and rubella) despite possible health risks, one might answer that one 
believes the general risks associated with vaccinations do not outweigh the benefits of 
being immunised against the three diseases. Or one might answer that one chooses not 
have one’s child vaccinated because of the rumoured correlation between the MMR 
vaccine and an increased risk of developing autism. One is responsible for the risks one 
exposes one’s child to in two different ways. Firstly, one is responsible in the sense that 
one can be expected to provide reasons for one’s decisions. Secondly, one will be 
considered a responsible parent if one’s reasons are accepted as good or adequate 
justifications. This shows that assignments and evaluations of responsibility, just as 
other ethical judgements, are fundamentally an interpersonal affair: persons can hold 
each other responsible, and evaluate the responsibility of each other’s choices. 
 
The example of vaccinations and their potential positive and negative health effects also 
points back to the previously discussed relation between risk and trust, and brings 
responsibility into this relation. Conflicting knowledge claims (does the MMR vaccine 
increase the risk of autism, and if yes, is it a small or improbable risk worth taking?) 
push individuals, who do not have the time or capacities to research the validity of these 
claims, to trust others to help them in their decision-making. How do people understand 
their individual responsibility, given the necessity of trust in and dependency on 
experts, abstract systems, and other individuals? Do they see themselves as bearing 
responsibility at all, and if so, how much? 
 
I argue that individual responsibility is often not absolute, as everybody depends on 
others to make moral choices about what to do, who to be, and how to live their lives. 
One is fully responsible if one completely understands, foresees, and intentionally and 
directly imposes confined risks on others, such as throwing a brick off a building onto a 
busy street and the associated risk of killing a pedestrian. A rational person does not 
require the knowledge of others to determine the riskiness of such a situation, or how to 
manage it. However, in the case of larger and more complex risks, the need for trusting 
the knowledge of others increases, which seems to decrease the extent of individual 
responsibility. Individual responsibility in the case of risks one contributes to, but does 
not cause personally, such as environmental and social risks associated with climate 
change or global poverty, is ambiguous and can be assigned to multiple actors. The 
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extent to which individuals are then responsible for a risk they impose on others 
depends on what they do – or can be expected to – know about the risk, on their abilities 
to manage possible negative consequences, and on the extent of their dependency on the 
knowledge of others. In Chapter 8 I will return to these issues. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In Part I of this research I have sought to answer the first research question: What is a 
risk? I have defined risk as the future possibility, sometimes quantified as probability, 
of harm related to human choice. Moreover, I have explored the ethical relevancy of 
risk by looking at value judgements relating to harm and benefit, normality and 
naturalness, emotions, blame, trust and trustworthiness, and responsibility. 
 
As was mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, risk is interesting from an ethical 
perspective because a) defining risk comprises a value judgement, and b) the fact that 
exposing others to risk requires an ethical justification. Having a general understanding 
of the morality of risk then enables us to continue with Part II of the research, which 
together with Part III focuses on the acceptability of risk impositions. This chapter’s last 
section on responsibility in a way already introduced this topic, for evaluating a risk 
imposition as responsible entails a moral judgement about that action as being 
permissible, acceptable, and perhaps even good, but in any case, justifiable. I have 
briefly touched upon a few moral considerations that are sometimes used in justifying 
risk impositions, such as beneficial outcomes, voluntariness or autonomy, and consent. 
In the following chapters I will continue explicating these considerations and discuss 
four ethical perspectives that prioritise such considerations differently in the evaluation 
of risk impositions: utilitarianism, deontology, rights-based ethics, and contractualism. I 
will investigate whether one can come to a convincing evaluation of risk impositions 
from any of these perspectives. 
 




3. THE UTILITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 Introduction 
In Part II, the second research question becomes relevant: Do mainstream ethical 
theories provide a convincing evaluation of risk impositions? In this chapter specifically 
I focus on utilitarianism, and the central question in this chapter then is: Does 
utilitarianism provide a convincing evaluation of risk impositions? But before attending 
to this question, I will first explain how I understand utilitarian theory. 
 
Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialist ethics. In consequentialism actions are 
morally evaluated in terms of consequences, which means that the rightness of an act 
depends on the goodness of its consequences. Different forms of consequentialism 
provide different understandings of what determines the goodness of a consequence. In 
utilitarian ethics, the moral appraisal of a consequence is expressed in terms of utility. 
Utility comes from the Latin utilitas, meaning usefulness, and an action is good or bad 
depending on whether it is useful in a sense, whether it has the ability to satisfy a certain 
need or desire. As was already touched upon in Chapter 2, classic utilitarianism, as 
developed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, understands the fundamental need 
or desire of all sentient beings as the drive to seek happiness and avoid pain. The basic 
moral focus of human beings is therefore always on maximising happiness, pleasure, 
flourishing, wellbeing, i.e. the good, and minimising pain, misfortune, deterioration, 
disadvantage, i.e. the bad. Actions are good insofar they produce happiness and 
minimise pain, and they are right insofar they secure these outcomes for the greatest 
number of people. Mill (1867: 53) argued that “Each person’s happiness is a good to 
that person, and then the general happiness must be a good to the aggregate of all 
persons”. Securing good outcomes for the greater good is then at the basis of 
utilitarianism. Which actions are in the interest of the greater good is determined by 
weighing their aggregate positive consequences against the aggregate negative ones: 
actions are right insofar they result in the best overall net balance of consequences. 
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From a utilitarian perspective then, risks can be worth taking or acceptably imposed if 
the beneficial outcomes associated with risk-taking or risk-imposing actions outweigh 
the harmful outcomes. On face value this is an intuitively appealing approach, for 
weighing advantages against disadvantages and aiming at obtaining the best overall 
result is something that is by default incorporated in decision-making about risk. The 
utilitarian approach is fairly straightforward in the evaluation of actions when the 
outcome of a course of action is, or can be, known in advance. If the outcome is known 
or knowable, it can be assessed according to the criteria of utility and a verdict about the 
goodness of the action can be reached. But the more indeterminate an action, i.e. the 
more uncertainty there is about the consequences of that action, the more difficult it 
becomes to evaluate it on utilitarian grounds. 
 
In the context of actions that involve risk one can be more or less certain about 
outcomes. Consider the following situation. A primary school teacher wants to take her 
class on an outdoor trip. The teacher believes the children will benefit greatly from such 
an experience. They will learn about nature, get to know each other better, have to be 
resourceful and resilient in an unknown environment, gain valuable life skills, and have 
fun along the way. The teacher knows that none of the children can swim. Taking the 
school class on an outing to swim in a deep lake is risky, as it is very likely that harm 
will occur. For illustrative purposes, take the ultimate form of harm: death of one, some 
or even all children – which of course can result in second-order forms of harm like 
shock and grief of the parents, and guilt and job loss of the teacher. Of course, one 
cannot know with certainty that death will occur: it is for example not given that 
swimming will take place. But considering the particularities of the situation it is likely 
that such harm will result, in which case the negative consequence outweighs all the 
positive ones. This makes the risk imposition of taking children unable to swim on an 
outing that will involve swimming morally unacceptable, other things being equal. 
 
But now consider a more indeterminate situation, a situation in which the outcome of a 
course of action is highly uncertain, or even completely unknown in advance. The 
teacher still wants to take the children on a trip but is now contemplating to take them 
strawberry picking on a nearby fruit farm. Things could still go horribly wrong: a child 
could wander off and get lost in the surrounding forests, where he could eat a poisonous 
plant or be attacked by a wild animal. But the chance of harm occurring is much 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 71 
smaller, or far less obvious, than in the previous example. This chance is further 
reduced if the teacher takes reasonable safety measures such as asking parents along for 
extra supervision and instructing the children to stay together. The question now is how 
this risk imposition, i.e. the teacher’s decision to take the school class on the strawberry-
picking trip, is evaluated from a utilitarian perspective. How can one determine the 
utility of actions of which the outcomes are uncertain? 
 
I will discuss two ways in which risky actions can be evaluated from a utilitarian 
perspective. The first approach focuses on the consequences that in fact result from a 
risk imposition, whereas the second approach focuses on consequences that might result 
from such an action. A precondition for both forms of utilitarian evaluation is that 
consequences are – or can be – known, assessed, and compared, either after the fact or 
in advance. In the next sections I will discuss these alternative routes, and the problems 
that result from utilitarianism’s dependency on either actual or hypothetical 
consequences. 
3.2 The focus on actual consequences 
A utilitarian focusing on actual outcomes would claim that, in order to know whether 
actions in general are good, and risk impositions specifically are morally justifiable, one 
should look at the way in which they unfold in the world. This utilitarian could even go 
as far as to insist that one has a duty to perform the action that in fact produces the best 
overall outcome (Moore 1912). In the example of the teacher and the outdoor trip, 
taking the children either to the lake or the farm will be good, and the risk imposition 
justified, if the children all return home safely. However, if a death occurs, it would 
have been a bad decision and an unacceptable risk imposition. 
3.2.1 Actual consequences matter 
One cannot deny that actual outcomes do influence the overall appraisal of choices and 
actions. Think of a villain who actually succeeds in murdering someone and one who 
attempts murder but fails. Because they both intended to kill another person, the first as 
well as the second villain will be convicted – a legal reaction – and blamed – a moral 
one. However, the type of conviction and degree of blame is different in both cases. The 
law reflects the general moral attitude that the first villain is more at fault than the 
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second one. The first villain will be sentenced to a heavier punishment, even when the 
second villain could have failed in his attempt only through no ‘fault’ of his own: 
maybe the police showed up in the nick of time, or he tripped, dropped his gun, and 
gave the victim time to get out of harm’s way, or he did shoot but missed. Whatever the 
reason, he somehow failed to kill his victim. This difference is also present in the 
evaluation of risky actions in which no harm was intended in the first place. Bernard 
Williams’ (1981: 28) example of a lorry driver who accidently hits a child that runs onto 
the road can be illuminating in this context. It is a typical case of ‘wrong place, wrong 
time’, for the driver did not have any intention of causing the child harm and he did not 
drive negligently. B. Williams phrases the situation in terms of luck: the fact that the 
driver ran over the child is the product of bad or ill luck. Nevertheless, the unlucky 
driver who hits and kills a child is still considered to be more at fault than the lucky 
driver who happens not to encounter a child or who is able to swerve out of the way. 
3.2.2 Actual consequences escape one’s control 
It then must be acknowledged that the eventual evaluation of decisions and actions is 
influenced by their actual consequences. At the same time, one has to be cautious not to 
let those consequences fully determine one’s evaluation, for such an approach runs into 
several insurmountable difficulties. The first problem for actual outcome utilitarianism 
was touched upon in the above: actual outcomes often escape an agent’s control. The 
second villain fails to murder his victim because the police arrive, and the unlucky 
driver kills a child because it did not look both ways before crossing the street. Actual 
outcome utilitarianism disregards the fact that the ways one’s actions materialise in the 
world are influenced by chance or luck, and the choices and actions of others. 
Luck and the choices of others 
To go back to the example of the teacher and the strawberry-picking trip, consider a 
mother who does not like the teacher and has told her son that whatever the teacher says 
is nonsense. The teacher warns the children never to go beyond the fence around the 
farm, for a river runs alongside it and she knows none of the children can swim. But the 
little boy, having his mother’s words in mind, wanders off, climbs over the fence, falls 
into the river and drowns. According to actual outcome utilitarianism this instance 
makes the overall outcome of the decision to take the children on an outdoor trip a bad 
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one and renders the risk imposition unjustified. To grasp the arbitrariness of actual 
outcome utilitarianism, compare this to the other examples of the lucky and the unlucky 
driver. In the lucky case the risk imposed by driving is justified, for the action resulted 
in an overall positive net balance. In the unlucky case the same risk is unjustified, for 
the overall net balance is negative. 
 
The lack of, or merely partial, control over the actions of others becomes even more 
apparent when one looks at actions embedded in wider contexts. The state of the world 
depends largely on the combined consequences of actions performed by countless 
people, now, in the past, and in the future. Reflecting on this complexity, Charlie 
Dunbar Broad (1914: 313) argues that: “since the rightness of your action is at mercy of 
all that is going to happen in the universe throughout all future time, there is no reason 
to expect better results from conscientious acts than from the most stupid and biased 
ones”. This statement might not acknowledge the effects informed decisions can have 
on the state of the world, but it does illuminate the overly demanding stance actual 
outcome utilitarianism takes when it makes the rightness of an action completely 
dependent on the actual outcomes of that action.20 The bottom line is that one does 
never, or can never, know all the possible outcomes of an action. 
 
To evaluate risky actions based on actual outcomes, without acknowledging the 
influence of luck and the lack of control over the actions of others, is then wrong for 
three reasons. The arbitrariness of the approach firstly leads to unfair judgements of 
agents and their actions. Secondly, it extends personal responsibility to apply to 
consequences over which one has no control, which renders it an unintelligible concept. 
Thirdly, it leads to a society of extremists: daredevils and opportunists who take every 
risk in the hope they turn out to be justified, and unassertive, overly principled or 
cowardly people avoiding all risks for the fear of being blamed. 
Responsibility and blameworthiness for actual outcomes 
But do actual consequences escape an agent’s control in such a way that she cannot be 
                                                
20 Rachels and Rachels (2010: 162) point out that utilitarianism in general is demanding because it 
demands agents to always do what has the best overall consequences for everyone concerned. For 
example, one should give away one’s money until the point at which further generosity would be more 
harmful to oneself than it would be helpful to others. Most people are reluctant to fulfil this demand 
because it prevents them from living normal everyday lives. 
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considered responsible or to blame at all? An element of control is generally seen as a 
precondition for responsibility and blameworthiness. If an agent has no control over the 
action she performs or the way they develop into outcomes, she cannot be ascribed 
responsibility or be appropriately blamed for her actions or their outcomes. I argue that 
luck and the choices others make do not annihilate an agent’s control over an uncertain 
situation. The teacher still decides how, or to what extent, she cares for the children 
under her supervision. She can take precautions or make less risky decisions. A driver 
still makes decisions about driving in the first place, what car to drive and how to drive 
it. Because agents retain elements of control over their decisions and actions, they also 
retain part of the responsibility – and blameworthiness – for their outcomes. 
 
I am also convinced that agents have a choice when it comes to responding to the actual 
outcomes of their actions, even if these outcomes escape their control. If the teacher or 
the driver shrugs off the death of a child with a simple ‘I couldn’t help it’, ‘I did what 
was within my power’ or ‘better luck next time’, that would be considered an obtuse, 
inappropriate, even morally wrong reaction – which in itself can be blameworthy. It is 
equally inappropriate if the teacher and the driver would praise themselves for ‘saving a 
child’ if no harm occurred. The lucky teacher and driver are recipients of luck just as the 
unlucky teacher and driver are victims of bad luck. Susan Wolf (1990) introduces a 
distinction that is helpful here. She differentiates external from internal praise and 
blame, and argues that from an external point of view, i.e. others blaming the teacher or 
driver, no distinction can be made between the lucky and unlucky ones. But from an 
internal point of view, i.e. the teacher or driver blaming herself or himself, the lucky and 
unlucky ones should judge themselves differently: even though outsiders cannot rightly 
blame unlucky agents, they should blame themselves. This self-blame can be expressed 
in the form of remorse, regret, or the wish that things had turned out differently.21 
 
In Chapter 8 I will return to the question as to what constitutes a morally appropriate 
response in unfortunate cases. Here it suffices to state that agents to some extent have 
control over the outcomes of their actions, as well as their reaction or attitude to those 
outcomes, and can be judged and held responsible accordingly. The evaluation of their 
actions should be susceptive to this and not be solely determined by actual outcomes. 
                                                
21 For a more detailed elaboration on regret and actual outcomes of risky actions, see Dickenson 2003: 59 
– 64, and Fried 2012a: 243 – 244. 
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3.2.3 Comparing consequences 
The second problem for a utilitarian evaluation based on actual outcomes is how to 
determine whether an action has the best overall net balance of outcomes, or in other 
words leads to the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people. To know 
this, one must not only scrutinise the consequences of the action under consideration, 
but also compare those to the outcomes alternative courses of actions would have had if 
they had been performed. It is difficult – if not impossible – to evaluate whether the 
action that is performed is preferable to other actions that could have been performed. 
For one has to then compare the realised consequences of a performed action to the 
realised consequences of other actions that were not performed. But as Hansson (2013: 
24), following Marcus Singer (1977, 1982), points out: “unrealized [sic] alternatives 
have no actual consequences”, making it impossible to evaluate them according to 
actual criteria. A logical alternative would be to compare the actual outcomes of 
performed actions to counterfactual outcomes of unperformed actions, i.e. the outcomes 
that would, could, or might have come about if the considered alternative actions were 
carried out. However, this seems to be an unfair comparison. The description of 
consequences of unperformed actions is always incomplete: one can never be as certain 
about the particularities of counterfactual outcomes as one is about actual outcomes. A 
counterfactual assessment then remains “vague and uncertain” (Hansson 2013: 25), 
which makes it an unsteady basis for moral evaluation. 
3.2.4 Cold comfort of hindsight 
The last difficulty for actual outcome utilitarianism is that it provides us with hindsight 
as the sole basis for evaluating risk impositions. Now firstly: when has an action ever 
reached an end-point, at which all its consequences have materialised and one can truly 
look back and judge an action in hindsight? The Chinese politician Zhou Enlai (Enlai in 
McGregor 2011) is sometimes – mistakenly, but expressively – quoted to have said that 
“It is too early to say” what the impacts of the French Revolution are. But apart from 
hindsight being epistemologically problematic, it is also practically impossible. Only 
under conditions of strict determinism would one be able to know the actual outcomes 
of possible courses of action before acting, and use hindsight as an evaluation method in 
the present. But the future state of the world is not set in stone. There is a deterministic 
element to the state of the world, for it could, and would have been, different if things 
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had gone differently in the past. However, the fact that they could have gone differently 
already indicates indeterminism. Also, how things are in the present influences – but not 
determines – how things will be in the future. There will always be an element of 
uncertainty and a need to make choices. Moreover, if the world were determined free 
will would not exist and ethical reasoning would be unnecessary.22 It would not make 
sense to speak of the evaluation of actions, of right and wrong choices, of acceptability 
or justifiability of risk impositions, or of risk at all. There is no place for moral language 
or talk of uncertainty in a determined world. An undetermined world is then a necessary 
precondition for a discussion about the evaluation of risk impositions. The outcomes of 
most events are not determined, and one does not know in advance what the actual 
consequences of one’s actions will be. As Peter Bernstein (1998: 229) remarks: 
“Uncertainty makes us free”. But it also calls for moral judgements and decisions, and 
for ethical guidelines that help one make justifiable choices under uncertainty and risk. 
 
In an undetermined world, hindsight as a method for moral evaluation is especially 
useless when outcomes are very uncertain or completely unknown. Consider a 
government deciding whether to spend part of its defence budget on researching alien 
life and preparing for an attack from outer space. Recognised scientists, such as Stephen 
Hawkings (BBC News 2010), have claimed that it is perfectly rational to assume that 
intelligent life exists elsewhere in the universe, and that it might very well not be 
friendly, perhaps even violent, to human life. Following a utilitarian approach based on 
actual outcomes provides no action guidance whatsoever for the government. It must 
randomly choose a course of action – to invest or not to invest in extra-terrestrial 
research and defence – rendering the evaluation of its decision utterly arbitrary. 
 
Judith Jarvis Thomson (1986: 185) states that “[w]e do not think that the permissibility 
of acting under uncertainty is to be settled only later, when uncertainty has yielded to 
certainty”. Clearly the acceptability of a risk imposition cannot depend merely on 
whether it materialises into harm. By relying on hindsight as an action-guiding principle 
one is left without guidance, for one does not have the luxury of looking back at the 
time of decision-making. Actual outcome utilitarianism therefore fails to live up to the 
                                                
22 The compatibilism vs. incompatibilism debate is about whether free will can exist in a determined 
setting. I do not enter this debate, as I personally do not see world as determined. Moreover, free will or 
the ability to choose is consistent with and necessary for moral responsibility. 
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fundamental task of any moral theory, which is to guide human actions in a consistent 
way. As Barbara Fried (2012a: 243) states: “a moral theory that cannot judge whether 
actions are wrongful until they are completed is not a theory of action at all”. Especially 
in a context of risk and uncertainty retrospective tools to evaluate a decision or action 
are hopelessly insufficient. Under those conditions one is very much in need of 
principles to guide actions and justify decisions before their outcomes are known. 
3.2.5 Writing it off 
It can now be concluded that utilitarianism based on actual outcomes does not provide a 
satisfactory account of the evaluation of risk impositions. Firstly, it does not take into 
account the extent to which actual outcomes are influenced by luck and the behaviour of 
others. To base the moral appraisal of risk impositions on actual consequences would 
therefore be unfair to agents, it would incomprehensibly enlarge their responsibility, and 
it would result in a society of extreme risk takers and risk avoiders. Secondly, such an 
evaluation cannot be applied because it is impossible to compare the actual outcomes of 
performed actions with the actual outcomes of unperformed actions. To compare actual 
outcomes of performed actions with counterfactual outcomes of unperformed actions 
misses the point of a utilitarianism based on actual outcomes. And thirdly, this form of 
utilitarianism provides hindsight as the only action-guiding principle, which performs 
badly under conditions of risk and uncertainty. 
3.3 The focus on hypothetical outcomes 
An obvious solution to the problems mentioned above is to switch the focus from actual 
to hypothetical outcomes, i.e. outcomes that might result from an action. This is a 
powerful alternative to hindsight, and a promising guide for acting and decision-making 
in contexts of risk and uncertainty. This switch, namely, liberates one from the overly 
limiting focus on actual consequences and enables one to evaluate a risk imposition at 
the time when the decision is made to perform the action, so before its outcomes have 
materialised. 
 
Hypothetical consequences can be merely possible outcomes that could result from an 
action. But in this variant of utilitarianism the focus is on consequences that are 
expected to result from an action, outcomes that are probable. An evaluation based on 
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probable outcomes requires an active stance. An agent cannot excuse himself by saying 
that he thinks a certain course of action will be beneficial: he needs to make a conscious 
effort to find out how probable that benefit will be. In other words, the outcomes of his 
actions must not only be likely, they must be probable (Dickenson 2003). A utilitarian 
adhering to this line of thought could claim that one has a duty to perform the action 
that will most probably result in the best overall outcome (Prior 1956). A risk 
imposition can then be permissible if that action has the highest probability of leading to 
the best overall net balance of consequences compared to its alternatives. This reasoning 
feeds into the idea that “individuals can justifiably be inflicted with ever greater levels 
of risk in conjunction with increasing gains” (Schroeder 1986: 508). 
 
In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the advantages of, and difficulties for, the 
most well-known interpretation of hypothetical outcomes utilitarianism: expected utility 
maximisation (EUM). According to this approach an action is right or desirable if it is 
expected to yield the highest utility compared to other actions. This involves weighing 
the combination of advantageous and disadvantageous consequences of one alternative 
against the combination of other alternatives. This utilitarian perspective is the most 
commonly used approach to risk: it is the standard rule used in theoretical models of 
decision-making under uncertainty and risk such as cost-benefit analysis and 
probabilistic risk analysis. 
3.3.1 Imposing a risk to maximise expected utility 
The utility or disutility of outcomes can be measured in different categories. Bentham 
(1970) identifies seven categories, namely, certainty or uncertainty, intensity, duration, 
extent or scope, propinquity, fecundity, and purity. To arrive at an estimate of the 
expected utility of a considered course of action, one has to calculate the utility of each 
possible outcome. One does so by multiplying the measure of (un)certainty, i.e. the 
probability, with the other measurements. I find Bentham’s last three categories – of 
propinquity, fecundity, and purity – quite vague. The other three seem to make more 
sense: intensity refers to how strong (good or bad) the effects of the action are; scope 
refers to who or what is, directly or indirectly, affected by the action; and duration refers 
to how long each outcome is in effect. I then arrive at the following calculations: 
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Possible outcome A: utility (intensity + scope + duration) x probability 
Possible outcome B: utility x probability  




Figure 2: Calculation of the total expected utility of an action. 
 
EUM requires one to choose the course of action with the highest expected utility. A 
risk-imposing action is then justified – or even required – if the possible benefits 
associated with it outweigh the possible harms in terms of their utility and probability. 
Returning to the example of the teacher and the outdoor trip, she can use the criterion of 
EUM to make her decision. She has to start by determining the alternative courses of 
action: taking the children to the lake, taking them to the strawberry farm, or staying in 
the classroom. She then forecasts the possible outcomes of each alternative: for 
decision-making purposes, she narrows them down to the children all returning home 
safely, and the occurrence of the death of one child. She then assigns a numerical value 
to the utility or disutility (a number representing intensity, scope, and duration 
combined) as well as to the probability of each possible outcome of each alternative 










Lake trip All home safely 




























Table 2: Expected (dis)utility calculations of teacher’s alternatives. 
Let us assume that, as shown in Table 2, the teacher assigns a utility of 95 to the 
outcome that all children return home safely after either a trip to the lake or to the 
strawberry farm. She bases this number on the prospect that the children will learn 
much and enjoy themselves, but also on the consideration that some children might get 
homesick or sustain minor injuries. When she opts for staying in the classroom, the 
outcome that the children return home to their parents safely she assigns a utility of 75, 
                                                
23  The numerical values used in this example are complete guesses. Whether these numbers truly 
represent the utility and probability of choice alternatives is beside the point: the example is merely meant 
to show how utilitarian calculation can function in practical decision-making situations. 
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seeing that the learning and enjoyment curve of the children will be smaller than if she 
would have taken them on a trip. The outcome of the occurrence of one death as a result 
of any of these activities she assigns a disutility value of 100, assuming that nothing 
good will result from the death. Now with respect to the probabilities she forecasts that 
the occurrence of a death will be very probable in the lake trip case, improbable in the 
farm trip case, and extremely improbable in the case of staying in the classroom. This 
means that the corresponding alternative outcome of all the children returning home 
safely is very improbable in the lake trip case, very probable in the farm trip case, and 
almost certain in the case of staying in the classroom. Now she can calculate the 
expected utility of each alternative by first multiplying utility times probability for the 
positive outcomes (UxP), then multiplying disutility times probability for the negative 
outcomes (DxP), and finally subtracting the latter from the former ((UxP)-(DxP)). The 
lake trip ends with an expected disutility of 8050, a trip to the farm with an expected 
utility of 8525, and staying in the classroom with an expected utility of 7325. She can 
now base her decision on a comparison between these numbers. According to the rule of 
maximising expected utility she should take the children to the strawberry farm.24 
 
The EUM approach seems to provide a clear, simple, and intuitively appealing principle 
for evaluating risk impositions. However, as I will discuss in the following paragraphs, 
it is not without complications. The approach completely depends on the ability to 
predict possible consequences of one’s actions beforehand, and to ascribe probability 
estimates to those consequences: both of these can prove to be impossible. Also, the 
approach can oversimplify and dehumanise the process of determining utilities. 
3.3.2 Problems with probabilities 
The practical problem with the EUM approach is that moments of decision-making are 
normally much more complex than clear-cut expressions of probabilities have one 
believe. To precisely determine the probability that a considered course of action will 
result in a certain outcome, one needs to know the whole range of possible outcomes an 
action might have. But how can one be sure that one has taken into account this full 
range of possible consequences, or that one has calculated their intensity, scope, and 
                                                
24 If they cannot go to the strawberry farm (it for example might not accommodate group visits), and she 
has to choose between the lake trip and staying in the classroom, she should obviously opt for the latter. 
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duration properly? Determining precise probabilities then requires an enormous amount 
of information about alternatives and their outcomes, rendering it extremely difficult if 
not impossible (Binmore 2008; Bennis, Medin & Bartels 2010; Gigerenzer 2010; 
Fleischhut 2012; Hansson 2008, 2013: 26). If one treats real-life choices and actions as 
possessing determinate outcomes and properties to which one can assign probabilities, 
one in fact subjectively simplifies complex uncertainty. 
 
According to John Harsanyi (1975) most individuals who are uncertain about 
probabilities of harm – or levels of risk – consider two decision-making options as 
reasonable. One could assign equal probabilities to all possible outcomes, or one could 
rely on the subjective probability estimates of experts. However, the arbitrariness of the 
first option makes it a rather unhelpful candidate for responsible decision-making. 
Moreover, experts are sometimes notoriously overconfident in ruling out or minimising 
the probability of negative outcomes or serious accidents resulting from risky actions 
(Shrader-Frechette 2010). So far, EUM seems to provide an overly simplistic, 
subjective, or even arbitrary evaluation of risk impositions. 
Unforeseen and unforeseeable consequences 
Decisions and actions can also have unforeseen or even unforeseeable outcomes. 
Consider laboratory experiments that test new treatments, drugs or technologies, or 
social experiments that investigate the more widespread effects of technological 
applications or policy interventions. In many of these experiments, complete or 
statistical information about risks and benefits is not at hand. There might be some 
knowledge about possible effects of an experiment, but it is impossible to characterise 
all the risky scenarios that might result from it. Because of this uncertainty or even 
ignorance about possible effects, unforeseen or even unforeseeable outcomes might 
result from conducting such research. In the case of testing a new drug or technology it 
is difficult to identify all risks because of the novelty of the subject matter. In the case 
of social experiments, the difficulty with identifying risks lies in fact that they are 
conducted in a more uncontrolled setting and involve many more human subjects than 
standard laboratory experiments. The uncertainty is even greater when clinical research 
is combined with social research and novel technologies are tested in the form of social 
experiments, such as nuclear waste management, the use of Google glasses, or 
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implementation of geo-engineering techniques. 
 
Even if possibilities can potentially be foreseen, it does not mean that they will be. 
Human history proves that people often are oblivious to the possibility of harmful 
consequences of their decisions and actions. The 9/11 attacks of 2001 are an example of 
unforeseen, but arguably foreseeable, effects resulting from concatenations of causes 
and effects that are explainable in hindsight. In general, people were not aware that 
providing military training to Al Qaida, in combination with the lack of enforcement of 
airspace security, could contribute to an attack on the World Trade Centre. In hindsight, 
this can be considered short-sightedness, or a failure to notice, and can be explained by 
the previously mentioned ‘What You See Is All There Is’ mental bias explained by 
Kahneman (2011). His theory states that when the human mind makes decisions it tends 
to focus obsessively on phenomena it has encountered before. It therefore disregards 
phenomena about which it does not have any or incomplete information, and is 
completely blind to the possibility of phenomena it does not know. When people form a 
hypothesis about the world, they focus on things they know and neglect the possibility 
of things they do not know (ibid.). The formation of such hypotheses is enforced by the 
confirmation bias as introduced by risk analyst Nassim Taleb (2007): the mind looks for 
confirmation of the things it understands and knows, and tends to forget or ignore the 
unknown. Attempts to forecast possible outcomes of considered actions are then 
opposed and impeded by the tendency of the human mind to primarily focus on 
available knowledge, and seek for confirmation thereof. Most people did not even 
consider a hijacked airplane crashing into the centre of New York City as a possible 
event before it happened. But after it happened and entered the general consciousness as 
an observed phenomenon, underestimation turned into an obsessive focus on that 
possibility realising again (ibid.). The idea that terrorism forms a threat to the nation 
state resulted in the War on Terror, even though the risk an average American citizen 
runs of being a victim of a terrorist attack is much smaller than the risk of freezing to 
death or dying by falling down a flight of stairs (Calabresi 2015). 
 
If one is unable, or fails, to identify possible harmful outcomes, one cannot ascribe 
probability estimates to those outcomes. Also, the fact that the list of consequences is, 
or might be, incomplete, affects the exactness of the probability estimates of the 
possible outcomes that are identified. This lack or incompleteness of probability 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 83 
estimates hampers the ability to forecast which course of action will yield the greatest 
overall utility. Depending on the EUM principle without acknowledging such epistemic 
uncertainty then results in actual uncertainty about what should be done in a particular 
situation (Sollie 2009; Fleishhut 2012). 
The importance of the improbable 
Even when it is possible to fairly accurately estimate the probability of a negative 
outcome occurring, it is not always what motivates agents’ decisions and actions with 
regard to that outcome. Consider the building of a nuclear power plant and the risk of an 
accident. Due to high safety levels, there is a low statistical expectancy of harms, i.e. 
diseases, deformations, or deaths due to an exposure to radiation poisoning. Moreover, 
there is a high statistical expectancy of benefits, i.e. cheaper and more widely available 
energy (Goldemberg 2009). From the perspective of EUM the decision to build the 
power plant is easily made. In reality, however, such decisions are not that simple, and 
are often characterised by cautiousness and risk averseness. As Hansson (2013: 26) 
remarks: “the avoidance of very large catastrophes, such as a nuclear accident costing 
thousands of lives, is often given a higher priority than what is warranted by the 
statistically expected number of deaths”. EUM cannot morally justify why one in such 
cases attaches more weight to improbable negative outcomes than to probable positive 
outcomes. In fact, if building the power plant maximises expected utility compared to 
not building it, the building is not only justified but also morally obligatory: cautious or 
risk averse decision-making is then morally impermissible. From a perspective of EUM, 
a significantly low probability of a negative outcome can invalidate the disutility of that 
outcome, regardless of the scope, duration or intensity of the possible harm. However, 
these factors can remain to influence one’s moral attitudes, irrespective of their 
probability. The fact that the EUM approach completely disregards other considerations 
once they become improbable is problematic: it indicates that it does not acknowledge 
the importance of the improbable, and therefore renders the approach incomplete. 
3.3.3 Problems with utilities 
The EUM approach also encounters difficulties when determining utilities needed for 
the calculation of expected utility. In the previous paragraphs, I already mentioned the 
technical problem of determining utilities, in the sense that uncertainty about possible 
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consequences of actions also complicates the calculation of their intensity, scope, and 
duration. But there are also problems relating to the impartial and impersonal character 
of the EUM approach and utilitarianism in general. For utilitarianism is an impartial 
normative theory: it considers all individuals as equal and promotes their aggregate 
wellbeing. If one follows the objective principle of maximising overall utility one needs 
to be able to decide what would be the best overall outcome for everybody, or at least 
the largest group of people. This means that individual advantages and disadvantages 
have to be aggregated to reflect collective wellbeing. But when one understands such an 
objective, impartial, and impersonal principle to apply to, and govern, interpersonal 
morality, one, in the words of Thomas Nagel (1970: 134), “fails to take seriously the 
distinction between persons. It [the principle] treats the desires, needs, satisfactions, and 
dissatisfactions of distinct persons as if they were the desires, etc., of a mass person”. 
From the perspective of EUM the values of probable utilities, i.e. benefits, and of 
probable disutilities, i.e. harms, are agent-neutral: they are independent from, and 
unrelated to, individuals, and can seamlessly be transferred from one person to another 
(Parfit 1984: 27; Nagel 1986: 164–185; Hansson 2003: 295–297).  
 
With regard to risk-imposing actions, then, the EUM approach turns a blind eye to who 
imposes the risk and who is affected by it, and how benefits and harms resulting from 
risk impositions are divided between these distinct agents. What counts in the 
evaluation of risk impositions according to the EUM principle, are overall beneficial 
and overall harmful outcomes. This however is at odds with moral reality, for when one 
evaluates specific instances of risk people tend to feel more strongly about harms and 
dangers that threaten their own livelihood, that of others close to them, and things they 
feel strongly about. To force people to adopt the perspective of the impersonal and 
agent-neutral ‘mass person’ is to blur their moral vision, and deny them their personal 
and agent-centric perspective that necessarily influences their judgement of actions, 
outcomes, and values. There is no obvious place for such humane partiality in 
utilitarianism. Also, differences between persons and the distribution of harms and 
benefits do matter. I turn to these latter problems in the next two sections. 
Differences in perception and experience of risk 
There are large differences between individuals with regard to their attitude towards 
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risk: some love taking risks and seek adventure, others are more risk averse and 
cautious. The EUM principle does not accommodate into its evaluation of risky actions 
the influence of personal differences on decisions made under uncertainty. Consider the 
following situation: Bongani, who suffers from severe arachnophobia, finds a spider in 
his house. He believes it to be a button spider, the neurotoxic venom of which is 
extremely dangerous, especially to small children. As Bongani is completely overtaken 
by his deep-seated fear of spiders his daughter, still a baby, crawls in the direction of the 
spider. Assuming that Bongani is responsible for the wellbeing of his daughter and that 
he knows button spider venom to be potentially fatal to children, he imposes a risk on 
her by not managing the risk properly and taking her out of harm’s way. It might turn 
out that it is not a button spider after all, the spider may scurry out of sight, or the baby 
may crawl the other way, but the particularities of the current situation make it an 
extremely risky one for the baby. Also, even if Bongani would be bitten while trying to 
save his child, the risk he runs as an adult of suffering severe complications or even 
death is much lower. However, his phobic condition makes him perceive and 
experience the risks involved differently from objective statistics: he thinks he will die 
if bitten. 
 
The EUM approach can accommodate Bongani’s phobia by weighing the disutility of 
his experience of extreme fear, or the disutility of his death, against the disutility of the 
baby suffering injuries or dying. But whatever is included in the calculation, from the 
perspective of EUM Bongani will fairly straightforwardly be allocated the duty to 
protect his child, and the risk he imposes on her by not doing anything is an 
unacceptable one. If from an objective or eagle eye perspective a certain course of 
action is expected to yield the highest possible utility, one has to see it through, even if 
there are small or unlikely risks involved and even if one has a risk averse personality. 
EUM then “fails to respect the distinctiveness of people's responses to risks” (Teuber 
1990: 247). Even though people should commit themselves to not letting their lives be 
dominated by irrational fears and beliefs, they should also not be expected to neglect 
their emotions and experiences. There is something wrong about the way in which the 
EUM approach disregards reasons and deliberations that are specific, relative, and 
unique to distinct agents, and the influence of personality traits on their identification 
and assessment of risks. 
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On a social level, there are also differences in risk perception. South African Bongani 
might be afraid of spiders, but members of the Piaroa community in Venezuela hunt, 
fry, and eat goliath tarantula spiders. Piaroa Indians surely know that hunting goliath 
tarantulas involves certain risks, but their assessment of these risks differs wildly from 
people outside their community. One’s personal and cultural make-up then seems to 
influence one’s perception of the world and the chances and dangers in it. Sociological 
and psychological research confirms that cultural and subjective differences influence 
the identification and experience of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Otway & Thomas 
1982; Otway & Von Winterfeldt 1982; Slovic et al. 1982; Bradbury 1989; Slovic 1999). 
 
The reality of individual and group-specific risk perception contributes to debunking the 
dominant objective-scientific understanding of risks as either facts or personal illusions. 
It also complicates the possibility of evaluating risky actions according to the impartial 
criterion of maximising expected utility. It shows, namely, that there is not one 
objective, impersonal, or ‘right’ perspective from which to evaluate risky actions and to 
judge whether they will maximise overall utility. Every appraisal is done from a specific 
standpoint, and this should be acknowledged by an ethics of risk aimed at guiding 
decision-making under risk and uncertainty. 
 
What should also be accounted for is that in practical instances of decision-making 
people are often not capable of understanding the statistical information needed for the 
precise calculation of expected utility. The possibility of objectively and precisely 
calculating probabilities and utilities has already been questioned, but when people start 
assigning subjective estimates when decisions need to be made, expected utility 
calculations tend to become even more arbitrary. The EUM approach then depends too 
heavily on the assumption that people are calculative and rational decision-makers, 
which, as I pointed out in Chapter 2, they are often not. Psychological studies show that 
individuals differ in their sensitivity to uncertainty and missing information, and their 
ability to understand, formulate, and engage with probability estimates (Natalier & 
Wilson 2008; Kahneman 2011; Fleischhut 2012). For example, Jens Zinn (2008: 443) 
points out that smokers, confronted with the probabilistic fact that half of all smokers 
die from lung-related diseases, “can exploit this uncertainty to argue that they are in the 
‘safe half’ because of special personal characteristics such as being a ‘careful person’, 
having ‘good genes’ or ‘living a balanced life’”. Normal people do not always – and 
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some do not ever – calculate the possibilities of future harm, nor weigh up costs and 
benefits of different alternatives. Truly maximising overall utility might then be an 
overly ambitious goal for the layman, or the individual human mind. 
Permitting unfairness 
Because the EUM approach promotes overall wellbeing, the wellbeing of a collective 
‘mass person’, it is insensitive to where the potential benefits and burdens of risky 
actions accumulate. It can therefore justify exposing one person or group of people to 
the possibility of harm by referring to a) a larger possibility of benefit or advantage for 
someone else or another group of people, or b) the prevention of a lesser risk to a larger 
group of people. For example: risks of anthropogenic climate change have for a long 
time been justified in a utilitarian fashion by referring to large benefits in terms of 
progress, wealth, and power associated with industrialisation and the emission of carbon 
dioxide. This justification is insensitive to the fact that only a small and already 
developed part of the world’s population continues to reap the benefits, while the risks 
are systematically imposed on a significantly larger, and more vulnerable, group. If the 
benefits resulting from a risky action are expected to be greater than the potential harms, 
the EUM perspective justifies the exposure of some to risk for the benefit of others.25 
Such justifications however contradict moral intuitions concerning interpersonal 
fairness, and culminate in what Madeleine Hayenhjelm and Jonathan Wolff (2011: e37) 
call “the problem of ‘permitted unfairness’” for consequentialist theories. 
 
Since climate change is a complex and controversial topic, consider the following 
simplified situation to make the problem of permitted unfairness more tangible. A 
tunnel is being constructed through a mountainous area. The vibrations of the drilling 
project have caused rocks on the slope of one mountain to shift in such a way that a 
rock avalanche is imminent. There is one mountaineer in the area who is experienced 
enough to hike up and secure the rocks with a safety net. But once he has put the net in 
place he will have blocked off the safe way back down. He then has to descend via an 
                                                
25 This attempt at justification had some argumentative force when benefits of industrialisation were 
reaped in the present but harms remained merely probable, i.e. risks. Now that the risks of carbon dioxide 
emissions and connected changes in the world’s climate systems become reality, it becomes less 
convincing. Moreover, some climate experts even claim that the future harms of climate change will 
eventually completely reverse the current benefits gained from industrialisation. As such the disutility 
expected to result from the emission of carbon dioxide outweighs its expected utility. 
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extremely dangerous route: 90 percent of the people who have taken this route have 
died. The alternative is to do nothing, which will not put the mountaineer at any specific 
risk but expose the 10 inhabitants of a village at the bottom of the mountain to a 0.9 
percent chance of being killed by the rock avalanche. The table below shows the 
calculations of the expected disutility of both options, with (M) standing for the 
mountaineer, and (I) for the inhabitants of the village. The probability that the 
inhabitants will live if the mountaineer secures the net, as well as the probability that the 
mountaineer will live if he does not go up the mountain, are both estimated at 95 
percent: this incorporates the chance that even in those cases the inhabitants and the 
































Table 3: Expected utility calculations of mountaineer’s alternatives. 
Seeing that the expected utility of the first option (i.e. mountaineer secures net) 
outweighs that of the second option (i.e. mountaineer does not secure net), the EUM 
approach demands that the mountaineer has to venture up the mountain to secure the 
safety net. To maximise expected utility, one person must be exposed to an extremely 
high risk of death in order to shield 10 people from a significantly smaller risk of death. 
The problem of permitted unfairness becomes even more apparent if the probability of 
the inhabitants being killed by a rock avalanche in the second option is reduced, or the 
probability of the mountaineer dying on the dangerous route in the first option is 
increased. Even if those chances are extremely low or extremely high respectively, the 
expected utility of the second option will still be lower than that of the first option, 
merely because of the difference in the number of people benefitting from the 
alternatives.26 
 
                                                
26 James Lenman (2008) makes the interesting point that utilitarianism provides no guidance when the 
expected utility of alternative courses of action is the same: it cannot explain the difference between 
killing 20 people out of 20 million, or imposing a risk of 1 in 1 million on 20 million people. 
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The utilitarian calculus, characterised by a strict disregard for individuals or minorities, 
holds that one life is worth less than the lives of ten people combined. But this does not 
sit well with general moral attitudes, which are far less cost-benefit orientated than the 
simple EUM principle presents them, and which require that people be treated and 
respected as individuals. As J. E. J. Altham (1984: 23) points out, it might be perfectly 
fine if an individual chooses to run a risk, but it is wrong to choose for someone else 
that he or she should run it. The mountaineer might then freely and voluntarily choose 
to go up and secure the net, but it would be wrong to force him to do so. Permitting 
unfairness on the basis of numbers then “reflects a serious and ineradicable flaw in 
utilitarian-based legislation theories. None of these theories adequately addresses a 
major anxiety of modern society: the fear that each individual inevitably will be 
overborne by society's pursuit of collective goals” (Schroeder 1986: 507). 
3.3.4 Why EUM does not work 
I conclude that the maximisation of expected utility does not provide a satisfactory 
account of the evaluation of risk impositions. Often the two conditions on which it rests, 
probability estimates and utility determinations, prove impossible to formulate. Firstly, 
the ever-present possibility of unforeseen or unforeseeable consequences increases the 
level of uncertainty about probabilities, which are indispensable for a proper calculation 
of expected utility. Secondly, improbable but very undesirable outcomes sometimes 
determine the overall evaluation of risk-imposing actions. Thirdly, the impartial and 
impersonal goal of maximising overall wellbeing does not account for the distinction 
between persons. There can be vast differences between individual and social 
perceptions and experiences of risk. And fourthly, understanding persons as impersonal 
bearers of want and needs allows unfair actions that expose some to risk for the benefit 
of others. This disregards other moral considerations such as individual rights and 
fairness as weighty influences on the evaluation of risk impositions. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The question guiding this chapter was: Does utilitarianism provide a convincing 
evaluation of risk impositions? I discussed that utilitarian ethics runs into significant 
problems when applying its rules and principles to situations of risk and uncertainty, 
and therefore it cannot provide a complete account of the appraisal of actions involving 
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risk to others. But even though a utilitarian perspective on risk is not unproblematic, its 
core principle of determining the moral status of an action by reference to its 
consequences should not be completely disregarded. To do so would be to throw the 
baby out with the bathwater, because consequences, as well as their probabilities, do 
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4. THE DEONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
4.1 Introduction 
The most fundamental problem of a utilitarian evaluation of risk impositions is that it 
straightforwardly allows, or even commands, imposing risks on an individual (or a 
group of people) if such impositions have large enough possible returns for another 
individual (or society as a whole). By calculating potential costs and benefits according 
to an aggregative procedure across individuals, utilitarianism fails to take into account 
the separateness of persons. The search therefore continues for an answer to the second 
research question: Do mainstream ethical theories provide a convincing evaluation of 
risk impositions? In this chapter, as well as the following two chapters, I approach this 
question from the perspective of normative theories that aim to protect individuals 
against such disadvantages: deontological ethics, rights-based – or libertarian – ethics27, 
and contractualist ethics. These ethics are based on the conviction that human beings 
have inherent value. Any action or decision should then respect human beings as 
persons, and cannot – and should not – merely be justified by reference to their actual or 
hypothetical outcomes, however useful, beneficial, advantageous or even morally 
required those outcomes may be. In contrast to utilitarian and other consequentialist 
theories, which are teleological in their orientation, deontological, rights-based, and 
contractual theories specifically refrain from letting their moral appraisal depend on 
outcomes, and can therefore be considered non-consequentialist theories (Fried 2012a). 
In this chapter I focus specifically on deontology, and the central question in this 
chapter is then: Does deontology provide a convincing evaluation of risk impositions? 
 
Just like utilitarian ethics, deontological ethics focuses on the rightness of actions. Both 
types of ethics ask the question: ‘How should I act?’ instead of the virtue-ethical 
question: ‘What kind of person should I be?’ (Roeser 2012). But where utilitarianism 
understands the rightness of actions in terms of the goodness of their consequences, 
deontology sharply diverges from this idea by stating that some acts are just not right, 
like lying, stealing or killing, however preferable, beneficial, or useful their 
                                                
27  Deontological and rights-based theories approach the principle of respect for persons from the 
perspective of duties and rights respectively. Even though many duties have corresponding rights, I 
discuss them separately. As will become clear later on, a deontological approach to the acceptability of 
risk impositions highlights different important aspects and runs into different problems compared to a 
rights-based approach. 
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consequences. The rightness of an action depends on its adherence to and strict 
observance of moral rules. Deon means duty in Greek, and the action-guiding principles 
deontological theories provide come in the form of duties, obligations, strict 
prohibitions, and authoritative requirements. 
 
The 18th century philosopher Immanuel Kant is seen as the intellectual father of this 
branch of normative thinking. He argues that one should have a rational conviction and 
dedication to fulfil one’s duty for the sake of fulfilling one’s duty alone, regardless of 
the produced consequences (Hallgarth 1998). By stressing formal adherence to rational 
moral rules, Kant (1996) uncouples morality from consequences and grounds it in 
human motivation, intention, or what he called the ‘good will’. What matters is not that 
an act leads to good outcomes, but that it is performed with good will and the right 
intention, i.e. that it is in accordance with moral duty. This tends to make deontology a 
less practically tangible theory than utilitarianism, which leads Terje Aven (2007: 304) 
to describe utilitarianism as ‘an ethics of consequences’ and deontology as ‘an ethics of 
the mind’. There are many ways in which Kant’s purely rational theory of duty diverges 
from intuitions, but deontological thinking in general does capture how people 
intuitively think about moral issues. For example, most people find it wrong to cause 
harm or to break promises, and deem it right to help others and treat them with respect: 
these are intuitively understood moral rules. For most people then, it is not only the 
outcome that counts when evaluating an action: they also incorporate deontological 
assessments of intentions with which they are performed and their adherence to 
intuitively endorsed moral rules. Kant rationalises intuition and argues that it is one’s 
duty to adhere to these rules: if one rationally explores how to act, one cannot come to 
any other conclusion than to follow these rules. Deontology then is rule ethics: it 
considers an action right or wrong depending on its adherence to rational moral rules. 
 
Kant argues that there are different kinds of duties. There are conditional duties, which 
are dependent on situational or personal factors and come in the form of ‘if X, then do 
Y’. For example, ‘if you want to lose weight, then follow a low-carbohydrate diet’. 
These are mostly positive duties that urge one to actively do something, and the strength 
of such demands is context-dependent: it would not make sense to claim that it is 
obligatory for any person in any place at any time to follow a low-carbohydrate diet for 
example. Positive obligations are then hypothetical in the sense that they are optional, 
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and Kant therefore calls them imperfect duties. There are also perfect duties or, in 
Kantian terms, categorical imperatives. These duties come in the form ‘do Y’, meaning 
that they are absolute, unconditional, and should be adhered to at all times. These are 
mostly negative duties, such as prohibitions against harming, killing, stealing, or lying. 
To determine what such unconditional duties exactly entail, Kant composes three rules. 
The first rule states that one must act according to that personal rule of conduct, or a 
maxim, of which one can always at the same time will that it is a universal law: this is 
called the Formula of Universal Law. The second rule states that one must always act so 
that one treats persons as ends and never merely as means to an end: this is the Formula 
of Humanity. The third rule states that one must act so that one treats the will of oneself 
and other persons as being capable of autonomously legislating universal laws: this is 
the Formula of Autonomy (Kant 1996; Hallgarth 1998). 
 
This set of rules embodies the principle of respect for persons, and generates the 
principle of non-maleficence. This is the duty not to harm others, or to avoid harming 
others’ physical and mental wellbeing, safety, and happiness. For Kant, the duty not to 
harm others is a categorical imperative, an absolute moral requirement that must never 
be violated. For if one causes another person harm one contradicts the three rules. One 
can never will that everyone is always allowed to perform harmful actions, and one does 
not respect the other as a person with intrinsic value and the capability to make moral 
decisions by harming him. Because non-maleficence is something that all persons owe 
to all other persons by virtue of both being human, some have denoted it a natural duty, 
a duty one has regardless of the acts one performs (Rawls 1971: 114; Simmons 1979: 
13; Schroeder 1986: 495). It is this principle of non-maleficence that is of fundamental 
importance when evaluating risk impositions from a deontological perspective. 
4.2 Risk impositions and the duty not to harm 
Risk impositions are by definition actions that expose others to the possibility of harm, 
loss, disadvantage, or any other setback of interests. As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, the Kantian rules generate the duty not to cause others harm. The question is 
whether risk impositions can be in accordance with this duty or, phrased negatively, if 
risk impositions violate the principle of non-maleficence. One has a duty not to harm 
others, but does one also have a duty not to expose others to a possibility of harm? Does 
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one have a duty not to impose risks? One is for example prohibited to perform actions 
that will undeniably harm others, such as firing a loaded gun at innocent people walking 
on the street. Now does this prohibition also apply to actions that will not directly harm, 
or will not certainly harm, but that are likely to, or could possibly, have harmful 
consequences? Think of aiming a loaded gun at passers-by, playing with the trigger of a 
gun in the vicinity of others, or even just carrying a gun in a public space. What makes 
firing the gun wrong is that harm will be unduly inflicted on other persons. In the other 
three actions harm is not necessarily, but only probably or possibly, unduly inflicted on 
others. Can those examples then be considered wrong because of this probable or 
possible harm? Hansson (2003: 298, 2013: 29) calls this the extension problem for 
deontological theories: whether deontological rules, applicable to cases with 
determinate outcomes, can be extended to cases with indeterminate outcomes. 
 
There are a couple of ways in which the duty not to cause harm can be understood, and 
each alternative perspective has a different judgement about the permissibility of risk 
impositions. Firstly, the duty can be understood in the Kantian, categorical sense of an 
unconditional and absolute demand, i.e. a duty not to impose any risk of harm on others. 
Such a duty would prohibit every increase in the possibility of harm and therefore 
render even the imposition of the slightest risk unacceptable. Secondly, one can imagine 
a cut-off point at which the duty not to harm ceases to be valid, allowing risk 
impositions if they are improbable or otherwise insignificant. Thirdly, the duty not to 
harm can be understood in relation to other important duties, most importantly the 
obligation to do good: to foster the happiness of others, as well as their health, 
development, and safety, and to increase general wellbeing. This principle of 
beneficence has to be weighed against the principle of non-maleficence when evaluating 
risky actions. A risk imposition, and its implicit violation of the duty of non-
maleficence, can then be considered justified if it potentially brings about benefits that 
outweigh the possible harms, and that the risk-imposer is obliged to bring about 
according to the principle of beneficence. In the following paragraphs these three 
alternatives will be discussed. 
4.3 Alternative one: an absolute duty not to impose risks 
Returning to Hansson’s question of the extension of moral, and in particular 
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deontological, rules, the answer is simple: “a prohibition to bring about a certain 
outcome implies a prohibition to cause an increase in the probability of that outcome 
(even if the increase is very small)” (Hansson 2003: 298). The prohibition to cause harm 
then entails a strict prohibition to make the occurrence of harm probable, likely, or even 
merely possible. This is a binary and uncompromising perspective on the principle of 
non-maleficence: an action either increases the chance of harm or it does not, and if it 
does, then it is unacceptable. Therefore, all risk impositions, which are by definition 
actions that increase the possibility of harm, are considered impermissible. 
4.3.1 Moral differences between probabilities 
It is obvious that deontological ethics formulated in absolute terms is overly demanding, 
especially when it comes to risks. Firstly, it does not account for the moral difference 
between slight, larger, or major probabilities of harm. Consider actions that impose a 
small possibility of harm on others, like standing next to a window and the risk of 
falling out on top of someone else, putting out the garbage and the risk of someone 
tripping over the garbage bags, or walking on the pavement and the risk of bumping 
into someone. Most people intuitively judge such actions differently than conduct that 
imposes a significant probability of harm on others, such as driving fast through a 
suburban area, smoking near a petrol station, or throwing a brick from a building onto a 
busy street. An absolute interpretation of the duty not to cause others harm does not 
explain why people deem some risks negligible and others not. 
4.3.2 Deadlocking social life 
Secondly, one should not even want to eradicate risks altogether, even if some expose 
others to a significant probability of harm. For there are many significant risks that are 
accepted nonetheless, with certain precautions, because of their social productivity and 
usefulness. One can think of the risks associated with construction work and driving. 
These risks are socially accepted to a large extent because they increase efficiency of, 
and pleasure in, human life, and are controlled by safeguards such as construction 
regulations and speed limits. Of course, to say that risks are socially accepted does not 
necessarily make them morally acceptable (Taebi 2016). But prohibiting actions purely 
on the basis of the fact that they increase the possibility, albeit remotely, of harming 
someone would mean prohibiting most actions altogether, or it would at the very least 
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make social life impossible. To do so would lead to what Hayenhjelm and Wolff (2011) 
call the ‘problem of paralysis’: the deadlocking of social life. 28  In order to make 
interactions between persons possible at all they need to be allowed to perform actions 
of which one knows that performing them will expose others to a small chance of harm. 
To then make such interactions efficient and pleasant they need to be allowed to expose 
others to sometimes significant, but controlled, possibilities of harm. One simply 
cannot, and should not want to, rule risk out from life completely: “in practice it is 
impossible to obtain a zero risk as anything more than a vision when facing uncertain 
future events and consequences” (Ersdal & Aven 2008: 203). 
4.3.3 Rejecting absolutism 
An absolute interpretation of the duty not to harm as a duty not to impose risk of harm 
has to be rejected. Questions that any theory of permissible risk impositions has to 
answer are then not if, but “When […] people [can] knowingly impose risks on each 
other” (Wolff 2006: 410), and “where to draw the line [between permissible and 
impermissible harms]” (Fried 2012a: 235). An absolutist deontological perspective is 
unable to answer these questions because it cannot make sense of the fact that some 
risks are accepted – and acceptable – because they are by-products of activities that are 
necessary, productive, or otherwise advantageous. 
4.4 Alternative two: drawing a line (or two) 
To counteract the strictness of alternative one, Fried’s question can be answered in a 
literal sense by drawing a line that indicates where risks tend to become so insignificant 
that they are considered negligible, and where the principle of non-maleficence 
therefore ceases to be valid. The idea is that exposing others to negligible risks is not 
necessarily a breach of the duty not to cause others harm. The extent of this duty 
depends on the likeliness and severity of harm: the more likely or severe harm is, the 
less acceptable an action is that exposes people to such harm. Legal scholars John 
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky (2002: 1689) acknowledge that drawing such a 
principled line is by no means easy. With regard to risks of HIV infection they admit 
that: “A […] very difficult question is whether the duty to be vigilant of causing a threat 
                                                
28 This problem is also mentioned or elaborated by Altham (1986), Thomson (1986), and Hansson (2003, 
2013). 
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of HIV infection involves a duty not to cause actual exposure to HIV or a duty not to 
cause possible exposure through a medically possible means of transmission”. 
 
Now if a risk is very unlikely, very small, or both, one generally considers it negligible. 
Likeliness and severity, as factors that influence the negligibility of risk impositions, are 
the most obvious candidates for establishing a cut-off line for moral scrutiny. This line 
distinguishes negligible from significant risk impositions. Because the duty not to cause 
others harm is in effect in the case of significant risky actions, these are unacceptable 
according to this form of deontological reasoning. 
4.4.1 A duty not to impose likely or probable risks 
Likeliness is an unscientific expression of the chance that an event will occur, arrived at 
through common sense, whereas probability is the numerical measure of likeliness, 
established by means of statistical calculation. If a certain estimate of likeliness or 
probability is taken as the cut-off line, one states that if the likeliness or probability of a 
harm occurring is lower than the cut-off estimate, the risky action that imposes the harm 
is permissible. Drawing a line based on likeliness or probability has different 
advantages and disadvantages, and therefore both options will be discussed 
consecutively. The idea of determining whether the duty of non-maleficence is in effect 
by referring to a common-sense limit of likely harm is intuitively attractive: people 
often make use of differentiations between likeliness and unlikeliness in their everyday 
assessments of risky actions. It is for example generally considered acceptable to walk 
on a busy sidewalk because it is very unlikely one will harm another by doing so: 
walking on a busy sidewalk is not seen as a breach of the principle of non-maleficence. 
But it is considered unacceptable to drive through a bustling town at night without 
headlights because of the likeliness of an accident: this action is considered as a breach 
of the duty not to cause others harm. 
A likeliness threshold 
This kind of reasoning is also applied in tort law. An example is the Dutch ‘Swishing 
branch’ court case (Dutch: Arrest Zwiepende tak, HR 09-12-1994, NJ 1996, 403). Four 
friends were walking through a forest, and one of them, Werink, kicked against a loose 
branch. The branch then swished back and hit one of his friends, Hudepohl, in the eye. 
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As a result of this unfortunate event Hudepohl lost his eyesight. He pressed charges 
against Werink, claiming that the latter had engaged in careless and inexcusably risky 
behaviour, thereby imposing an unacceptable risk of harm on him. The Dutch High 
Court denied Hudepohl’s appeal, arguing that it was not likely that Werink’s action of 
kicking against the branch would result in Hudepohl’s loss of eyesight. The Court stated 
that the possibility of an accident was inherent in Werink’s action, but that this 
possibility did not make the conduct unlawful. “Such risk-creating behaviour is only 
unlawful, if the degree of likeliness of an accident (incurring harm as a result of 
someone else’s behaviour) as a result of that behaviour is so high, that the perpetrator 
should have refrained from acting as such according to standards of care” (free 
translation from Dutch statement, HR 09-12-1994, NJ 1996, 403). Here one can clearly 
distinguish the argument that risk-creating or risk-imposing behaviour does not 
necessarily forsake the duty not to cause others harm: this is only the case if the harm 
such behaviour creates or imposes exceeds a certain limit of likeliness.29 According to 
the Dutch High Court, the likeliness of the harm Werink imposed on Hudepohl through 
his act of kicking against the branch fell below that limit. Subsequently Werink could 
not be held accountable for the unfortunate outcome of the event, and neither could he 
be said to have violated the duty not to cause others harm. 
 
When the court stated that it was not straightforwardly likely that the branch kicked by 
Werink would swish back and hit his friend in the eye, it addressed a common-sense 
idea of the likeliness of that event, as a reasonable person would understand it. But what 
determines the reasonableness of an assessment of the degree of risk and its likeliness in 
any given situation is debateable. Also, assessments of likeliness might differ per 
individual and social perspective. There does not seem to be only one correct answer. 
The arbitrariness or subjectivity of likeliness assessments could be overcome by 
expressing likeliness statistically in terms of probability: the line between permissible 
and impermissible risk impositions would then be drawn with reference to a probability 
estimate of harm. 
                                                
29 In tort law, the duty not to cause others harm is understood in relation to the duty to care for others 
(Fried 2012a: 232). The duty to care is a legal obligation to “adhere to a standard of reasonable care while 
performing any act or omission that could foreseeably harm others” (Icheku 2011: 118). As the Swishing 
branch case shows, in tort law both duties are considered to be in effect only from the moment that the 
risked harm is foreseeable, i.e. exceeds a certain degree of likeliness. 
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A probability threshold 
The idea behind a probability threshold is that it provides a more objective and precise 
differentiation between likely and unlikely events. One could propose a probability limit 
of 0.000,001 for the prohibition to harm another person, and argue that the duty not to 
cause others harm applies to actions that expose others to risks of harm with a 
probability of 0.000,001 and higher. If the risk of harming another person by twirling a 
bunch of keys is lower than 0.000,001, then walking around while twirling a bunch of 
keys is not a breach of the duty of non-maleficence. The idea of fixing one numerical 
limit that demarcates the acceptability of all risk impositions, and making duties 
applicable in cases of high-probability risks but not in low-probability ones, is explored 
by Hansson. However, he is quick to dismiss this option because it does not take into 
account the benefits associated with imposing, and being exposed, to risks. People 
generally find a risk with a small probability of significant harm acceptable, if taking or 
being exposed to that risk entails the obtainment of a valuable benefit. But that same 
small measure of probability of significant harm would be considered unacceptable if it 
was associated with a risk that did not come with considerable benefits. As Hansson 
(2013: 30) argues: “Most of us would accept a very small probability […] of a deadly 
outcome if it comes from a vaccination against a serious disease, but not if it is caused 
by food additives that improves the colour of orange juice”. The alternative would be to 
establish individual probability limits for all risk impositions, but practically this would 
be quite impossible. 
 
Another important argument against a probability limit from a deontological perspective 
is that it numerically expresses the value of invaluable things, such as a human life. 
According to the option of a probability limit of acceptable harm, a risk that imposes a 
deadly harm is acceptable if its probability is sufficiently low. But even risk impositions 
that impose an improbable lethal harm can and will sometimes result in death. From the 
perspective of a probability limit an improbable death of a person could be considered a 
risk worth taking or accepting. Such an evaluation of deadly risks based on a probability 
estimate of harm attaches a number to the value of human life. Another way to 
numerically express the value of life is to determine what one is willing to pay (WTP) 
to retain it, or how much compensation one is willing to accept (WTA) for the loss of it. 
But WTP and WTA are utilitarian conceptions that aim to produce the greatest good for 
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the greatest number of people. As Glenn Blomquist (2015: 16) remarks, a deontologist 
would categorically claim that “If it is morally wrong that people are exposed to risks of 
death, then it is wrong to construct a value of life to be used to guide decisions 
involving risks of death”. From a deontological perspective, a likeliness limit of 
acceptable harms is more appealing than a probability limit because it does not place a 
numerical or monetary value on human life and the acceptability of risk impositions. In 
the next option likeliness will therefore be considered instead of probability. 
4.4.2 A duty not to impose severe risks 
Another option is to attach the cut-off line to an estimate of severity, and to argue that if 
the harmful consequence that might result from a risky action is smaller than the cut-off 
estimate, the risk imposition is permissible. One then has a duty not to impose severe 
risks. But on the basis of previous arguments one can quite easily dismiss this option as 
well. For it would mean that one would have to prohibit risks that might be large but 
very unlikely, controlled by safety measures, and highly beneficial even for the person 
exposed to risk. Imagine that telecom companies were not allowed to sell any mobile 
phones because of the risk that they could explode and kill their users. First of all, 
mobile phones are almost indispensable for a modern lifestyle. Moreover, the risk of a 
phone exploding is highly unlikely, especially if companies take sufficient safety 
measures. 
 
Or is it not? In September 2016, telecom company Samsung, lauded for its product 
quality and innovativeness, had to recall millions of its newly released Galaxy Note 7 
smartphone, and in October it was forced to stop their mass production. As it turned out, 
the risk of this device exploding is not completely unlikely: exploding phones have 
already ruined cars and resulted in skin burns (Solon 2016; Said-Moorhouse 2016). 
According to newspaper headlines, the risk of exploding phones is now not only severe, 
but also likely. The significance of such risks is discussed in the next paragraphs. 
 
4.4.3 A likeliness-severity grid 
Understanding the cut-off line in terms of either likeliness or severity does not aid the 
evaluation of risk impositions. A last option worth discussing is to envision likeliness 
and severity as two axes making up a grid of four categories, in which risk impositions 
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can be classified. Risky actions can impose a harm that is likely and big, likely but 
small, unlikely and small, and unlikely but big. Whether a certain risk imposition 
breaches the duty not to cause others harm depends on its order of negligibility. And 
whether a risky action imposes a negligible harm can be decided by determining the 
classification of the risk imposition in a certain category on the likeliness-severity grid. 
Recall that risks are negligible if they are unlikely, small, or both. This means that risky 
actions that impose likely and big harms, such as the risk of selling explosion-prone 
smartphones, are not negligible and therefore violate the duty of non-maleficence.30 
Actions that impose unlikely and small risks are negligible and can be considered as 
being in accordance with this duty. But the other categories, i.e. likely but small risks 
and unlikely but large risks, form stumbling blocks for the grid alternative. 
Likely but small risks 
Actions that impose likely but small harms would at face value be considered negligible 
and therefore not seen as violations of the duty not to cause others harm. Consider 
Emma smoking a cigarette in the vicinity of Bill, who is a non-smoker. The harms 
imposed on Bill are considerably small: he might have to cough or dislike the smell of 
smoke, but Emma does not cause him permanent damage. However, a necessary 
condition for this negligibility is that the action is performed once or by one person. If a 
small but likely harm is imposed constantly, or by many people simultaneously, it 
ceases to be small. Imagine that Emma is a chain-smoker, that Bill shares an office with 
Emma, and that Bill and Emma live in a society without smoking laws. Emma now 
continuously exposes Bill to the harms of passive smoking. An act that in itself only 
creates a likely but small risk can create a likely and big risk if it is repeated sufficient 
times. Or consider Bill being in a room with ten other people who smoke: pretty 
harmless acts of smoking single cigarettes are now aggregated into a collectively risky 
action that imposes a likely and big harm on Bill. 
 
                                                
30 It is alarming that citizens of developing countries are often exposed to likely and big risks, such as 
risks of climate change, air pollution, unsafe drinking water, road traffic injuries, workplace accidents, 
poor health care, lack of education, political unrest, and economic instability. Actions or omissions that 
impose such risks, like emitting vast amounts of CO2, dumping toxic waste, not maintaining the built 
environment, not prioritising education, or failing to provide medical aid, can be said to violate the 
principle of non-maleficence. But the challenge is to determine where responsibilities lie, which agent 
imposes which risks, and from whom justification can be demanded. 
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The paradoxical character of this situation can be described as a ‘problem of many 
hands’. The notion was initially introduced to describe the difficulty of identifying a 
cause or holding someone accountable for harms to which many individuals contributed 
(Thompson 1980). It is now also used to denote difficulties with understanding harm 
and negligibility in cases where many contributors are involved. Climate change is a 
paradigmatic example of a problem of many hands in this sense: one person’s share of 
carbon dioxide emissions exposes others to negligible harms, but contributes to 
significant harms on a collective level (Van de Poel et al. 2012; Van de Poel, Royakkers 
& Zwart 2015). In conclusion: not all risks that fall in the category of likely but small 
harms fit neatly into the binary distinction between negligible and not negligible, or 
insignificant and significant. It is not immediately obvious, then, whether a risk that 
imposes a likely but small harm is a violation of the duty not to harm. 
Unlikely but large risks 
Risk impositions that fall in the category of unlikely but large harms also do not always 
adhere to the above-mentioned distinction. Call to mind the example of the nuclear 
power plant in the previous chapter, which illustrated that people tend to be more 
cautious and risk averse with regard to risks that impose unlikely but severe harms. This 
would lead one to assume that the duty not to cause others harms is valid in the contexts 
of such risks: one is not permitted to expose others to very grave risks, even if it is 
highly unlikely that these risks materialise into harm. But this would also mean that 
actions or omissions that impose extremely unlikely risks are impermissible by the 
standards of the principle of non-maleficence. According to the grid alternative 
governments for example have a duty to spend a significant part of their defence budget 
on preparing for an alien invasion, because failing to do so could expose citizens to the 
risk of an attack from outer space. 
4.4.4 Rejecting cut-off lines 
Compared to the uncompromising and absolutist first alternative of an absolute duty, the 
second alternative of a cut-off line is less rigid because it distinguishes significant from 
insignificant risks. But the latter is still too rigid because it does not differentiate within 
the categories a cut-off line creates. For example, it does not differentiate between 
merely unlikely and almost unthinkable risks. Once the harms risky actions impose fall 
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on the wrong side of the line, other considerations are excluded from influencing the 
acceptability of risk impositions, such as social necessity, convenience, and 
acceptability of spending the budget on defence measures against more real threats than 
an alien invasion. 
 
Whether the duty not to cause others harm is valid with regard to certain risk-imposing 
actions, is affected by the measure of negligibility of the harms such actions impose. 
However, negligibility of harms can be difficult if not impossible to unambiguously 
determine: a negligibility estimate might not be interpersonally shared, or might change 
depending on how often the risky action is performed. And as was discussed in the 
above, negligibility alone cannot determine the validity of the duty of non-maleficence: 
benefits gained from risk impositions, together with their social necessity and 
acceptance, play a role in this regard. In what follows I will elaborate more on the effect 
of benefits and the duty of beneficence – as well as other duties – on the strength of the 
duty not to harm. 
4.5 Alternative three: a balancing act of duties 
The third alternative allows for a more flexible approach by proposing a gradual and 
variable understanding of the duty of non-maleficence. The duty is gradual in the sense 
that as the amount of harm imposed by risky actions increases, the duty of non-
maleficence gains validity and becomes a weightier obligation. It is variable in the sense 
that it is influenced by several factors. Whether, or to what extent, the duty of non-
maleficence is valid does not only depend on the likeliness and severity of a risked 
harm: it also depends on the strength of other duties, which can override the duty of 
non-maleficence. Apart from not harming others, one might be obliged to keep 
promises, do good, give back, and act fairly towards others. In any given situation 
multiple duties may apply, and one has to weigh the various applicable duties in order 
to arrive at a moral judgement on what should or ought to be done in that particular 
context. 
 
The 20th century philosopher W. D. Ross (1930) is a well-known advocate of this kind 
of deontological balancing. He lists seven prima facie duties, i.e. duties that apply other 
things being equal, but that in specific situations can be overridden by other duties. Ross 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 104 
mentions the duties of fidelity, reparation, non-maleficence, beneficence, justice, 
gratitude, and self-improvement. By reasoning from prima facie duties applicable in a 
given situation, one can arrive at one’s actual duty, or duty proper. Another list of duties 
or principles with a similar prima facie, or pro tanto, character is provided by 
bioethicists Tom Beauchamp and James Childress (2001, 2009). They argue that in 
biomedical decisions the principles of respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, 
beneficence, and justice have to be balanced against each other in order to make 
ethically acceptable decisions. 
4.5.1 Imposing a risk to reduce risk for the risk-bearer 
In situations in which both the duty of non-maleficence and other prima facie duties 
apply, it is a rule of thumb that the duty of non-maleficence has priority. As the Apostle 
Paul (Holy Bible (King James Version): Romans 3:8) proclaims: “And not […] Let us 
do evil, that good may come”. Avoiding harm is more important than anything else. 
Consider a father, who has the duty to protect and save his child from a sinking ship. 
Does this allow him to snatch a life vest from another child in order to save his own? In 
such situations, duties of justice, fairness, and non-maleficence come into direct conflict 
with the duties of beneficence and protection. I would argue that – even in such a life-
threatening situation – the father’s duty to do no harm is weightier than his other duties. 
I would find it humanely understandable if the father did snatch the life vest to save his 
own child, but would nevertheless find his actions ethically condemnable: one cannot 
condone putting an innocent life at risk to bring another to safety. The father’s duty 
proper is then, other things being equal, to bring his child to safety without exposing 
other lives to risk. The tragedy is that he might be unable to do so. 
 
But what if an agent exposes a person to risk to reduce another risk for that same 
person? The fact that the benefits of risk exposure now accrue to the person exposed to 
risk seem to positively influence its evaluation. Consider a mother, taking her child to 
hospital to receive vaccinations. This is not without risks, as it is possible that the child 
will not respond well to the vaccine and develop health problems, or that the nurse uses 
equipment that has not been disinfected. Also, the trip to the hospital can be risky: the 
mother and child might have to walk, take a bus, or drive, and have an accident along 
the way. But if the mother decides not to have her child vaccinated, it is exposed to the 
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risk of contracting – perhaps life-threatening – diseases. The risks to which the child is 
exposed if they undertake the journey to the hospital seem to be outweighed by the risks 
it is protected from if it receives the vaccination. The mother’s duty proper is then, other 
things being equal, to take the child to the hospital. 
 
Risk consultants Chris Elliot and Tony Taig (2003: 7) therefore acknowledge that the 
uncompromising deontological principle that “No person or organisation has a moral 
right to expose another to risk” in some cases must allow for exceptions. Others can be 
legitimately exposed to risk when “the person creating the risk is acting entirely to 
reduce net risk for the other person” (ibid.). Such an exception respects the value of 
individual life. Both the father and the mother in the previous examples, in their role as 
guardians, have parental responsibilities do act in their child’s best interest, to safeguard 
it, and to adhere to duties of beneficence and protection. However, only in the mother’s 
case do those duties trump the prohibition to expose a person to harm, as the benefits of 
the risk exposure befall the same person and reduce that person’s overall risk exposure. 
4.5.2 Imposing a risk to reduce overall risk 
In the previous example, the person exposed to risk can also be said to benefit from that 
risk exposure. But even if the potential benefits and harms do not accrue to the same 
person, a risk imposition can still be considered acceptable. Consider the example of 
Nicolas Espinoza and Martin Peterson (2012: 10), concerning a severe type of pandemic 
influenza that has a high mortality: 
 
Suppose a vaccine for humans has been rapidly developed. Naturally, 
before the vaccine can be distributed to the population, it must be 
approved by the medical products agency. […] There are some concerns 
about the safety of the new vaccine. Preliminary results indicate that it 
may cause serious cardiovascular health risks to the elderly, even though 
it is likely to be safe in all other respects. No other vaccine is available. 
 
It seems that the most reasonable option in this situation is to approve the vaccine. A 
pandemic and possibly lethal influenza would pose such a serious and widespread threat 
that the demonstrated benefits provided by administration of the vaccine outweigh the 
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known risks.31 The duty to help the majority of the population is stronger than the duty 
not to inflict harm on a minority. The duty of non-maleficence is then outweighed by 
the duty of beneficence, i.e. the duty to maintain or increase general wellbeing. This is 
not only because of the difference in the number of people aided and affected, but also 
because the vaccine will most likely benefit the majority, whereas it will only possibly 
harm a minority. Also, the fact that there is no available alternative contributes to the 
acceptability of imposing cardiovascular health risks on the older part of the population. 
4.5.3 Critique on balancing 
According to Ross (1930) as well as Beauchamp and Childress (2001, 2009), it might 
be difficult, or even practically impossible, to know which principles actually override 
others in a given situation. Despite this, they believe it is always possible, at least 
theoretically, to conclude what the duty proper is. Espinoza and Peterson (2012) argue 
on the contrary that determining the duty proper is not so straightforward: the principles 
of non-maleficence and beneficence are sometimes incomparable and therefore trade-
offs between them are impossible to make. In the vaccine example the two situations 
which have to be compared are a) immunising the majority against a possibly lethal 
influenza but exposing a minority to the risk of possibly lethal cardiovascular disease; 
or b) not exposing a minority to the risk of possibly lethal cardiovascular disease but 
failing to immunise the majority against a possibly lethal influenza. These situations 
have to be assessed according to how much benefit they yield and how much harm they 
inflict, but the benefits and harms are not of the same kind, and they do not affect the 
same people. The incomparability between the benefits of the vaccine, the risk of 
influenza, and the risk of cardiovascular disease, makes the principles of non-
maleficence and beneficence so dissimilar that there seems to be no common ground on 
which one can balance them against each. It might therefore be impossible “to find out 
whether it is more important to protect citizens from the risk of getting pandemic 
influenza, than from the risk of being harmed from some adverse effect of the vaccine” 
(ibid.: 11). This leads the authors to conclude that some risks are morally indeterminate, 
and there is not always a clear answer to the question as to which principle overrides the 
                                                
31 Espinoza and Peterson base this argumentation on the 2005 Action Plan to Further Progress the 
European Risk Management Strategy. This plan streamlines decision-making on the European level with 
regard to drug safety in contexts of risk and uncertainty, and was developed by the European Medicines 
Agency. The condition of demonstrated benefits outweighing known risks is a core feature of the action 
plan. 
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others. One might have an obligation to immunise the majority against a possibly lethal 
influenza, but at the same time also have an obligation not to expose a minority to the 
risk of possibly lethal cardiovascular disease: “the obligation to perform the act in 
question is only valid to a limited degree” (ibid.). 
Moral indeterminacy 
This moral indeterminacy is strengthened by the uncertainty surrounding both risks. 
Which, and how many, people will contract either disease? Which, and how many, 
infected people will eventually die? And what will the ripple effects of either approving 
or refusing the vaccine be? More research could lessen the uncertainty but it will only 
disappear once the risks do, or do not, materialise. This means that the duty proper, if it 
can be determined at all, can only be determined after the fact. Given the outcomes of a 
certain decision one can reason in hindsight whether or not the decision was in 
accordance with what one ought to have decided. If there is no uncertainty clouding the 
particularities of a decision-making situation, and if the outcomes of a choice are known 
in advance, a deontological balancing act of duties can be performed fairly easily. 
Imagine that one knows that the vaccine will result in serious cardiovascular health 
problems only for people above the age of 85 who have suffered two or more heart 
attacks in the past. One also knows that the vaccine will safely immunise all others 
against the influenza. Lastly one knows that there in fact are no other options. Such 
knowledge about consequences, partly identifiable victims, and alternatives, facilitates 
the act of weighing harms against benefits. The more one knows, the stronger one’s 
moral convictions become about the right choice and the right action in a given 
situation. Ross (1930: 32) himself argues that what is right in a given situation is “that 
which if I were omniscient I should see to be my duty”. However, in most decision-
making situations people are not omniscient. Especially everyday cases of risk 
impositions, are characterised by uncertainty to an extent that problematises the notion 
of a duty proper.32 
                                                
32 A similar kind of critique has been voiced concerning the unrepresentativeness of philosophical thought 
experiments for real life problems, such as the Trolley Problem (Foot 1967), the Famous Violinist 
(Thomson 1971), Jim and the Indians (B. Williams 1973), or the Lifeboat (Hardin 1974). Fried (2012b), 
Hansson (2013), and Fleischhut (2013) have argued in a similar fashion that even if such thought 
experiments would expose people’s true moral intuitions, they provide little to no guidance to people in 
real-life decision-making situations. The uncertainty present in such situations frustrates or negates any 
clear or strong moral intuitions exposed by philosophical thought experiments. 
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The deontological unjustifiability of balancing 
Apart from these difficulties with determining one’s duty proper, a balancing act of 
harms and benefits encounters other problems from a deontological perspective. As I 
stated in the beginning of this chapter, deontological ethics are based on the principles 
of respect for persons and sanctity of human life. Allowing the offsetting of duties 
against each other enables the justification of risk impositions by referring to benefits 
outweighing harms, or other duties overriding the duty of non-maleficence. This means 
that harm to one person or a group of people can be justified by large or important 
enough benefits to another, and this is exactly what deontological ethics opposes. Even 
if harms and benefits would be knowable in advance, weighing them against one 
another in the context of duties tends to become a bastardised form of utilitarianism. 
One could adjust this weighing in favour of the person or people exposed to a risk: a 
risk imposition can then only be justified if the possible benefits outweigh the possible 
harms for the affected person. Such an addition would secure the principle of respect for 
persons as ends and not merely as means to an end. But this would also entail that many 
socially necessary and beneficial risks cannot be allowed, and this renders the adjusted 
deontological principle too stringent. 
4.5.4 Rejecting balancing 
Balancing the duty of non-maleficence against other duties can legitimise imposing 
risks to reduce risks for the risk-bearer specifically, or for society in general. However, 
these arguments cannot originate from deontological theory itself. Deontological, non-
aggregative principles of respect for persons and non-maleficence do not manage to 
draw the line between permissible and impermissible risks based on competing duties.33 
                                                
33 The same critique applies to other possible obligations in the context of risk impositions. An example is 
a duty to take a chance and impose a risk, provided that the benefits expected from that imposition are 
significant and accrue to the risk-exposed person. A related question is whether one can be blamed or 
punished for refusing to take a chance, or for being too risk averse? Another example is a duty to share 
the benefits that result from risk impositions: if a risky action has unexpected or unimagined benefits for a 
person, is that person then obliged to share their good fortune with the risk-imposer? I am indebted to 
Andrea Hurst for pointing out these duties pertaining to beneficence, luck, and good fortune. They 
generally come to the fore when one views risk in a more positive light than I do. My definition of risk 
tends to be negative – as possible harm – and I therefore focus mostly on duties not to harm. However, I 
include these questions as suggestions for future research, which are offered in the conclusion. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Deontological ethics in general draws attention to the importance of moral rules, 
principles, or duties. In this chapter I investigated whether such rule-ethics, and 
especially the duty not to harm and its founding principle of respect for persons, could 
sufficiently account for the appraisal of actions that expose others to risk. I first 
explored the tenability of a duty not to impose any risks, but this possibility should 
immediately be rejected as it prohibits virtually all action. Other duties seemed more 
promising, such as a duty not to impose likely, probable, or severe risks; a duty not to 
impose likely but small risks, or unlikely but large risks; and a duty not to impose risks 
that are not outweighed by (possible) benefits. But in isolation the principle of non-
maleficence and respect for persons cannot account for an all-round evaluation of all 
risk impositions, and they therefore fail to guide decision-making in the face of 
uncertainty. The question: Does deontology provide a convincing evaluation of risk 
impositions? then has to be answered negatively. I do believe that the conviction that 
one ought to show respect for the humanity of others by not causing them harm is – and 
should be – generally held and interpersonally shared. However, such an intention 
should be complemented, or more robustly expressed, by other normative 
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5. THE RIGHTS-BASED PERSPECTIVE 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the second research question – Do mainstream ethical theories provide a 
convincing evaluation of risk impositions? – is approached from the angle of rights. The 
focal question is: Does rights-based ethics provide a convincing evaluation of risk 
impositions? Rights correlating to the duty of non-maleficence, or the duty not to harm 
others without qualification, are scrutinised: the right not to be harmed, and the right not 
to be exposed to risk (from now on: ‘right against risk’). But before I proceed to give an 
account of rights in the context of risk impositions, let me elaborate on the notion of 
rights, and the relation between rights and duties. 
 
Rights and duties are both fundamentally based on respect for persons. Also, they are 
often thought of as related to, dependent on, and interacting with one another. If 
someone has a right to a certain state of affairs, for example a right not to be lied to, 
then other persons have a duty to bring it about, for example by being honest. And vice 
versa, if someone has a duty to bring about a state of affairs, then other persons have a 
right to it. Joel Feinberg (1980: 143) calls this the “doctrine of the logical correlativity 
of rights and duties. […] all duties entail other people’s rights and […] all rights entail 
other people’s duties”. Feinberg (ibid.) himself questions whether the doctrine is correct 
and answers: “In a sense yes and in a sense no”. The correlativity holds for many rights 
and duties, but not for all. Take the duty to pay taxes: this duty is not directly related to 
a right of other persons, for one cannot claim to have a right that others pay their taxes. 
One has a right to a just and fair society, so if one has a duty to pay taxes, then every 
other person in that society also has a duty to pay taxes. But one’s duty to pay taxes is 
not logically correlated to a similar right of others. Or consider the right to give money 
to charity: this right is also not directly related to a duty, either of oneself or of other 
persons. One has a right to give money to charity, but does not have an obligation to do 
so.34 And if one decides to exercise one’s right to give to charity, it does not entail that 
others have a duty to do the same. 
 
                                                
34 Peter Singer (1972, 2002) would claim otherwise with regard to affluent nations and well-off people: 
they have a duty to give to charity, or more precisely, to poverty and famine relief. 
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Because duties and rights are not always logically correlative, it is important to discuss 
them separately with regard to risk impositions. The discussed interpretations of the 
duty not to harm or impose risks of harm on others could not fully explain why and 
under what conditions exposing other persons to risk can be deemed acceptable. This is 
not to say that there never is a duty not to harm or impose risks of harm on others, or 
that this duty does not correlate to a right: the right not to be harmed or to be exposed to 
risk of harm. In this chapter I will consider whether, and if so, under what conditions, 
these rights can be claimed. The perspective of rights might open up new ways of 
determining when it is allowed to impose risks on others, and as such aid the 
understanding of the acceptability of risk impositions. 
 
In ethical theories based on rights, rights of individuals are given priority over other 
moral considerations. Rights are not just entitlements that are “nice to have […] [or] 
generous of others to provide” (Sumner 2012: 298). Rather, one can claim and demand 
them, others have the duty to respect or provide them, and it is considered unjust to 
withhold or violate them. Morality is then derived from rights in the sense that rights 
determine which actions ought to be performed or refrained from. “Rights are justified 
claims that individuals and groups can make upon other individuals or upon society; to 
have a right is to be in a position to determine by one’s choices what others should or 
need not do” (Beauchamp & Childress 2001: 357, original italics). Rights then define 
and demarcate the space in which people interact: they function as boundaries that 
prohibit and prevent people from acting in certain ways (Teuber 1990). Take for 
example one of the most basic human rights: the right to property. Because individuals 
have a right to property they can demand that other persons act so as to respect that 
property, that they do not unduly use, steal, damage, or destroy it. The foundation of 
rights-based ethics “seems delightfully self-evident: individuals possess certain rights, 
and the violations of those rights are wrong. If possible, such violations ought to be 
prevented” (Schroeder 1986: 499). Rights are also entitlements: having a right means 
being owed the content of that right. Examples are entitlements or claims to certain 
freedoms, such as the rights to freedom of speech, movement, and religion, or 
entitlements to treatment, such as the rights to recognition before the law, to be 
educated, and not to be tortured (UN General Assembly 1948). 
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One can distinguish between rights that people have because they are human and rights 
they have because they are part of a particular community or society. In the first 
category one finds rights that human beings are born with and that are universally valid. 
They are considered natural or God-given, such as the Lockean rights to life, liberty, 
and property (Locke 2004). These rights can never be taken away, and are negative in 
the sense that they call on others for their inaction: others ought not to interfere with or 
impede such rights. In the second category one finds rights that are only recognised 
within a particular community and presuppose socially established practices, rules or 
laws (Pojman 1989; Mackie 1989). These rights, such as rights to health care, rest and 
leisure, and employment, are considered positive because they call on others for their 
action: others ought to realise and advance them. 
 
Rights are based on, and express, respect for persons. In fact, respecting persons and 
respecting rights are inextricably linked. As Feinberg argues (1980: 152): 
 
To think of oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduly but 
properly proud to have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to be 
worthy of the love and esteem of others. Indeed, respect for persons (this 
is an intriguing idea) may simply be respect for their rights, so that there 
cannot be the one without the other: and what is called “human dignity” 
may simply be the recognizable [sic] capacity to assert claims. 
 
To understand human beings as persons means understanding them as possessing 
human dignity, as being entitled to humane and respectful treatment, as capable of 
making valid moral claims to that kind of treatment, and therefore as holders of rights. 
The language of rights translates the abstract notion of human dignity into practical 
guidelines for human interaction and treatment. To phrase it in Kantian terms, persons 
can never be merely used as a means to an end, but must always be treated as ends in 
themselves, because they possess dignity, are entitled to respect, and can claim their 
rights. Dignity, respect, and rights “are owed to man because of the very fact that he is a 
man” (Maritain 1943: 37). Principles of equity and equality between persons are 
important in this context. Respect for persons can be personally orientated as respect for 
oneself and interpersonally orientated as respect for others, but the reason why one 
respects oneself is the same reason why one ought to respect others. Infringing upon 
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another’s rights cannot be done lightly, for a wrongful impingement means treating the 
other as less worthy of respect, as less of a human being. Rights can be rightfully 
overridden or limited, but such actions always demand justification. 
5.2 Rights in the context of risk impositions 
It is fairly straightforward to claim a right against, and condemn instances of, certain or 
actual harm infliction. But can one make a valid claim to a right when harm is only a 
future possibility or probability? How one understands the connection between harm 
and risk, or between actual and possible harm, defines what one deems to be wrong 
about imposing risks on others. As David McCarthy (1997: 205) argues: “any plausible 
theory of rights will ascribe to us something at least very much like the right that others 
not harm us […]. It would be very surprising if facts about the morality of imposing 
risks of harms did not connect importantly with the morality of harming”. In a similar 
vein, Fried (2012a: 249) argues that the problem of risk and the problem of harm to 
others are in fact the same, but approached from a forward-looking and a backward-
looking perspective respectively. But even though traditional rights-based ethical 
theories restrict actions that straightforwardly harm others, they generally do not say 
much about the impermissibility of risk impositions (Scheffler 1985: 81). 
 
Kirstin Shrader-Frechette (1991: 117) argues: “If all members of society have an equal 
prima facie [sic] right to life, and therefore bodily security, as the most basic of human 
rights, then allowing one group of persons to be put at greater risk, without 
compensation or for no good reason, amounts to violating their rights to life and bodily 
security”. A right not to be harmed is inseparable from the rights to life, health, safety, 
and bodily integrity. A right against harm must entail not only protection against actual 
instances of harm to life, health, safety, and bodily integrity, but also against being 
exposed to possible negative effects on these things. But what does a right against risk 
exactly entail? Can it be overridden, and if so, on the basis of what kind of arguments? 
Does the notion of rights employed in the context of risk impositions help one 
understand under what conditions risk impositions are acceptable? 
5.3 An absolute right against risk 
In a discussion on the nature of rights, Thomson (1990) formulates two theses with 
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regard to harm and risk. The Harm Thesis (HT) reads that individuals have a right not to 
be harmed: they have a claim against other persons that they not harm them, and others 
are obliged to respect that right. Claims can be lost, for example if one waives or 
forfeits a right, and in those cases the HT is no longer applicable (ibid.: 228; 
Zimmerman 2006: 300). Thomson’s second thesis is the Risk Thesis (RT), which reads 
that individuals have a right that other persons not expose them to risks of harm. 
Thomson gives the example of a person D, who, in the process of cleaning up his land, 
throws a log on the highway next to his property. Is it the case, she wonders, that 
through this risk imposition D has infringed upon a right of every other person on the 
planet that could have come onto the highway, fallen over the piece of wood, and 
incurred harm? “We might well prefer that our theory of rights avoid saying this”, 
argues Thomson (1990: 245). Almost every human action imposes some kind of risk on 
others, however small or improbable. The RT suggests that everyone can file claims 
against everyone else to not perform actions that merely remotely expose her or him to 
risk: “each practice that creates a risk of violating a right then becomes an unqualified 
“wrong” that requires tougher regulation and enforcement” (Bardach & Kagan 2010: 
14). This implies an impossible abundance of rights, which would be far too restrictive 
on human interaction by rendering virtually all action morally impermissible: recall the 
problem of paralysis discussed in the previous chapter (Hayenhjelm & Wolff 2011). 
Thomson therefore accepts the HT, but rejects the RT. Interesting to note is that even 
though she rejects the RT, she nevertheless deems it can still be wrong to impose risks 
on others. However, she deems risk impositions such an unavoidable aspect of life that 
they cannot be considered as rights violations.  
5.4 A right against likely or severe risk 
The extremity of an absolute right against risk must be refuted, but this does not mean 
the rights-based perspective should be disregarded altogether. A possible solution could 
be to select a threshold that separates risks that do not violate rights from risks that do. 
As with the duty not to expose others to risk, a claim to a right against risk can be 
considered valid if the risked harm exceeds a certain limit. Again, this limit can be 
based either on the likeliness of the risked harm, its severity, or on a combination of 
both factors. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 115 
5.4.1 Differences between persons 
A threshold of likeliness or severity entails that risk impositions only infringe upon a 
right of the person on whom the risk is imposed if the possible harm exceeds an agreed 
limit. Thomson (1990) briefly considers a limit for rights infringements when she 
deliberates on whether to nuance the RT to the High Risk Thesis (HRT), which reads 
that individuals have claims against other persons that they not impose high risks of 
harm on them. She almost immediately rejects the HRT because she deems the term 
‘high’ too vague (ibid.: 246). For what is a high risk of harm? Going back to the 
example of D and the log thrown onto the highway: it depends on what kind of person 
encounters the log, and under what kind of circumstances he or she encounters it, 
whether the log constitutes a high risk of harm. There cannot be one threshold that 
determines this. It might be a high risk if the log is lying on the highway just around a 
bend that obstructs the view, but not if any road user can see the log from miles away. It 
might be a high risk for a motorist driving at the speed limit of 120 kilometres per hour, 
but it is not for the average walker. It might be a high risk for an old and fragile 
grandfather trying to lift his stout grandchild over the log, but not for a professional 
hurdling athlete.35 Also, other things might influence the risk, such as someone moving 
it. The fact that D cannot foresee or predict how his act might play out, as well as the 
fact that other causes might contribute to the intensity of the risk, impedes the 
establishment of a clear threshold. 
5.4.2 The motivations of the risk-imposer 
Apart from the vagueness or arbitrariness of such a threshold, another problem for this 
proposal is that it allows the imposition of malevolent harms if they fall below the 
threshold. Consider a skilled but malicious driver who suddenly accelerates in a traffic 
jam to give his passengers and other road users a fright. Compare this to an ambulance 
driver speeding on a busy highway to get a patient to hospital as soon as possible. Both 
drivers impose the same unlikely risk of harm on their passengers and other road users. 
However, most people would morally judge both risk impositions differently, and find 
the first but not the second imposition a rights infringement. The difference lies in the 
motivation with which the risks are imposed. I understand motivation here as what one 
                                                
35 This example is an adaptation of Laura Westra’s (2015: 356) “elderly tripper” and “athletic young 
person” encountering the log. 
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desires to result from one’s action. The first driver imposes an unlikely risk just for his 
own enjoyment; the second driver imposes a similar risk but is motivated to save a life. 
A likeliness or severity threshold does not take into account the motivations of the risk 
imposer, which influence the moral evaluation of risk impositions and rights 
infringements. 
5.4.3 Thresholds contradict the essence of rights 
A more fundamental problem for the threshold proposal is that it contradicts the essence 
of rights. What matters for the infringements of rights is not the extent to which a right 
is violated, but that a right is violated. Recall that rights demarcate the space in which 
persons interacts by functioning as boundaries that protect the dignity and integrity of 
persons, their life, and their property. The moment such boundaries are crossed, rights 
are violated, regardless of how far the limit is exceeded. This can be illustrated with the 
example of smoking in the vicinity of others, mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Singular, multiple, or even many combined instances of inhaling second-hand smoke 
will not necessarily result in severe, long-term damage to others. However, the 
likeliness that others will suffer such harm increases every time they breathe in cigarette 
fumes. Inhaling second-hand smoke makes a person more vulnerable and susceptive to 
negative health effects, and this renders every single instance a risk imposition that is 
simultaneously a boundary crossing, i.e. a rights infringement. 
 
Peter Railton (1985: 92) remarks: “There is no room in a Lockean view for regarding 
minor injuries inflicted across boundaries as morally permissible, since […] whether a 
boundary is crossed does not depend on the magnitude of the effect, or the value of 
what was affected”. A right is either violated or respected, and whether a boundary is 
crossed depends on whether harm was done, even if it is small. Consider that if stealing 
infringes upon a right to property, then even stealing a ballpoint pen from a 
multimillionaire is an infringement of a right (ibid.; Mills 1985: 2). A risk imposition 
can then only be considered permissible if it can be shown that no harm was done and 
no boundary was wrongfully crossed, not even a little bit. The proposal to establish a 
limit, separating rights-violating risk impositions from non-rights-violating risk 
impositions, dilutes the protective strength of rights. It can therefore never be the 
product of a rights-based perspective, and it: 
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[…] cannot be utilized [sic] by a tradition which holds that stealing a 
penny or a pin or anything from someone violates his rights. That 
tradition does not select a threshold measure of harm as a lower limit, in 
the case of harms certain to occur. It is difficult to imagine a principled 
way in which the natural-rights tradition can draw the line to fix which 
probabilities impose unacceptably great risks upon others. (Nozick 1974: 
75, original italics) 
 
Selecting a threshold that determines under what conditions the right not to be harmed 
or exposed to risk of harm is valid seemed a fruitfully flexible alternative to the absolute 
interpretation of such rights. However, thresholds of any extent of severity or degree of 
likeliness do not incorporate the intentions of the risk-imposer. Moreover, establishing a 
threshold that determines the validity of any right cannot originate from rights-based 
ethics alone, as doing so contradicts the essence of rights as expressing respect for 
persons and protecting the sanctity of human life. 
5.5 A prima facie right against risk 
Another alternative is to understand the rights of individuals not to be harmed or 
exposed to risk as prima facie rights, which have to be weighed against other rights, 
duties, values, and concerns to determine what deserves priority in a given situation. 
Such a bounded right against risk is proposed by Schroeder (1986: 510), who argues 
that a “notion of a right against risk that trumps all considerations of countervailing 
values cannot be so validated by any theory in the rights tradition”. 
5.5.1 Imposing a risk for the greater good 
Risk impositions on individuals are often justified by referring to the competing, and 
initially compelling, collective claim to the greater good. Constructing buildings, 
developing drugs, and peacekeeping are activities that expose construction workers, 
medical trial participants, and soldiers to heightened risk of harm so that the population 
in general can reap the benefits of buildings, drugs, and peace. The question is whether 
individual rights against risk can ever be justifiably limited or overridden to serve the 
benefit of others. Can for example the installation of surveillance cameras, and exposure 
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of individual citizens to a heightened risk of privacy infringement, be justified by 
referring to a collective safety benefit for the population? Lanre-Abass Bolatitio Asiata 
(2010) believes that this risk imposition is unjustifiable from a rights-based perspective. 
He (ibid.: 320) argues that if individual rights can be sacrificed to provide significant 
benefits for others, rights lose their value, strength, and protective force: “not infringing 
on human rights has greater moral force than providing public goods”. 
 
However, it is clear to see that Bolatito Asiata’s rights-based perspective, in which 
infringements of rights are absolutely impermissible, is too restrictive. A reason why 
risk impositions on some individuals for the greater benefit of society can be considered 
permissible is because those individuals belong to society, and therefore equally enjoy 
the benefits of such risk impositions. However, an equal share in benefits can in itself 
not justify exposing some to risk. Because the risk-exposed carry a greater share, or all, 
of the burden, it would only be fair to allow them a greater share, or all, of the benefits. 
But public goods such as buildings or peace cannot be divided into shares. Hayenhjelm 
(2012: 924) therefore argues that “The justification for such cases of increased risk 
cannot be fulfilled looking at the level of benefits alone”. Apart from a share in benefits, 
she mentions other important considerations with regard to justification of risk 
impositions, namely, consent to, and compensation for, the imposed risk. Consent and 
compensation will be discussed in the next sections, but in the next paragraph the 
argument of collective benefit is scrutinised further. 
5.5.2 Collective life-saving benefits 
For what if imposing a risk on some provides not merely practical or welcome benefits 
for others, but saves or preserves the lives of others? Can the individual prima facie 
right against risk then be justifiably overridden? Consider the well-known ethical 
dilemma of a physician faced with the possibility to harvest five organs from one 
relatively healthy patient in order save five dying patients all in need of a different 
organ. The physician is bound by the duty to do no further harm, and therefore ought 
not to kill one person irrespective of how many other persons he is able to save by doing 
so (Hogan & Lairet 2007; Geale 2012). Now imagine that the physician considers 
harvesting only one kidney from the relatively healthy patient in order to save one of the 
five dying patients of whom both kidneys will soon stop working. The physician will 
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then not kill the first patient for she can still live with one remaining kidney, but he is 
exposing her to risks associated with having one kidney, such as high blood pressure 
and injury with contact sports. For argument’s sake assume that she is not aware of the 
actual harm done to her, and that she never experiences high blood pressure or engages 
in contact sports. She does not experience herself to be worse off than when she had two 
kidneys, and moreover another person lives because of the transplant. 
 
In these kinds of dilemmas Thomson’s (1990) Trade-Off Idea can be applied. Instead of 
clinging on to the inherent value of rights, she provides a more flexible approach to the 
permissibility of rights infringements with her idea of balancing harms against benefits. 
The Trade-Off Idea roughly states that a claim to a right can be permissibly infringed 
upon if the good resulting from the infringement outweighs the degree to which the 
risk-bearer is being made worse off (ibid.: 149–175). This idea renders harvesting the 
kidney under the described circumstances permissible: the degree of good brought about 
by the transplant is higher than the degree of harm experienced by the risk-bearer. But, 
from a rights-based perspective, harvesting the kidney is wrong despite the positive 
trade-off. The risk exposure is unjustifiable because it violates her right not to be used 
and unduly exposed to risks of harm so that others may benefit: “To achieve the greater 
good, the basic rights of another should not be violated […] no matter what possible 
benefit to the greater number of people” (Geale 2012: 547). A live-saving benefit to 
others in this case is not enough to override the right against risk. 
 
Now recall the example provided by Espinoza and Peterson (2012) of the vaccine 
against pandemic influenza and its severe cardiovascular health risks for elderly people, 
discussed in the previous chapter. The argument of a life-saving benefit now gains 
momentum because the vaccine will not merely save a few, but the majority of a whole 
population. The pandemic influenza that will break out if the vaccine is not approved 
for administration has a high mortality, meaning that most of the people who contract 
the virus will die. Approving the vaccine will then fairly certainly save many lives. On 
the other hand, there are only ‘some concerns’ that the vaccine ‘may cause’ health risks 
for the elderly, something merely shown by ‘preliminary results’ (ibid.: 10). A crucial 
characteristic of the influenza example is that there is no alternative available. Now 
imagine the worst-case scenario: all the expectations come true, all the elderly persons 
to whom the vaccine is administered develop extremely vicious health problems, and all 
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of them die. Even then the individual prima facie rights against risk from the elderly has 
to be justifiably overridden, for if this is not the case, a significant part of the population 
will most likely die. If the elderly do not die from complications caused by the vaccine, 
they will probably die from contracting the virus. The comparison is between life and 
death: if the vaccine is administered it will save many lives and might take a few; if the 
vaccine is not administered a few lives are temporarily saved but eventually all will be 
lost. Another potentially important aspect is that the risks affect the elderly, but the 
benefits accrue to the younger part of the population. As Sara Geale (2012: 458) 
remarks: “there remain varied definitions of the entitlements of people related to their 
age, gender, caste and their political or social standing”. The age difference between 
elderly persons who might die from the administered vaccine, and younger persons who 
will escape death by the virus because of the vaccine, might influence the valuation of 
their rights. 
5.5.3 An unclear outcome 
For rights-based ethics to contribute to the ethics of risk, it needs to be able to explain 
when a right against risk can legitimately be overridden. An individual prima facie right 
against risk might be legitimately overridden to save the lives of an overwhelming 
majority, but this example belongs to a very small class of cases in which collective 
life-saving benefits override the rights of individuals. The example deals with a question 
of the life and death of a vast majority, and only a few instances of risk impositions 
satisfy this characteristic. In most daily, average, or in the words of Fried (2012a: 236) 
“garden-variety cases of risk imposition”, the stakes are much lower, or at least less 
obvious. The argument that individual rights against risk can be overridden by life-
preserving benefits for an overwhelming majority is not relevant for such impositions, 
and gives no decisive answer to the question of their permissibility. For most cases of 
risk impositions, it is still unclear whether persons can claim a right against risk. 
5.6 A right against risk without consent 
From the perspective of rights-based ethics, risk impositions can only be considered 
permissible once the person exposed to risk has freely consented to the imposition. 
Persons can waive their rights, also their right against risk, by giving consent. This is 
what makes the crucial difference between simply harvesting a kidney and asking the 
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patient, or giving her the opportunity, to donate it. Consent is also what makes the 
difference between forcing persons to construct buildings, take part in medical trials, 
and wage their lives in war, and ensuring their personal choice in doing so. As Thomas 
Scanlon (1998: 236) remarks with regard to workers who do risky jobs, such as 
construction work: “Our sense that it is permissible to undertake these projects also 
depends crucially on the assumption that […] workers have the choice whether or not to 
undertake the risks involved”. 36  As such consent has a “morally transformative” 
character (Kleinig 2010: 4): it can turn wrongful infringements into permissible, 
welcome interactions (Teuber 1990; McCarthy 1997; Nickel n. d.). Now it also becomes 
clearer why rights need to be discussed separately from duties. From the perspective of 
the duty-holder, the government and the physician respectively in the examples above, 
no moral consideration can make the decision to impose a risk justifiable. From the 
perspective of the rights-holder, i.e. the citizens and the patient, the risk imposition can 
be rendered permissible by giving consent. Through the notion of consent, the rights-
based approach opens up new possibilities for understanding the permissibility of risk 
impositions. 
5.6.1 Actual consent 
Requiring actual consent to justify risk impositions sounds intuitively appealing, but 
leads to several problems. Neelke Doorn (2015: 356) rightly remarks that “the absolute 
right not to be exposed to a hazard without one’s consent is difficult to assure in all 
situations”. Firstly, a person who impermissibly imposes risks on others obviously loses 
or forfeits the right. Consider Tom who despises Jerry and is intent on killing him. If 
Tom attacks Jerry, Tom’s right to not be exposed to harm without consent is no longer 
valid, and it is permissible for Jerry to use force on Tom in an act of self-defence. 
Secondly, consent can be literally impossible to obtain for risk impositions that concern 
future generations, children, or mentally impaired persons. Also, for many risk 
impositions it is impossible to identify the risk-bearers in advance (Sunstein 2002). 
Requiring consent for such risk-imposing activities rules out the permissibility of any 
risk-imposing activities that involve these groups of people, even if they themselves 
                                                
36 It must be noted that risky jobs, such as those in industries like fishing, garbage collection, long-
distance transport, logging, meatpacking, and e-waste recycling, are often done by people with a low 
income. The world’s poor often do not have another choice but to work in dangerous environments, and 
without alternatives they cannot truly have said to consent to the risks involved in their work. The fact 
that many risky jobs also do not pay well continues this cycle of poverty (Fleischner 2015). 
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stand a chance to greatly benefit. Thirdly, consent can be practically impossible to 
obtain, especially for risk impositions that involve large groups. To require consent 
from each potential risk-bearer will result in heavy delays without regard for the size of 
the risk or the possible benefits of its imposition. Delaying the imposition of a risk can 
itself have more harmful effects, such as in Thomson’s (1976: 208) example of US 
President Harry who debates deflecting an incoming bomb from a large city to a small 
town. The consent requirement obligates the president to apportion time to obtaining 
consent of all those involved. This is impossible because there is not enough time, and 
because it is difficult to determine who exactly will suffer harms as a result of the 
decision. McCarthy (1997: 216) therefore argues “it is permissible for the about-to-be 
infringer of the right not to seek consent if seeking it would be unduly onerous”. 
Fourthly, an absolute interpretation of the consent requirement leads to a situation of 
stalemate (McCarthy 1997; Hansson 2006; Doorn 2015). If each potential risk-bearer 
has to give consent before a risk imposition can be considered permissible, each 
individual has the power to veto the process of approving and justifiably imposing the 
risk. This imprisons the decision-making system in a constant state of deadlock. 
5.6.2 Hypothetical consent 
These problems might be countered by requiring hypothetical, instead of actual, 
consent. What would a person, if he or she was able or had the opportunity to give 
consent, consent to? What risk impositions are reasonable and understandable to the 
average rational person? The first problem for the option of hypothetical consent is how 
such consent can be binding: what it the legitimising force of such consent, and when 
can one say that someone has consented? Secondly, not even hypothetical consent is 
always necessary for making a risk imposition permissible. Philip Nickel (n. d.) 
identifies a special case of risk impositions in which the right to informed consent, or 
the right against unconsented risk, can justifiably be overridden. When a risk-bearer has 
a significant chance of benefiting from the imposition of a certain risk, and that risk 
imposition is the only way of preventing (risk of) harm to the risk-bearer, it is 
permissible to infringe upon his rights. Examples are “social experimentation with new 
technologies for disaster relief, the use of mandatory vaccines for prevention of deadly 
infectious diseases (where widespread compliance is required), or the implementation of 
built-in speed limits in automobiles” (ibid.: 17). The right to consent should then not be 
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understood as an absolute right but an important prima facie right that in certain 
situations can be overridden by weightier considerations, or that is sometimes literally 
or practically impossible to respect. 
5.6.3 Important, but not necessary 
While the notion of consent does open up the right-based approach to new possibilities 
for understanding the permissibility of risk impositions, consent, either actual or 
hypothetical, is not always possible to obtain. Moreover, a right against unconsented 
risks, or a right to be asked for consent in risky situations, can be legitimately 
overridden. In cases where consent cannot, or does not need to be, obtained, but risk 
impositions result in harm, it would be fair to require some form of compensation. I turn 
to this consideration in the following section. 
5.7 A right to compensation 
There is “a strong connection between rights infringements (permissible or not) and 
duties to compensate. […] other things being equal, if one person infringes the right of 
another, then, very roughly, the infringer is under a duty to compensate the bearer of the 
right,” states McCarthy (1997: 218–219). It is indeed fair to argue that those risk-
bearers whose rights have in fact been violated, and who have suffered harm as result of 
a risk imposition, are entitled to compensation. I generally believe that when harm is 
inflicted, some kind of compensation or restitution is in order. This is an ex post 
interpretation of compensation, meaning that only when risk impositions result in actual 
harm is compensation required. But as David Rosenberg (1984: 878) observes: “A right 
not to be wrongfully interfered with is fundamentally different from a right to 
compensation after the fact. Transgressions of victims’ rights offend the victims’ human 
dignity regardless of whether their material losses are “fully” compensated”. A person 
on whom harm is inflicted has been wronged regardless of whether or not he receives 
compensation. To mitigate or alleviate this wrong, and to incentivise potential infringers 
of rights not to perform potentially harmful actions, compensation could be considered 
obligatory before the actual harm or rights infringement occurs. Risk impositions are by 
definition actions from which no harm has yet resulted: in the case of risky actions 
compensation can be required ex ante, meaning before actual harm has materialised. 
But now Hansson’s extension problem recurs: can the compensation requirement for 
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actual harm and right violations be extended to cases of possible harm and rights 
violations, i.e. risk impositions? In other words: does the ex ante compensation 
requirement make sense? 
5.7.1 Ex ante compensation 
An ex ante interpretation of the compensation rule states that if persons have a right to 
be compensated for actual harm, they have a right to be compensated for possible harm. 
Or phrased differently, if actual harm is a rights violation that evokes a duty to 
compensate on the side of the risk-imposer, the same counts for possible harm. Risk 
impositions are then permissible if and only if compensation is provided to the risk-
bearer, regardless of whether or not actual harm occurs, or rights are in fact violated 
(Nozick 1974: 75–76; MacLean 2012: 794). This is what McCarthy (1997: 221) calls 
the Direct Payment Rule: if a risk is imposed, compensation needs to be paid 
immediately to the risk-bearer. Otherwise the risk imposition qualifies as an 
impermissible rights infringement. But does a pure risk imposition, i.e. a risky action 
from which no harm has resulted yet, qualify as a rights violation that can demand 
compensation? 
 
An ex ante compensation requirement for risk impositions makes sense when a person 
can justifiably consider him- or herself to be worse off purely by being exposed to risk: 
risk is then itself a form of harm and imposing a risk on someone violates his or her 
rights. Recall Finkelstein’s (2003) understanding of exposure to risk is a form of harm, 
discussed in Chapter 2. The conception of risk as harm can explain general moral 
intuitions about reckless driving or attempted murder: even if no actual harm results 
from those actions, they are wrong and the persons subjected to them are wronged. It 
can also explain why ex ante compensation is required for risk impositions: when risk 
exposure is itself a form of harm, it violates risk-bearer’s rights, which ought to be 
compensated for in order to make them as well off as they would have been if risk was 
not imposed on them. 
 
However, Finkelstein’s argument presupposes that risk-bearers are aware of the fact that 
they are exposed to risk, and are worse off because of this realisation. One could claim 
that risk-imposers have a duty to inform risk-bearers of their actions. But in cases where 
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individual risk-bearers cannot be identified beforehand, it is simply impossible to 
communicate with them. If the risk-exposed is not aware of her exposure, she cannot 
experience herself to be worse-off because of the risk imposition. Her rights cannot be 
considered violated and ex ante compensation is either impossible or unnecessary. 
Moreover, actual harm is not the same as risked harm, and should be addressed 
differently. Even if a person is aware of the fact that she is exposed to risk and suffers 
because of this knowledge, her suffering is not the same as what she experiences when 
the risked harm actually realises: being hit is not the same as anticipating or dreading to 
being hit. Even though anticipation of harm is not good or preferable, it is not 
straightforwardly clear that it constitutes a rights violation just as actual harm does, and 
why it ought to be compensated, especially if the anticipated harm never realises into 
actual harm (MacLean 2012: 794). A last difficulty with ex ante compensation is that it 
instigates the problem of paralysis, or even tends to reserve this problem for 
economically disadvantaged groups. The requirement to pay compensation up front 
might incentivise less privileged persons to become overly cautious and reluctant to 
perform any action that is slightly risky, and privileged persons to act recklessly and 
immorally. Persons who are wealthy and wicked have a free pass to impose any risk as 
long as they can compensate it immediately. 
5.7.2 Ex post compensation 
A more realistic option is a partial extension of the compensation rule, requiring ex post 
compensation to be paid to those persons on whom harm is actually inflicted, and whose 
rights are in fact violated (Nozick 1974: 75–76; MacLean 2012: 794). A risk imposition 
is then considered permissible if and only if resulting harm can be compensated. This is 
what McCarthy (1997: 221) calls the Natural Lottery Rule, which states that “if an agent 
imposes a risk of harm on another, then he or she is under a duty to pay the risk bearer 
compensation for the harm if the risk bearer suffers the harm as a result of bearing the 
risk, and nothing otherwise”. McCarthy (ibid. 222) claims that this rule is easier to 
apply than the Direct Payment rule, for instead of needing to identify who imposed a 
risk on whom, one only needs to identify who caused harm to whom. But in many cases 
of harm resulting from risk impositions it is difficult, if not impossible, to clearly 
identify an imposer and a victim. Harm from risk often occurs through a chain of many 
consecutive instances of risk imposition that cumulatively result in harm, or through 
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many simultaneous instances of risk imposition that aggregately result in harm. 
 
An example of a cumulative risk of harm is different people making use of a road: every 
time a person uses that road it deteriorates, thereby contributing to a greater risk of 
potholes for the next road user. An example of an aggregate risk of harm is air 
pollution: every individual making use of a car, a stove, or factory-produced goods 
contributes a miniscule part to a collectively substantial risk of air pollution. If a road 
user eventually crashes into a pothole, or contracts asthma as a result of inhaling 
polluted air, it is impossible to identify one or more individuals who exposed them to 
this risk. It is impractical and unrealistic to require all contributors to the creation of 
risks to directly compensate all others that suffer harm from such risk impositions. 
 
There are also some forms of harm that are impossible to compensate, for example 
death. According to the ex post compensation requirement, actions that impose a risk 
that cannot be compensated, like a risk of death, can never be permissible because a 
risk-bearer cannot be compensated for death (because he is dead and because death is 
the gravest of harms). But many risky actions impose a small possibility of death on 
others, such as driving a car, making a fire, or building a scaffold. Requiring ex post 
compensation, or the possibility that compensation can be provided, for such risk 
impositions to be permissible could result yet again in the problem of paralysis. 
 
Moreover, the promise of ex post compensation might persuade risk-bearers to accept 
the imposition of risks for the wrong reasons. Consider youngsters agreeing to partake 
in a drug research because the research institute offers them coupons for a MacDonald’s 
meal. The compensation requirement can then become exploitative, and turn into a form 
of impermissible nudging, manipulation, or bribing. 
5.7.3 Important, but not conclusive 
The compensation requirement for risk impositions, either ex ante or ex post, runs into 
difficulties. In cases where harm eventually results from imposed risk, and where a 
causal link from identifiable risk-imposer to identifiable risk-bearer can be clearly 
established, the harm generally has to be compensated. But these cases are dealt with 
from the perspective of realised harm, not from anticipated harm. The compensation 
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requirement is therefore important but not conclusive in providing an answer to the 
question of permissibility of risk impositions. 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter centred on the question: Does rights-based ethics provide a convincing 
evaluation of risk impositions? A rights-based evaluation of actions that involve risk to 
others is only possible if some sort of right against risk can be derived from the right not 
to be harmed. The main goal of this chapter was then to see whether a justifiable and 
tenable right against risk could be derived from the right against harm. Five different 
rights against risk were scrutinised. 
 
The first right was an absolute right against risk impositions. This was straightforwardly 
rejected because it prohibits virtually all action. The second right was a right not to be 
exposed to likely or severe risks of harm. Selecting a threshold measure for rights 
refutes the nature of rights-based ethics, and can therefore not be derived from a 
libertarian perspective. The third right was a prima facie right not to be exposed to risk, 
which can be overridden by weightier rights, duties, values, or considerations. A rights-
based approach can only consider one reason weighty enough to override an individual 
right against risk: a risky action must provide life-saving benefits to an overwhelming 
majority in order to justify imposing life-endangering risks on a minority. However, this 
extreme argument is not applicable in most normal cases of risk impositions and 
therefore provides little practical guidance. The fourth right was a right against risks the 
risk-bearer did not consent to. Actual consent can be literally impossible or practically 
difficult to obtain, for example when risk impositions involve children, mentally 
impaired persons, future generations, large groups of people, or unidentifiable victims. 
Requiring hypothetical consent in such situations is a possibility, but it is unclear when 
such consent can be considered valid, and whether it has any legitimising force. 
 
A last right worthy of discussion in the context of risk was the right to be compensated 
for being exposed to risk. I considered an absolute extension of the compensation rule 
for actual harm, requiring ex ante compensation for risk impositions. It proved unclear 
why an anticipated harm required compensation in the same way as actual harm does. I 
then considered a partial extension of the compensation rule for actual harm, requiring 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 128 
ex post compensation for risk impositions that materialised into harm. However, this 
requirement unrealistically presupposes that both risk-imposer and risk-bearer can be 
identified, lacks sensitivity to harms that cannot be compensated, and can become 
exploitative. 
 
I conclude then that rights-based ethics alone cannot provide a convincing evaluation of 
risk impositions, i.e. it cannot account for what makes certain risk-imposing actions 
acceptable, and renders others impermissible. For only in cases where harm is imminent 
or very likely to occur, people might claim a right not to be exposed to risk. This 
conclusion does not exclude rights from influencing the evaluation of risk impositions: 
it merely states that other normative considerations have to be included in such 
evaluations as well. A right-based ethical perspective highlights the importance of 
consent and compensation, two considerations that are of substantial concern during and 
after the justification of risk-imposing actions. Moreover, it lends strength to the 
individual voice, which is often drowned out by the aggregated benefits of a majority. 
In the next chapter I will discuss an ethical perspective that continues to focus on the 
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6. THE CONTRACTUALIST PERSPECTIVE 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter contractualism will be put to the test of finding an answer to the question 
of when it is permissible for one agent to expose another agent to risk: Does 
contractualism provide a convincing evaluation of risk impositions? As its name 
already indicates, contractualism is a branch of normative theory that determines 
whether human conduct is right or wrong by referring to a contract, an agreement, or a 
consensus, between individuals. Scanlon (1998) develops contractualism specifically in 
his influential work What We Owe to Each Other. But since Scanlon uses the notion of 
a social contract, the foundations of contractualism are already laid in A Theory of 
Justice by John Rawls (1971). Rawls focuses on the question as to what kinds of 
political institutions are just, and understands a contract as a socio-political concept that 
aids in formulating a framework for a liberal, just, and fair society. Scanlon uses the 
same notion of a contract as an ethical tool with which to evaluate principles governing 
interpersonal conduct, and focuses on the rightness and wrongness of actions. 
 
Despite this difference, the predominantly political work of Rawls and the ethical work 
of Scanlon are grouped together under the label of contractualist thinking.37 This stands 
in opposition to contractarian thinking: a distinction based on the reasons that motivate 
individuals to enter into a contract with others. Advocates of contractarianism, such as 
Hobbes (2003 [1651]) and his modern counterpart David Gauthier (1986), argue that 
humans are first and foremost self-interested agents who enter into collaborative 
contracts with others to further their own interests.38 Advocates of contractualism on the 
other hand, like Rawls (1971) and Scanlon (1998), but also earlier expounders such as 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (2012 [1762]), hold that people make binding agreements with 
others because they have an intrinsic desire to justify their acts to others. 39 
Contractarianism focuses on self-interest and views the individual in opposition to 
                                                
37 In general, there is much overlap between political and normative philosophy: one can even argue that 
the former has its beginnings in the latter. Because humans are social beings, the ethical question of what 
constitutes a good life for a human being evokes the political question of what is a good life for a human 
being amongst others (Moseley 2016). 
38 In the political domain for example it is beneficial for individuals to cede part of their autonomy to the 
state in exchange for protection, and it is exactly this self-interested consensus that legitimises the 
authority of the state. 
39  For an overview of the relation between contractarianism and contractualism, consult Elizabeth 
Ashford and Tim Mulgan (2012). 
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others who threaten the realisation of that self-interest if they are not negotiated with. 
Contractualism focuses on respect for human beings as persons and sees the individual 
in a more cooperative relation to others. This means that “Under contractarianism, I 
seek to maximise my own interests in a bargain with others. Under contractualism, I 
seek to pursue my interests in a way that I can justify to others who have their own 
interests to pursue” (Ashford & Mulgan 2012). 
6.1.1 Respect for persons 
Rawls (2009 [1971]: 4) acknowledges that people enter into contracts that are mutually 
advantageous for both parties when he claims that “a society is a cooperative venture 
for mutual advantage”. But he adds that for such a contract to be just and fair, it must be 
based on principles that express respect for the equal moral status of rational and 
autonomous persons. The conviction that all human beings have dignity and are worthy 
of respect is a property contractualism shares with other non-consequentialist theories, 
such as deontology and rights-based ethics. 
 
Respecting human beings as persons entails that one should refrain from negatively 
impacting the lives and integrity of others: one should not harm them physically or 
mentally, or limit their ability to make their own choices and pursue their own interests. 
But many human actions can and will in some way negatively impact others: even more 
often will one expose others to risks of harm. Both actual harming and exposing others 
to risks of harm are unavoidable corollaries of living in a social setting with other 
people. There is, as Fried (2012b) points out, a friction between two fundamental 
freedoms. On the one hand, one has the freedom to form and pursue one’s own goals 
and life path, and on the other hand one has the freedom not to be interfered with by 
others, or not to have harm inflicted on oneself by others. But “most conduct in pursuit 
of one’s own projects carries with it some risk (however remote) of harming others. As 
a result, we cannot protect one of those two interests without compromising the other” 
(ibid.: 64). 
 
Risks cannot be completely eliminated from life. The question then is “to what extent, 
and for the sake of what, it is permissible to engage in activities from which others 
might suffer. […] What risks are fair to impose on others?” (Altham 1984: 21). 
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Contractualism tries to answer these questions and solve the conflict between the two 
freedoms by allowing for actions that may or will in fact harm others, on the condition 
that an adequate justification can be provided to the affected persons. A moral contract 
is aimed at regulating interpersonal conduct in such a way that individuals can follow 
their own life paths with minimal negative interference from others, or that, when such 
interference is unavoidable or necessary, it is justifiable. The contract is then an 
expression of the equal moral status of human beings, and of the respect they deserve 
because of their equality (Groves 2009: 21). 
6.1.2 Justification: agreement or rejection 
In early strands of contractualism, justification is predominantly understood as 
agreement with others. One can think of Rawls’ hypothetical decision-makers behind 
the veil of ignorance, who have to agree on the fundamental principles of social and 
political justice. Action-guiding principles, as well as the individual actions they 
authorise, are considered right if everyone affected by them endorses, agrees on, and 
consents to them, or could at least hypothetically do so. 
 
In later versions of contractualism the focus is no longer on what everybody will agree 
to, i.e. what is right, but on what an individual can reasonably disagree with and 
therefore reject, i.e. what is wrong. This approach leaves more room for diversity and 
discussion in the realm of the right, instead of, often fruitlessly, searching for 
unanimous agreement. According to modern contractualism then, one should follow 
action-governing principles that no individual can have a reasonable complaint against. 
From this follows that “An act is wrong if its performance […] would be disallowed by 
any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could 
reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement” (Scanlon 1998: 
153). What is right is then determined in opposition to what is wrong: “an act is right if 
it would be required or allowed by principles which no one, suitably motivated, could 
reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement” (Scanlon 1986: 
151). 
6.1.3 Spotlight on the individual 
The ‘what’, ‘why’, and ‘how’ questions of contractualism are now answered: the 
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acceptability of interpersonal conduct is understood in terms of a contract between 
persons (what), based on respect for persons (why), reached through justification to 
persons (how). The answer to the last important question, of ‘who’ is the focal point of 
this contractual justification, is evident. Contractualism focuses specifically on the 
individual: ethical claims should be justifiable to each person, for it is from the 
perspective of the individual that interpersonal conduct in general, and harmful and 
risky conduct specifically, have to be evaluated. 
 
Because of its strictly individualistic focus, contractualism fundamentally opposes 
utilitarian aggregation. Classical utilitarianism, as discussed in Chapter 3, states that the 
rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the goodness or badness of its total 
consequences, aggregated across all affected individuals. This theory then permits 
actions that significantly harm one person or a few people, but lead to relatively greater 
benefits for another person, or to smaller benefits for more people (which, once 
aggregated, outweigh the harm done to the one or few). According to utilitarian 
reasoning then it would for example be permissible “to kill an innocent person in order 
to prevent some, perhaps astronomically high, number of people from suffering minor 
headaches” (Norcross 2002: 303). 
 
The same goes for exposing some to significant risks of harm. Basically, any risky 
action is permitted, as long as the potential benefits are large enough or accrue to a 
larger number of people, i.e. as long as interpersonally aggregated utility, happiness, or 
welfare is maximised. To build on the previous example, it is permissible to spend tax 
money on developing aspirin against minor headaches instead of investing it in research 
on a rare and fatal disease, provided that the probabilistic frequency of suffering a minor 
headache is many times larger than contracting the rare disease.40 Efforts to prevent or 
compensate for harm may be required, but only if these efforts maximise the total 
expected benefits (James 2012: 264). Maximisation of general welfare or overall 
happiness functions as an impersonal justification of actions “to the world at large” 
(Nagel 1979: 67 – 68). In the aggregative approach an action is good or permissible if it 
leads to the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people. 
 
                                                
40 An example from Francis Kamm (2007: 36 – 37). 
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Contractualism rejects interpersonally aggregating benefits and losses on the basis of 
respect for persons, and the distinctness of individuals. What is of value or disvalue for 
one person does not gain or lose value by being valued or disvalued by two persons. In 
other words, what is good or bad for one person does not become better or worse if 
more people experience it. No one enjoys the total benefits, or carries the total burden, 
so it would not make sense to let the permissibility of an action depend on its 
aggregated outcomes. Contractualism responds to aggregative utilitarianism by 
removing calculations from moral deliberation. A contractualist is concerned with the 
weight of the benefits and burdens for each individual, not with how many people gain 
or suffer, or with the summed-up total of their gains or losses. Justification for 
interpersonal conduct should be provided in the form of “a direct interpersonal 
response”, or a “justification for what one did to another person […] offered to him 
specifically” (Nagel 1979: 67 – 68; see also Kumar 2001: 12 – 13; Oberdiek 2014: 114). 
The adequacy of such a justification depends on the weightiness of claims that 
individuals have to be treated – or complaints against being treated – in a certain way. 
Whether an action is right or permissible therefore depends on “each individual’s 
personal reasons for rejecting a principle that licenses the action” (Frick 2015: 187). If 
an individual has a reasonable complaint against a general action-guiding principle or 
an individual action, both the principle and the action it allows are unjustifiable. 
 
The contractualist approach specifically focuses on those affected who have the 
strongest reasons for objecting to the action under consideration. Those who have the 
strongest reasons to object to an action are the ones who will be worse off as a result of 
that action. Rawls (1971) acknowledges this when he argues that fair principles of 
justice are those that maximise the expectations of the least advantaged group in 
society. Scanlon (1998: 207) also focuses attention on the perspective of the least 
advantaged when he argues that actions need to be justifiable to each person, in 
particular to those who face “the maximum level of burdensomeness”. When one 
compares claims or complaints on an individual level one ensures that the individual’s 
voice will not be drowned out by the combined voices of the many, and that one 
chooses the alternative that is most beneficial to the least advantaged. As such 
contractualism is part of the “paradigm of moral thought […] [that] allow[s] the grave 
objections of a single individual to defeat a project or plan that would otherwise be 
expedient for many” (Wallace 2002: 469). It gives expression to the moral conviction 
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that a significant harm to one person cannot be outweighed by a comparatively larger 
benefit for another person, and that it is wrong to let a few people suffer so that many 
others are able to obtain smallers benefits (Frick 2015: 175 – 176, see also Scanlon 
1998; Lenman 2008: 100). 
6.1.4 An example of one against many 
Consider an example provided by Scanlon (1998: 235). Many people are watching a 
World Cup soccer match. Now Jones, who is working in the operating room of the TV 
station broadcasting the match, has an accident. Some piece of equipment has fallen on 
his arm, bruising his hand and giving him extremely painful electrical shocks. His 
colleagues can stop Jones’ suffering by switching off the transmitter. However, they 
have to do so for fifteen minutes, thereby interrupting the broadcast and turning 
thousands of TV screens black. Should they wait until the match is finished, or rescue 
Jones the moment they realise he is in trouble?  
 
From a utilitarian perspective, a trade-off has to be made between the harm done to 
Jones, and the pleasure of watching the important soccer match aggregated across many 
individuals. If the relatively insignificant but combined pleasures of the many outweigh 
the significant harm to Jones, the transmitter must not be turned off. From a 
contractualist perspective however, this decision needs to be justifiable to all those 
affected, especially to Jones who is most disadvantaged and therefore has the strongest 
complaint. The decision to keep transmitting the match is obviously unjustifiable to 
him. Scanlon, and contractualism in general, points out that it does not matter how 
many people will enjoy watching the match uninterrupted: what matters is the 
individual claim to enjoy watching the match without interruptions. Weighed against 
Jones’ individual complaint against suffering extremely painful electrical shocks, the 
latter is without doubt much stronger. 
6.2 Justifying risk impositions 
6.2.1 A question of distribution 
Just as in cases of harmful conduct, contractualism allows for risk impositions if they 
are justifiable (in the sense of not reasonably objectionable) to each person exposed to 
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risk, especially those facing the maximum level of burdensomeness, i.e. risk exposure. 
Consider the following: to generate enough energy to supply the whole country 
consistently with electricity, the South African government either kills 52 of the 52 
million citizens, or exposes all 52 million to a micromort41, i.e. a one in a million 
probability of death.42 Because the factual outcome of both alternatives is the same (i.e. 
52 people die, and the other 51.999.948 benefit from a consistent energy supply), a 
surefooted utilitarian would be indifferent in his choice. Most people would however 
agree that the first alternative is morally condemnable, whereas the second alternative 
sounds intuitively fair. Contractualism accounts for this moral intuition by 
acknowledging that the justification of harm and risk impositions is fundamentally a 
question of distribution. How are potential harms and benefits associated with risky 
actions distributed amongst the involved parties? In other words: who shoulders the 
harms and who reaps the benefits? And, more importantly, is this distribution fair? Non-
consequential normative theories like contractualism critique consequentialist theories 
like utilitarianism on the fact that its aggregative focus blinds it to harm-benefit 
distributions amongst individuals. Contractualism tries to avoid this by zooming in from 
an impersonal to a personal perspective, and individually focused justification indeed 
seems an attractive alternative to utilitarianism’s cold calculations. However, 
prioritising the lone voice over the combined voices of others is simultaneously the 
strong point and the Achilles’ heel of contractualism. This becomes most apparent when 
one tries to justify risky actions with an unequal distribution of benefits and risks. But 
before turning to these obvious problem cases for contractualism, let us investigate two 
types of situations in which the justification of risk impositions is pretty straightforward, 
and, other things being equal, acceptable from a contractualist perspective.43 
6.2.2 Equal distribution of risks and benefits 
Sharing 
The first type of situation in which risk impositions can be justified to the risk-exposed 
                                                
41 The concept of a micromort as a descriptor of a one in a million probability of death was introduced in 
the 1970’s by Ronald Howard (Spiegelhalter 2011: 24). 
42 This situation is inspired by a more general example from Lenman (2008: 100). 
43 Altham argues that risk impositions are acceptable when the agent performing the risky action can 
isolate the risk-exposed from possible harm (1984: 27). However, such protection seems to eliminate the 
very possibility of harm, and in my opinion this situation therefore does not count as a risk-imposing one. 
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is when agents share potential harms and benefits associated with risky actions. 
Multiple agents perform the same risky activity, thereby exposing each other to the 
same risk. The risky activity must yield benefits to the agents that outweigh the possible 
harms: if the benefits they obtain by performing the risky activity are less desirable than 
the possible harms are bad, it would make no sense to perform the activity in the first 
place. An obvious example is that of driving: by driving one exposes others to risks on 
the road, but by driving themselves they expose yet others to the same risks. This seems 
quite logical and acceptable, for “we may be expected to bear, without indemnification, 
those risks we all impose reciprocally on each other” (Fletcher 1972: 543). 
 
The contract between rational agents can then be understood as a mutual agreement to 
being exposed to risks in order to expose others to the same risks, and benefit from that 
mutual exposure. The justification for exposing a person to risks lies in the opportunity 
that person receives to expose others to the same risks and gain a certain benefit. Note 
here that exposing others to risk must be understood not only in the literal sense of 
performing an action oneself that imposes a risk on others, but also as allowing others to 
be exposed to risk, asking of them to expose themselves to risk, supporting a system 
that in one way or another exposes other persons to risk, etc. For example, one may not 
drive personally, but one’s partner does, one rents out one’s car, or makes use of taxis: 
one then still reaps the benefits of driving and being mobile. 
Trading 
The second type of situation in which risk impositions can be justified, is when agents 
can trade risks and benefits, associated with different activities, in a system of risk 
trading. The possibility of trading risks and benefits accommodates “people all of whom 
want to do some things that carry risks to others, but who do not all want to do the same 
risky things” (Altham 1984: 26). Consider constructing buildings or participating in 
medical trials: the builder might be facing risks on the construction site but benefits 
from the development and improvement of medicine, and vice versa the participant in 
the medical trial is confronted with risks associated with such experiments but benefits 
from properly constructed buildings. Being exposed to risk in a particular situation is 
then counteracted by reaping the benefits of an action that exposes others to risk: “If 
[…] the (expected) losers on one risky project are likely to be the (expected) winners on 
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another, we can treat those two events as offsetting” (Fried 2012b: 57). In this case the 
contract between rational agents is to be understood as a mutual agreement to being 
exposed to risks in order to expose others to comparable or otherwise exchangeable 
risks, and benefit from that mutual exposure. The justification for exposing a person to 
risks lies in the opportunity that the risk-exposed receives to expose others to different 
risks and gain a certain benefit. Hansson (2003: 305) argues that any person would 
agree to an “equitable social system of risk-taking that works to her advantage”. It is 
indeed a flexible and dynamic solution to the previously mentioned problem of 
paralysis, or moral gridlock, that would arise if one would categorically reject or not 
consent to risk exposure. 
 
However, the main problem with the solution of a risk trading system is whether risks 
can ever be traded in a fair fashion. Potential harms associated with different risky 
activities must be exactly the same, similar, or at least comparable in order for an 
exchange to be fair. One cannot just trade any risk for any other risk, but the type of risk 
must be taken into account. For example, one can wonder if it makes sense to trade the 
risk of injury related to working as a meatpacker in a slaughterhouse for the risk of 
damage to property related to living in a hurricane prone area: an injured body and 
damaged property are significantly different harms. But similar harms also prove 
difficult to trade: can the risk of dying in a car accident associated with road travel be 
traded for the risk of dying from radiation associated with living in the vicinity of a 
nuclear reactor? Does it make sense to trade the risks of road travel for the risks of air 
travel? Moreover, the tradability of risks is influenced by the personal situation of the 
risk-exposed person. Take the example of the meatpacker and the resident of a 
hurricane prone area: now assume that the meatpacker is a struggling single mother and 
the resident is a well-off stockbroker with a love for extreme weather events. Not only 
would it be difficult to trade the risks they are exposed to: it would also be unfair. As 
Hayenhjelm and Wolff (2012: e41) point out: “a scheme that made you face the risks of 
mining, me the risks of infectious diseases in being a doctor, and another the risks from 
a waste dump, may neither be efficient nor fair, since this may not take special 
vulnerabilities, interests or concerns of individuals into account”. 
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6.2.3 Unequal distribution of risks and benefits 
Justifying risk impositions from a contractualist perspective becomes even more 
difficult when risks and benefits are not, or practically cannot be, shared or traded, but 
are distributed unequally. Unequal distributions of harms and benefits indicate that a 
trade-off has been made between conflicting interests, and that some ended up with 
more of the good than others. Such trade-offs might sound unfair, but in fact people 
collectively make them every day: trade-offs are an integral part of life. The goals 
people pursue through their actions, and the freedom with which they do so, are scarce, 
i.e. there is more demand than there is supply. There are for example finite resources to 
produce and maintain health, safety, and security. Also, as mentioned above, people’s 
freedom to pursue their own life goals is bounded by the freedom of others to be free 
from harm: it is therefore also necessarily finite. In a world of scarce goods and 
conflicting claims to those goods, trade-offs between the interests of different persons 
are inescapable. Fried (2016: 5) calls this “the universal tragedy of social life”. The 
difficulty contractualism encounters in the face of the tragedy of trade-offs becomes 
apparent when one attempts to justify socially beneficial risky activities from a 
contractualist perspective. 
Socially beneficial risky actions 
A socially beneficial decision, action, or project is one from which the majority of a 
population stands to benefit. Examples are the construction, maintenance, and use of 
infrastructure; purification treatment and supply of water; generating and distributing 
energy; or setting up medical schemes and running vaccination projects. Even though 
these projects are beneficial to the society at large, they are also, just like many other 
human activities, inherently risky: some are expected to suffer losses as a direct result of 
these activities. Many if not all public policies regulating social life are of this character. 
Contractualism must ask how such actions can be justified to the least advantaged. 
 
The first question is whether everyone indeed stands to benefit from activities that are 
beneficial to the majority. Consider a government promoting urbanisation. This brings 
opportunities for a faster growing and more innovative economy, job creation, declining 
poverty, and cultural exchanges from which most citizens stand to benefit. However, 
urbanisation is also associated with risks such as the spread of diseases, social unrest, 
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and environmental damage, to which the poorest citizens are often mostly exposed. The 
next question is whether those potentially affected are also involved in making the 
decision whether to perform generally beneficial but nevertheless risky activities. As 
Hermansson and Hansson (2007) point out, it tends to be particularly problematic if one 
person or group of people makes this decision as well as possibly benefits from its 
outcomes, but another person or group of people is exposed to the possible harms, 
without having any say over that exposure. Consider for example the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), an agreement about which the United States 
of America and the European Union are currently negotiating. Developing countries are 
excluded from the negotiations. The TTIP and other mega-regional trade agreements 
place developing countries under pressure to liberalise their markets, even though some 
of them are not strong enough to compete in the international free market. Moreover, 
the world’s least developed countries will likely shoulder most of the negative effects 
related to trade diversion, such as loss of market shares, investments, and access to 
capital, which results overall in even more reduced economic competitiveness (Schmieg 
2015; Weinhardt & Bohnenberger 2015; Elliot 2016).44 
 
Now consider situations in which the benefits associated with risky activities are 
available to all, i.e. they are part of Hansson’s equitable social system. The previously 
discussed example of the construction worker and the participant in the medical trial can 
provide an illustration. The construction worker is involved in the building of a 
university in a city: many locals as well as people from outside the city are expected to 
enjoy education there, and such a public asset will most likely boost the intellectual 
image of the city. However, all workers face a risk of serious injury or even death, and 
passers-by might be accidently harmed during the building process. But then again, the 
workers and the passers-by also have access to the national education scheme. Now 
imagine the development of a medicine that can cure cancer: the specific medicine is 
expected to save many lives but also to have highly negative side effects on the health 
of some, especially on participants in the trial period. Testing this drug might pose a 
life-threatening risk to a few persons but eventually provide a life-saving benefit to 
many others, including the participants of the medical trial. 
                                                
44 In fact, the TTIP is not even an example of a socially beneficial risk, an agreement that entails both 
risks and social benefits for all partners. But it is presented as one by those in favour of it, as if all 
countries would benefit from a liberalised market. 
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How can one justify the possible harms to which construction workers or participants in 
medical trials are exposed? One can argue that safety regulations for construction sites 
and ethical rules regulating scientific research respectively are supposed to set the 
acceptable level of risk to which workers and participant can be exposed. Moreover, one 
might argue that by working in construction or participating in trials – activities that are 
quite obviously risky – people give their implicit consent. Written consent might also be 
required. However, it can prove to be quite difficult to justify socially beneficial risky 
activities from a contractualist perspective. Because of the scale and duration of such 
activities it is almost certain, at least statistically, that someone or a few people will get 
hurt in the long run. This means that if enough buildings are constructed and if enough 
medical experiments are conducted, harm is bound to materialise at some point in time. 
And even if those who are harmed also stand to benefit from risky activities (everyone 
benefits from living in a society with proper infrastructure, decent education, and good 
medical care), the harm itself can still remain unjustifiable. As was discussed above, 
according to contractualism it is unacceptable to let a few suffer significant harm or 
even death so that the majority can enjoy pleasant, practical, or even necessary but 
comparatively less significant benefits. How can permitting risky actions ever be 
justified to future victims, i.e. future least advantaged, who either face a small chance of 
death or a bigger chance of a lesser harm? 
A matter of perspective 
As will be explored in the next paragraphs, it depends on the temporal perspective one 
takes as to whether risk impositions can be justified. The perspective, namely, 
determines what has to be justified to the potential victims: the actual harmful outcome, 
or the expected risk of that outcome (James 2012: 265). If one has to justify the actual 
consequences of a risk imposition, evaluation takes place ‘after the fact’, i.e. from an ex 
post point of view. If one has to justify the possible consequences of a risk imposition, 
evaluation takes place ‘before the fact’, i.e. from an ex ante point of view. 
6.3 The ex post perspective 
If one takes a perspective ‘after the fact’, one evaluates actions by looking at their actual 
consequences (Scanlon 1982: 122 – 123; 1998: 208). The probabilities associated with 
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those consequences do not determine the acceptability of the actions that cause them. 
Scanlon (1998: 209) admits that this sounds counterintuitive, for “it is intuitively 
obvious that the likelihood that a form of behavior [sic] will lead to harm is an 
important factor in determining its permissibility”. He continues that it is assumed that 
the likelihood of an action resulting in harm must be taken into account by discounting 
the complaint an affected person has against that action being performed, but that “this 
assumption is mistaken. The probability that a form of conduct will cause harm can be 
relevant not as a factor diminishing the “complaint” of the affected parties (discounting 
the harm by the likelihood of their suffering it) but rather as an indicator of the care that 
the agent has to take to avoid causing harm” (ibid.). The probability of harm arising 
from a certain action then determines which precautions are reasonable for a risk-
imposing agent to take. This reflects the view that it would be unacceptably costly to 
avoid all behaviour that entails a risk of harm. For when the probability of harm is low, 
the cost of implementing extra safety measures to avoid that harm can be considered 
unnecessary and unreasonable. For example, it would be unreasonable for a local 
government official to employ traffic controllers on quiet intersections with traffic 
lights. But the higher the probability of harm, the more precautionary methods become 
practically and morally necessary: it would be reasonable to employ traffic controllers 
on busy intersections where the traffic lights have stopped working during rush hour. 
However, the probability of harm does not influence, i.e. discount, the weightiness of 
the complaint an affected person has against having a risk imposed on him. Being killed 
because someone jumps a red traffic light on a quiet intersection is just as bad as having 
a similar fatal accident on a busy intersection without traffic lights. The fact that the 
probability of someone getting killed is lower in the first situation than in the second 
one does not say anything about the permissibility of, say, reckless driving. 
 
What matters for the acceptability of a risk imposition from an ex post perspective is not 
the likelihood of harm, but the harm that in fact results from an action. To judge an 
action then, one must know what the consequences will actually be: one must be certain 
whether or not that action will in fact result in harm. As was discussed in the section on 
actual consequences in the chapter on utilitarianism, certain knowledge necessarily 
entails hindsight. A judgement is reached by looking backwards with certain knowledge 
about outcomes to the moment at which the decision, leading to these outcomes, was 
made. But how can a person ever possess such knowledge at the time of decision-
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making? Fried (2012b: 43) argues that the only way a contractualist can endow 
someone with an ex post point of view is “to allow her to ‘peek ahead’ in time to see 
how things will in fact turn out if the principle is adopted”. 
6.3.1 What does one know? 
Knowledge of possible consequences 
There are two ways of understanding the ex post contractualist perspective. Firstly, 
there is the point of view sketched by Rawls (1971), in which decision-makers are 
placed behind a veil of ignorance, shielding off access to information about themselves, 
their preferences and their social status. However, they can ‘peek ahead’ to gain full 
knowledge about how the principles they adopt will generally play out in the future. 
Because they do not know themselves, they do not know how those principles will 
affect them personally: they only know what possible fates can result from adopting 
certain principles. It is therefore rational to maximise the outcomes for the least 
advantaged, for decision-makers behind the veil of ignorance might be amongst them 
once the veil is lifted. When assessing a risk imposition, the main question is then: ‘how 
is the least advantaged person affected by this action?’ or ‘how does the least 
advantaged person fare under a principle allowing such an action?’ Rawls paints a far 
more elaborate picture then I am able to do here, but the essence of his theory is quite 
simple: when confronted with alternative action-guiding principles, decision-makers 
have to assess their actual outcomes and choose the principle that has the best worst 
outcome, thereby maximising the prospects of the least advantaged. A risky action is 
then acceptable if it, compared to available alternatives, leads to the best possible 
outcomes for the least advantaged. 
 
Critical voices have attacked the tenability of Rawls’ hypothetical decision-making 
situation and the possibility of reasoning about society from this standpoint (Fried 
2012b; Hansson 2013). In actual decision-making contexts persons do know about their 
subjective preferences, personal situation, and available options. This will influence 
decisions to allow or reject actions and principles governing actions: situated selves 
make situated judgements. By making decision-makers hypothetically uncertain about 
things they are not uncertain about in real life and vice versa, Rawls reverses reality. 
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Knowledge of oneself and possible consequences 
The second variant of ex post contractualism tries to better suit actual decision-making 
situations by removing the veil of ignorance and understanding personalised 
information as morally important. The main question when assessing a risk imposition 
is: ‘how am I affected by this action?’ or ‘how do I fare under a principle allowing such 
an action?’ This ex post perspective allows one to reason with certainty about the 
outcomes of risky actions for situated selves: one not only knows oneself but one also 
knows one’s specific fate if a certain principle is adopted. But this invites the question: 
are people ever certain about the future, do they ever know the actual outcomes of their 
actions before acting? The answer is clearly ‘no’: real life is lived in a context of 
pervasive uncertainty. The ex post perspective is based on assumptions about available 
knowledge that are far from realistic, and is therefore doomed to remain purely 
theoretical. 
6.3.2 Moral deadlock revisited 
Apart from this shortcoming, the ex post perspective in general also puts extreme moral 
demands on persons, which in effect overly restricts their scope of action. Elisabeth 
Ashford (2003) makes this point in her critique on Scanlon titled The Demandingness of 
Scanlon’s Contractualism. To understand her point, let us begin with the 
acknowledgement that any action is potentially risky, meaning that it can result in harm, 
even severe harm or death. It is for example hypothetically possible that a train derails 
from the tracks and runs someone over. The possibility of getting killed by a derailed 
train is perhaps very small, but contractualism holds that assessments of likelihood 
should not be taken into account in the moral evaluation of risky projects. As Ashford 
(ibid.: 299) rightly remarks: “the remoteness of the risk of being killed does not reduce 
the complaint of the person unlucky enough to end up being killed”. The fact that death 
is a possible outcome demands us to take it seriously. Moreover, if an action is repeated 
often enough, harm statistically becomes more and more certain: if trains run often 
enough, accidents caused by derailing trains will most probably occur. Allowing train 
transportation and the associated risk of death by derailing trains has to be justified to 
future victims, just as disallowing train transportation and the associated risks of 
increased travel time and expensive transport alternatives has to be justified to 
commuters. The individual complaint against being killed by a derailed train is to be 
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weighed against the individual complaint against suffering a loss from a ban on train 
transportation. 
 
But can a principle that allows risk impositions ever be considered justifiable from the 
perspective of a victim, who has peeked ahead in time and is certain that he will suffer 
significant, severe, or deadly harm as a result of that action? How can comfortable, 
practical, or even life-changing (but not life-preserving) ex post benefits for the majority 
override the actual death of one person? One can argue that it matters whether the 
potential costs and benefits are distributed equally, in the sense that everyone stands a 
chance to benefit as well as faces similar risks of harm. In such a scenario, the future 
victim’s harm can be offset by his present access to benefits related to the risky action. 
If someone has always used the train to commute between home and work, and as such 
has shared in the benefits associated with train transportation, it would seem unfair if 
that person files a complaint against train transportation in general only when he is 
(about to be) involved in a train accident in which he loses his life. 
 
Matters seem to become more pressing when potential costs and benefits are not 
distributed equally, and future victims are exposed to risks without being able or willing 
to share in the benefits. Consider Scanlon’s (1998: 209) example of air travel and the 
risk to people on the ground of being killed by a crashing plane. Ashford (2003: 298) 
mentions that poor people are exposed to this risk while being unable to benefit from air 
travel. Véronique Munoz-Dardé (forthcoming publication) develops the example further 
by making it revolve around an Amish farmer, who is exposed to the same risk, but is 
not willing to share in the benefits of travelling by air because his convictions prohibit 
him to make use of such technological developments. 
 
The problem is that in the context of socially beneficial risky actions there will almost 
always be that one person, or group of people, who is severely harmed as a result of an 
activity from which others benefit. Innocent bystanders (those who do socially 
participate and therefore stand a chance to benefit, as well as those who do not) will be 
harmed as a result of allowing socially beneficial risky activities such as road or air 
travel, infrastructure and real estate projects, medical experiments and vaccination 
programmes. One only needs to be able to imagine the ex post perspective of one 
hypothetical future death as a result of a risky activity in order for that activity to be 
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deemed impermissible. The imagined victim can then file a reasonable and overriding 
complaint against it, regardless of enormously beneficial outcomes or a huge group of 
beneficiaries: the badness of death trumps the goodness of any other benefit. His 
complaint is even stronger if he did not benefit from the risky activity in the first place, 
such as the Amish farmer killed in a plane crash, or a vegan killed by an outbreak of an 
infectious disease in livestock.45 This means that virtually every action that potentially 
gravely harms someone, and every principle authorising such actions, can be reasonably 
rejected by the one who is potentially harmed (Fried 2012b; also see James 2012; Frick 
2015; Verweij 2015). Such competing claims bring one back to the now known, overly 
restricting and extremely risk averse, moral gridlock prohibiting all actions involving 
risk to others. 
6.3.3 Numbers count 
In the above, the possible harms and benefits resulting from socially beneficial risky 
actions were unequal: the complaint against being killed had to be compared to the 
complaint against being denied life enhancing, but not life-saving, benefits. In such 
cases ex post contractualism results in a moral deadlock. How does it fare when guiding 
choices between alternative courses of actions that both have an equally bad worst 
possible outcome, i.e. death? Consider the construction of a hospital: the death of 
construction workers during the process is possible, but even more people die if the 
hospital is not built. An equally weighty complaint against being killed can now be 
given from the imagined ex post perspective of the dead workers and from that of the 
dead patients. Now one is back in a situation of moral gridlock for in such cases the 
respective weights of the competing complaints form a tie, i.e. they cannot determine 
which alternative is morally permissible. In these situations, ex post contractualism 
allows numbers to break the tie: one should choose the alternative that saves most 
people, or harms the least (Scanlon 1998: 235). 
 
Now one has to consider that almost every action can hypothetically lead to death. 
Moreover, in the context of socially beneficial risky actions, which are performed on a 
large scale (e.g. mass construction projects), are often repeated (e.g. vaccination 
programs), or both (e.g. driving), death becomes a statistical certainty. This means that 
                                                
45 An example from Marcel Verweij (2015: 142 – 143). 
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in essence every choice between alternatives in a social setting becomes a tie, and the 
numbers of people coming to harm have to offset the draw. Death is statistically certain 
to occur whether one chooses to construct a building or not, run a vaccination program 
or not, allow a speed limit increase or not. It does not matter whether a specific 
alternative has a lower probability of death than other alternatives, for ex post 
contractualism does not incorporate probabilities into moral evaluation. But by allowing 
the number of people coming to harm to break the tie in draw-like situations, ex post 
contractualism invites aggregation in via the backdoor. 
 
An ex post focus on actual outcomes then either leads to moral deadlock by prohibiting 
all risk impositions (and therefore virtually all actions), or reverts back to aggregation to 
decide what is the best, or the least-worst, alternative. Moreover, it paints an illusionary 
picture of reality by assuming that one can know what consequences a decision or 
action will in fact have. If one would have hindsight at the time of decision-making, the 
choice for one alternative or the other would be much less difficult. 
6.4 The ex ante perspective 
The ex ante perspective captures the normal reference point for decision-making in real 
life: people possess knowledge about themselves, their preferences and dispositions, but 
they are never completely certain, i.e. they can only guess or estimate, how decisions 
and actions will affect them. People are placed behind, as Sophia Reibetanz (1998: 301) 
calls it, a “natural veil of ignorance”. One might for example know that there is a 
possibility, a probability, or even a statistical certainty that some persons will come to 
harm, but one is seldom able to identify the victims beforehand. In other words: one 
might know that there will be least advantaged persons, but often one cannot be certain 
who those persons will be. Persons exposed to risk are therefore owed a justification, 
not of the harm itself, but of their exposure to harm, and the probability that they will 
experience harm. Important for morally evaluating actions from the ex ante perspective 
are not actual but expected outcomes of those actions. One bases one’s moral 
assessment of a risk imposition on the consequences one expects it to have, meaning 
that its permissibility depends on the information one has, what one in fact knows or 
can reasonably be expected to know, about possible or probable harmful outcomes. 
From the ex ante perspective, the main questions are: ‘how likely am I to come to harm 
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because of this risky activity, and how likely am I to benefit from it?’ 
 
Take a policy example of a government deciding whether or not to increase the speed 
limit for motorised vehicles. What matters for the evaluation of its decision are not the 
actual accidents and deaths that will occur over time as a result of a higher speed limit, 
but the statistical information available to the authorities at the time of decision-making. 
Actual accidents and deaths matter only insofar as they influence and determine 
statistical information over time. According to this information the authorities have to 
review the permissibility and tenability of the height of the speed limit. Now a higher 
speed limit will undeniably increase the probability of road accidents, and it is this 
larger chance of harm that has to be accounted for. The only way in which a 
government can justify raising the speed limit is by referring to a negligible increase in 
the likelihood of harm faced by all road users, coupled with an increase in the benefits 
they are likely to gain. The complaints road users might have against an increase of the 
speed limit are discounted by the probability of them coming to harm: the lower the 
probability, the weaker their claim. 
 
To elaborate more on this, consider a decision-making institution debating which one of 
two vaccines to use in a nationwide vaccination programme against a deadly influenza 
virus. Assume that everyone faces identical risks of negative side effects associated with 
the vaccines, meaning that risks and benefits are equally distributed across the 
population. This is the case for most socially beneficial activities, otherwise they would 
not be considered to be truly socially beneficial. Vaccine A has a relatively large 
probability of a severe side effect: one in a 1000 people will lose their eyesight. Vaccine 
B on the other hand has a relatively small probability of a fatal side effect: one in 1 
million people will die after being administered the vaccine. The institution, when 
deciding whether to use Vaccine A or B in their programme, takes the perspective of the 
average individual citizen and assesses which choice is justifiable, other things being 
equal, from this perspective. Not knowing whether one will in fact be the one in a 1000 
who becomes blind, or the one in a million who dies, it is rational from an ex ante 
individualistic perspective to weigh expected costs against benefits, and go for the most 
equal and fair option. It is rational to choose vaccine B, for the chance of becoming 
blind when administered vaccine A is 1000 times bigger than the chance of dying when 
administered vaccine B, whereas the expected benefits are the same, i.e. protection 
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against the deadly influenza. The institution must opt for vaccine B: this option is 
justifiable to each potentially affected individual before harm has occurred. Moreover, 
the complaint an individual might file against dying (or: being allowed to die; being 
killed) when administered vaccine A is discounted by its probability, and cannot trump 
the much stronger complaint another individual might have against losing her eyesight 
(or: being allowing to become blind; being blinded), for this is much more probable. 
6.4.1 Reasonable ex ante, unreasonable ex post 
An action might be justifiable to each potentially affected person before the harm 
associated with a risky action occurs. But the person that in fact has come to harm as a 
result of a risk imposition can reasonably reject that action from an ex post perspective. 
Now one might argue, as Lenman (2008: 117) does, that “a policy that is not acceptable 
at every time is plausibly acceptable at none”. However, such reasoning is too 
optimistic about people’s ability to avoid harm. It ignores the fact that harm is bound to 
occur at some point as a result of any choice made in a social setting. It assumes that if 
the right choices are made no one will come to harm, or that the amount of people 
coming to harm as a result of a certain choice determines whether that choice was the 
right one. But this is indicative of a hindsight bias, for it enslaves the moral justifiability 
of a choice to its actual consequences. Moreover, the fact that some people are harmed 
as the result of a certain decision might be a tragic outcome, but that alone does not 
undo the ex ante justifiability of that decision. Actual consequences, or the ex post, 
backward-looking perspective, should not be used to debunk the reasonableness of a 
decision ex ante. 
6.4.2 Reverting back to aggregation 
Even though ex ante contractualism escapes the hindsight bias as well as the problem of 
moral deadlock haunting the ex post perspective, it has its own obstacles to overcome. 
Even though its evaluation of conduct based on the justifiability of its expected 
outcomes sounds familiar – for it is the way in which many social decisions, especially 
policy decisions affecting large groups of people, are made – it is a problematic solution 
for contractualism. By allowing probabilities to guide moral evaluation of risky conduct 
before their consequences have unfolded in the world, ex ante contractualism starts to 
look suspiciously like a masked form of utilitarianism. Take the vaccine example: the 
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choice that optimises the expected outcomes for a given individual converges with the 
choice that optimises aggregated wellbeing (Fried 2012b: 44). Also, by allowing 
probabilities to determine the weight of individual complaints, ex ante contractualism 
breaks with the contractual opposition to numbers. It is therefore unclear how ex ante 
contractualism offers a systematic alternative to utilitarian decision-making tools like 
probabilistic cost-benefit analysis and expected utility maximisation.46 
6.4.3 Individual vs. social aggregation 
However, some have argued that weighing probabilities of harms and benefits does not 
necessarily entail harmful aggregation (James 2012; Frick 2015). A specific form of 
aggregation, namely, is consistent with the separateness of persons: intrapersonal 
aggregation of risks and benefits over a human lifetime. For an individual, it makes 
complete sense to expose oneself to small, or sometimes even significant, risks of harm 
to obtain certain benefits. From an individual ex ante perspective, it then makes sense to 
approve socially beneficial risky actions, provided that one does not know in advance 
whether or not one will be negatively affected. For example, it can be reasonable ex 
ante to consent to allocating scarce resources to research on a cure for a common 
disease instead of a rare disease. Now if it eventually turns out that one contracts the 
rare disease, one can obviously regret one’s ex ante decision from an ex post 
perspective, but this does not make the ex ante decision unreasonable. The fact that one 
lacked information about the actual outcomes of a decision or action ex ante is morally 
important: because one does not know if one will be the person that is harmed, it can be 
in one’s individual interest to take, or agree to exposure to, a risk. 
 
An intrapersonal speculation in the face of risk consists in deciding ex ante from an 
individual perspective whether it is worthwhile to be exposed to a risk, and therefore 
justifiable for others to impose that risk. This stands in contrast with an interpersonal 
trade-off in the face of certainty, in which one decides from an ex post perspective 
whether it is worthwhile to sacrifice a few for the benefit of the many (Frick 2015). By 
refraining from aggregating risks and benefits across individuals, but allowing it when it 
is intra-personally justifiable, aggregation is circumscribed by respect for persons. As 
                                                
46 For an elaborate critique, see Fried (2012b): Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation?; and 
Fried (2016: working paper): Facing Up to Risk. 
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such, one walks “a careful line between the “bad aggregation” characteristic of 
utilitarianism and the “good aggregation” that is both unavoidable and fully appropriate 
in public life” (James 2012: 266). 
6.5 Conclusion 
The central question in this chapter read: Does contractualism provide a convincing 
evaluation of risk impositions? I have discussed two types of contractualism – ex post 
and ex ante – and their evaluation of actions involving risk to others. Ex post 
contractualism runs into the problem of hindsight when justifying risk impositions, 
whereas ex ante contractualism arguably does not provide a sustainable alternative to 
utilitarianism. Contractualism thus far does not provide a completely satisfying account 
of the evaluation of risk impositions. But limiting aggregation by respect for persons 
does open the door to seeing the permissibility of risk impositions in a new light, for it 
entails the possibility of allowing one to weigh costs and benefits, as well as distributing 
them unevenly. If one wants to justify a risk imposition by referring to a trade-off that is 
desirable overall between costs and benefits, while at the same time displaying respect 
for individual persons, one has to take on the perspective of the people potentially 
affected by the risk in question. If these people can consider the risk imposition to be 
acceptable, or a risk worth taking, at the time of decision-making, the risk can be 
justifiably imposed. However, a prerequisite for this solution is that potentially affected 
people are known in advance, otherwise the justification cannot be addressed to them. 
Moreover, thus far the contractualist solution leaves out the perspective of the decision-
maker, on whom the burden falls in the end to make the choice whether or not to 
impose a risk. In Chapter 8 I will focus on the position of the risk-imposing agent, and 
on what she can do in order to ensure the justifiability of choices made and risks 
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7. RECAPITULATION 
So far, a lot has been discussed. Let us take a moment to determine where we stand in 
relation to the main question that this research aims to answer: When – under which 
circumstances or conditions – it is acceptable to impose a risk on others? Or phrased 
differently: when is it acceptable to perform actions that put other people at risk? In 
order to answer this question, three research questions were formulated. The first 
research question – What is a risk? – was answered after the first two chapters. The 
second research question – Do mainstream ethical theories provide a convincing 
evaluation of risk impositions? – can now be answered based on what has been 
discussed in Chapters 3 to 6, in which respectively a utilitarian, deontological, rights-
based, and contractualist evaluation of risk impositions were considered. I conclude that 
individually the discussed theories draw attention to aspects that without a doubt 
influence the evaluation of risk impositions, but that on their own they are not capable 
of providing a sound answer to the question of when it is acceptable to impose risks on 
others. They do not provide convincing evaluations of risk impositions. In this short 
chapter I will support this conclusion by recapitulating the main strong points and 
weaknesses of the discussed ethical theories in the context of risk. By doing so, I will 
pave the way for the third research question: Can a virtue-ethical understanding of 
responsibility offer a tenable alternative evaluation of risk impositions? 
7.1 The utilitarian perspective 
A utilitarian answer to the main question is that a risk imposition is acceptable if it 
promises greater overall benefit than overall harm, i.e. if the probability of a beneficial 
outcome outweighs the probability of a negative outcome for the greatest number of 
people. This outcome-oriented perspective acknowledges that the consequences of 
actions that expose others to risks influence how one evaluates those actions. It first of 
all matters whether these consequences are considered good or bad: one might find it 
acceptable to be exposed to risk if one can obtain some benefit because of that 
exposure. Secondly, it matters how many people stand to win or lose: it is in general 
morally wrong to let one person suffer so that others can benefit, but there are situations 
in which this is justified. Thirdly, it matters how likely and big the benefits and harms 
are: for example, the more likely or grave the expected harm, the more likely and 
desirable the expected benefit must be – amongst other things – to justify an action 
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imposing that harm. And fourthly, it matters whether benefits or harms in fact 
materialise: a beneficial outcome can make one forget the risked harm, whereas a 
harmful outcome can make one doubt whether the promise of benefit was worth 
suffering the harm. 
 
All these considerations, related to the consequences of risk impositions and the number 
of people experiencing them, do influence the acceptability of risk impositions. 
However, they are not the only important things to consider when evaluating actions 
that put others at risk. A major downside of a purely utilitarian evaluation is that it is 
radically egalitarian: it focuses on overall outcomes and does not show regard for the 
way individual people are potentially affected by risk impositions. Such moral 
reasoning can justify letting a few people suffer so that more people can thrive. True, 
sometimes the voice of a few loses against the demands of the many, but it matters how 
one arrives at that conclusion. It should not be reached by purely calculative reasoning 
based on interpersonal aggregation: such reasoning must be circumscribed by an innate 
respect for the personhood of the potential losers. 
 
Another problem is that to weigh expected benefits against expected harms one needs to 
be able to predict what consequences will result from present actions. The utilitarian 
perspective then depends heavily on the ability to derive the likelihood of future 
outcomes and their implications from current knowledge. Moreover, it also assumes that 
people use available knowledge in a rational and calculative way when making 
decisions, that they are proactive in identifying risk, and responsible in minimising 
harm. But probabilistic information about risks is not always available. And even when 
it is, many people do not incorporate it in their decision-making process as it is difficult 
for most laymen to understand such information. 
 
Non-consequentialist alternatives to the utilitarian evaluation of risk impositions place 
the notion of respect for persons at the centre of their moral reasoning, albeit in a 
slightly different interpretation. Three of those alternatives were discussed. A 
deontological perspective centres around the duty not to harm, a rights-theoretical 
perspective around the right not to be harmed, and a contractualist perspective around 
the objections the person(s) exposed to risk could have against that exposure. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 153 
7.2 The deontological and the rights-based perspectives 
A deontological answer to the main question is that a risk imposition is acceptable if it 
is in accordance with the duty of the agent imposing the risk to do no harm. This 
approach acknowledges the interpersonal obligation to respect the integrity and 
wellbeing of other persons, and to refrain from harming them without qualification. The 
same can be said of a rights-based answer, which argues that a risk imposition is 
acceptable if it does not violate the right of the person exposed to risk to not be harmed. 
This approach also acknowledges the importance of respecting others as persons by 
drawing attention to their right not to be harmed. The duty not to harm and the right not 
to be harmed can explain why for example reckless or negligent behaviour are 
considered wrongful: when Johnny speeds in his car and exposes other road users to a 
higher than normal risk of an accident, he – other things being equal – refutes his duty 
not to harm others and does not respect the right of other road users to not be harmed. 
However, one has to draw a line somewhere between permissible and impermissible 
risks of harm. If no risks were permissible, life would be unliveable; but if all risks were 
permissible, life would be equally unliveable. 
 
Now what is wrong about Johnny’s reckless and negligent driving is not merely that it 
exposes others to some possibility of harm, but that this is a likely and severe (perhaps 
even deadly) possibility. One might then establish the threshold for acceptable risk 
impositions on the basis of a) how likely or probable the risk is, and b) how severe the 
risk is. Actions that impose risks that fall above the threshold would qualify as being not 
in accordance with the duty not to harm, and as violations of the right not to be harmed. 
But knowledge is again a problem here: determining whether deontological and rights-
based principles will be violated depends on what is known at the time of decision-
making. They can then only provide guidance for evaluating risk impositions before 
harm materialises if the risk-imposing agent can or should know the future 
consequences of his actions. 
 
Moreover, even likely or severe harms can be deemed permissible if other 
considerations, such as the expected benefits related to the risk imposition, are 
overriding. For example, there might come a time when one will judge it permissible to 
implement risky geo-engineering techniques to counteract anthropogenic climate 
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change because the conservation of biodiversity, or perhaps the conservation of human 
life on earth, is considered to be more desirable than heavy financial burdens or extreme 
international tensions are considered to be undesirable. It then matters how great the 
expected benefits are, and to whom they accrue. Likely or severe harms might also be 
deemed acceptable if there are no other viable alternative courses of action available to 
the risk-imposing agent, or if the person exposed to risk has a say in the decision-
making process, consents to, or is compensation for the exposure. 
 
On their own then, the deontological as well as the rights-based perspective struggle to 
argue convincingly where and how to erect a threshold that distinguishes permissible 
from impermissible risks. The duty not to harm and the right not to be harmed are not 
the only considerations that underpin the evaluation of risk impositions, and should be 
incorporated into a more holistic approach. 
7.3 The contractualist perspective 
A contractualist answer to the main question is that a risk imposition is acceptable if the 
person exposed to risk cannot reasonably object to the exposure. The contribution of 
this principle is that it gives those that might suffer harm a voice as well as bargaining 
power. If an action will expose a person to a likely possibility of grave harm – for what 
has to be justified is the possibility of harm, not the harm itself – he can reasonably 
object to the exposure, despite the weight other considerations, such as benefits, the 
number of people enjoying them, or compensation, might have. However, a 
contractualist evaluation must determine how likely and grave a harm must be to give a 
person a reason to object, otherwise all potentially harmful actions could be prohibited. 
 
A problem for such evaluation of risk impositions are normal everyday actions that have 
dire consequences. One can turn on the stove and cause a domestic fire, reverse one’s 
car and hit a child, and plant flowers in the garden to which a passer-by has a life-
threatening allergic reaction. The possibility of understanding such risks as part of a 
system of conscious risk-sharing and risk-trading was discussed. Because risks are a 
part of life, and social life in particular, people in communities seem to naturally share 
and trade some risks. However, to consciously share and trade all risks one needs 
exhaustive information about the future: one needs to be able to gauge uncertainty, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 155 
think through the possible consequences of actions, identify and compare risks. 
Developing and implementing a sharing-and-trading system for all risks would be 
infinitely complex and therefore impractical. Moreover, risks that cannot be traded or 
shared might also be acceptable if there are no viable alternatives available to the risk-
imposing agent. But the main problem for a contractualist evaluation of everyday risk 
impositions arises when there is uncertainty about the likeliness and severity of 
consequences and uncertainty about who will suffer them. Under such conditions one 
has to revert back to utilitarian principles, related to the (un)desirability of consequences 
and the number of people affected, to say something about the acceptability of a risk 
imposition. On this point contractualism has rightly been accused of concealed 
aggregation. 
 
However, there is a class of risk impositions that contractualism can evaluate 
adequately: social risks. These are social actions or projects that have potentially 
beneficial outcomes for the many, but also potentially harmful consequences for some 
(road construction, vaccination programmes, etc.). Ex ante contractualism explains that 
if everyone has roughly the same (large) prospect of benefitting and the same (small) 
expectation of suffering harm from a proposed action, no one has a reason to object to 
that action: therefore, it is acceptable to impose such risks. With regard to the social 
risks that fit this description, contractualism succeeds in combining a calculative 
outlook focused on overall expected outcomes with the notion of respect for persons. It 
is committed to the conviction that every person deserves individual concern and has an 
equally relevant interest in reducing one’s risk exposure. But many risks do not fit the 
social description, and therefore contractualism does not offer a generally applicable 
and substantial evaluation of risk impositions.  
7.4 The proposed alternative 
I argue that risk impositions cannot be adequately evaluated with one principle alone: 
for that one needs a whole array of principles. The available ethical perspectives are, as 
discussed, insufficient to assess the acceptability of risk impositions, for in general they 
incorporate just a fraction of the important considerations. They are however not 
superfluous, for taken together they can form a holistic account of the acceptability of 
risk impositions. What is required is an alternative that enables one to evaluate actions 
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that expose others to risk depending on the context in which they are performed. 
 
I believe the discussed perspectives all run into difficulties for the simple reason that 
they focus exclusively on finding (an) action-guiding principle(s) that can be used to 
evaluate risk impositions. Perhaps this quest is born from the belief that one can 
theoretically know and control the outcomes of actions, as was discussed and critiqued 
in sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this research. This deterministic bias might have led to a 
narrow focus on rules and principles in normative thinking, which entails the idea that if 
one defines and lives by the right rules or principles, one can escape epistemological as 
well as moral uncertainty and will know what is the right thing to do in any given 
context. But one must acknowledge that such rules and principles, insofar they exist, 
will always have exceptions. I then agree with Nafsika Athanassoulis and Allison Ross 
(2010: 218), who state that “it is impossible to give a generalised account of the ethics 
of risk-taking or provide a formula for assigning moral responsibility/blame for the 
consequences of risk-taking”.47 What determines the justifiability of actions performed 
under conditions of uncertainty, and what renders risk impositions acceptable, cannot be 
captured in one rule or principle. 
 
Moreover, as the previous four chapters indicate, there is not one moral criterion that 
forms the basis for evaluating risk impositions. An honest evaluation recognises that 
risk impositions are not right or wrong depending on their adherence to a particular rule, 
but that they are right or wrong within a specific context in which a multitude of moral 
considerations come into play. These contextual particularities provide an action with a 
degree of rightness or wrongness. For example, consider drawing blood: it depends on 
the circumstances whether this action is a violation of a right not to be harmed – a 
person is forced to give blood and is not informed about associated risks – or in 
accordance with a duty to care – a medical professional performs the procedure in order 
to give proper health care. A focus on contextual particularities does not imply a lapse 
into complete moral relativism, for what is right, just, or good in a specific context can 
be perfectly right, just, or good in many – and perhaps even all – other contexts. 
 
                                                
47 The authors write about risk-taking, but with their ‘consequences of risk-taking’ they refer to the 
potential effects of risky actions on others, i.e. risk impositions. 
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But what principles and considerations apply in what circumstances, and how much 
weight should be attached to them? To determine whether it is acceptable to expose 
others to risk in a given situation, an agent must identify, assess, deliberate, and judge 
which principles are important in that context, to what extent they matter, and whether 
they justify exposing others to risk. Quality judgement is indispensable for imposing 
acceptable risks on others. Virtue ethics is concerned with making quality judgements in 
ever-changing particular situations. Traditional Aristotelian virtue ethics is centred on 
the notion of eudaimonia: the good life. However, I am not so much concerned with the 
general ethical question of good living or being good, but with the more specific 
question of good and prudent decision-making. Drawing on the discussions of modern 
agency and the importance of choice in Chapter 1, I believe that responsibility is a key 
concept in a modern understanding of virtuous decision-making. In the next chapter I 
wish to explore the notions of virtue and responsibility, the idea of responsibility as a 
virtue, and the contribution of these notions and ideas to the evaluation of risk 
impositions. This exploration will be guided by the third research question – Can a 















8. THE VIRTUE-ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE: RESPONSIBILITY AS THE 
VIRTUE OF ANSWERABILITY 
8.1 Introduction 
As the main question remains unanswered, the search for an adequate evaluation of risk 
impositions continues. I propose an alternative ethical perspective, born out of a 
hybridisation between virtue ethics and the notion of responsibility. From this 
perspective, one can formulate the following, very simplified, answer to the main 
question: it is acceptable to impose a risk on others if one does so responsibly. In this 
chapter I will argue that responsibility for risk impositions can be understood as the 
ability, or at least willingness, to answer the question as to why one acted the way one 
did, i.e. to provide reasons for one’s actions. Responsibility can then be interpreted as 
answerability. But answerability involves more than just giving reasons for acting. If the 
extent of one’s responsibility would be limited by one’s ability to reasonably explain 
why one acted the way one did, one cannot be answerable for harm that one did not 
cause, did not intend, or could not foresee. I believe that agents sometimes must be held 
accountable for risks they did not impose directly or personally, as well as for 
unintended or unforeseeable risks to others. I therefore propose to extend the notion of 
answerability to involve certain kinds of attitudinal responsiveness – e.g. experiencing 
and expressing care and respect – as well as practical responsiveness – e.g. adjusting 
one’s actions to avoid or minimise further harm – to risky and harmful situations. 
 
What qualifies as a legitimate reason for acting or an appropriate response to risky and 
harmful situations depends on many different things: the people involved, their values 
and norms, what they know, and the circumstances in which they operate. It therefore 
makes sense to understand responsibility as a virtue: a good moral quality that enables 
one to deliberate what moral considerations are relevant in a given situation, and judge 
what is the right thing to do in that situation. A virtue-ethical interpretation of 
responsibility is then promising with regard to the evaluation of risk impositions, as it is 
not fixated on abstract ethical rules and principles, but is committed to the virtuous and 
responsible application of those rules and principles in practical situations. It stands 
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closer to the reality of actual situations that involve possible harm to others, as it 
recognises that every situation must be assessed and managed individually. Moreover, it 
draws attention to the person imposing risks on others and her responsibility to justify 
her decisions and actions. 
 
In this chapter I aim to develop this new and useful approach to the evaluation of risk 
impositions. In order to do so, I will flesh out the notion of responsibility as the virtue 
of answerability by drawing on the expositions of other philosophers on the topics of 
responsibility, answerability, virtue, and risk (responsibility: G. Williams 2008; 
McKenna 2012; Niekerk & Nortjé 2013; answerability: Anscombe 1957; Hieronymi 
2014; virtue: Aristotle 2000, 2011; Rachels & Rachels 2010; Annas 2011; responsibility 
and risk: Hansson 2013; virtue and risk: Athanassoulis & Ross 2010; Van de Poel & 
Nihlén Fahlquist 2012; Nihlén Fahlquist 2015). 
8.2 Responsibility 
‘The cabinet is responsible to the parliament’, ‘the accused claims not to be responsible 
for a murder’, ‘that kid is too young to be considered responsible for its behaviour’, 
‘Martin acquired many more responsibilities the day he became a father’. Responsibility 
is used in different ways and does not have one standard definition. As Neal Tongazzini 
(2013: 4592) remarks, responsibility is “remarkably easy to use but dreadfully difficult 
to understand”. One can act, be, or be held responsible, and one can acquire, take, deny, 
or claim responsibility. In philosophical literature, four types of responsibility are 
generally distinguished: causal responsibility, role responsibility, legal responsibility, 
and moral responsibility (Hart 2008; Tongazzini 2013). 
 
Causal responsibility is being responsible for having caused something to occur: Jane is 
responsible for the broken plate because she dropped it on the floor; Jack is responsible 
for delaying the flight because he overslept and arrived late at the airport. One can also 
be causally responsible for having failed to do something, i.e. for an omission: Daisy is 
responsible for Gatsby’s heartache because she did not love him. One can understand 
causal responsibility in terms of attributability: a person did or did not do something, 
and the consequences of that action or omission are therefore attributable to that person. 
Role responsibility is acquired by virtue of fulfilling a role or having a position, either 
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on a personal or professional level: people have responsibilities as friends, parents, 
teachers, colleagues, bosses, etc. Legal responsibility is related to being punishable or 
liable for a potential or actual harm, such as negligent driving or vandalism. Note that 
one can be legally responsible without being causally responsible: a child who shoots a 
ball through a window is causally responsible for the damage, but his parents are liable 
for compensating the homeowner. Also, one can be causally or legally responsible 
without being blameworthy. For example, if the child broke the window by accident, he 
is causally responsible but did not commit a moral wrong; his legally responsible 
parents are also not blameworthy (unless they refuse to compensate the homeowner). 
Blameworthiness is related to moral responsibility, which is understood as being the 
appropriate object of moral judgements, expressed in terms of praise and blame. 
Hendrik Verwoerd is blameworthy, and therefore morally responsible in the negative 
sense, for his role in the construction and maintenance of the South African Apartheid 
regime; Nelson Mandela is praiseworthy, and morally responsible in the positive sense, 
for the part he played in the South African liberation struggle. 
 
Moral responsibility can also be understood by referring to obligations and virtues. As 
persons, members of a moral community with other human beings, people have certain 
obligations towards each other. In most societies, contemporary and historical, it is for 
example considered wrong to lie to, steal from, or kill, others. If one does not honour 
these obligations, and one does lie, steal, or kill, one is irresponsible and blameworthy – 
other things being equal – for being morally at fault. If on the other hand one is, and 
acts as, a virtuous person by being honest, fair, and caring, one is responsible and 
praiseworthy – again, other things being equal – for one’s behaviour. One can then be 
blamed for violating moral obligations, and be praised for respecting them. It must be 
noted that simply fulfilling one’s obligations does not necessarily makes one a 
praiseworthy and virtuous member of the human community. While respecting one’s 
duties towards others is a necessary condition for humane interaction with others, acting 
virtuously is doing more than what is required. One is merely doing one’s human duty if 
one does not kill or harm others; one is virtuous if one cares for others and enables their 
personal flourishing. 
 
To highlight these different aspects of moral responsibility, Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist and 
Ibo van de Poel (2012) divide it into five more specific notions: responsibility-as-virtue, 
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responsibility-as-obligation, responsibility-as-accountability, responsibility-as-
blameworthiness, and responsibility-as-liability. Responsibility-as-virtue is the 
disposition to act responsibly: ‘that politician is a responsible woman’. Responsibility-
as-obligation is the state of having to deal with something, to see to it that something is 
the case: ‘it is the responsibility of parents to take care of their children’. 48 
Responsibility-as-accountability is the moral obligation to account for what happened: 
‘the oil firm is responsible for the oil spill’. Responsibility-as-blameworthiness is being 
the appropriate object of blame: ‘it is irresponsible to tell prejudiced jokes’. And 
responsibility-as-liability is being the appropriate object of punishment or claims to 
recuperation, as in the example of the parents and the broken window. 
 
For conceptual purposes these distinctions are helpful. However, there is always some 
overlap between different forms of responsibility. Take again the obligation parents 
have to take care of their children. A parent who leaves a young child alone all night to 
party with friends has forsaken a parental duty, and can be rightfully considered 
negligent and blameworthy. A person is then the appropriate object of blame if she has 
committed a moral wrong: if she had a moral obligation to act in a certain way but 
failed to do so. Responsibility-as-obligation and responsibility-as-blameworthiness are 
then inextricably tied, and covered by the disposition to act responsibly (responsibility-
as-virtue), i.e. recognising one’s obligations and blameworthiness in particular cases. 
Moreover, responsibility-as-virtue entails the willingness to acknowledge one’s role in, 
and account for, harms done (responsibility-as-accountability). Also, such a virtuous 
disposition entails the ability to discern when one is liable for harm (responsibility-as-
liability). I therefore propose to unite responsibility as obligation, accountability, 
blameworthiness, and liability under the notion of virtue. If one has a virtuous 
disposition to act responsibly, one aims to fulfil one’s moral obligations towards others, 
displays a willingness to account for one’s actions, and to accept liability when one’s 
actions have resulted in harm; if one fails to have such active intentions, one is 
blameworthy. 
                                                
48 See how this ties in with role responsibility. However, role responsibility should be distinguished from 
responsibility as obligation (as Nihlén Fahlquist and Van de Poel do), for one can fulfil a specific role 
without having any associated moral obligations. For example, if one works in a lunchroom and is 
responsible for making customers coffee in one’s role as employee, one is not obliged to do so. On the 
other hand, if one is a parent one is responsible for taking care of one’s child, not only because one fulfils 
the role of parent, but also because one has an obligation to do so. The difference lies in the fact that the 
relationship between parent and child is a moral one, whereas the relationship between an employee and a 
customer is not. 
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But what does it mean to have the virtue of responsibility, and why is it relevant for our 
purposes to understand responsibility as a virtue? I believe that the virtue of 
responsibility and the notion of phronēsis, or prudence, can aid in determining when it 
is acceptable to impose risks on others. To be able to argue why I think this is so, I first 
need to explicate how I understand these virtue-ethical notions. 
8.3 Virtue ethics 
Virtue ethics is often characterised as a third branch in ethical theorising, next to 
consequentialist and deontological theories. The latter two are both concerned with the 
moral quality of actions, by referring respectively to the desirability of their 
consequences and to the respect for persons they exhibit. Virtue ethics is concerned 
with agents and the quality or virtuousness of their character, based on their motives and 
the continuity and reliability of their behaviour over time. 
8.3.1 Virtues 
What is a virtue? Truthfulness, patience, courage, compassion, benevolence, loyalty, 
and fairness for example are all recognised as virtues, as things that are good to have or 
be, but why so? A dictionary consultation yields that a virtue is “a good moral quality in 
a person, or the general quality of being morally good” (Cambridge Dictionary Online, 
2016, s. v. ‘virtue’). Here one finds two determinants of virtue. Firstly, it is a moral 
quality in a person, i.e. a trait of his or her character. Secondly, it is not just any moral 
quality in a person, but a good one, i.e. a praiseworthy trait of his or her character: this 
distinguishes virtues from vices. But an adequate definition of virtue needs to 
incorporate a third determinant as well, namely, that a virtue is a consistent character 
trait, i.e. “a commendable trait of character manifested in habitual action” (Rachels & 
Rachels 2010: 160, original italics). 
Means between extremes 
Commendableness is a careful balancing act. For what makes a person not a miser or 
alternatively extravagantly wasteful, but generous? What makes a person not cold-
hearted or obsessively concerned, but compassionate? What makes a person not 
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quarrelsome or fawning, but friendly? Aristotle, the intellectual father of virtue ethics, 
argues that virtues are means between two extremes. The extremes are characterised by 
deficiency on the one hand and excess on the other. As Aristotle (2011: 38 – 39 
[1108b15]) writes: “There are, then, three dispositions, two of them vices – one relating 
to an excess, the other to a deficiency – and one of them a virtue, namely, the mean”. If 
one lacks generosity, compassion, or friendliness, one is tight-fisted, uncaring, or 
pugnacious. Being too generous, compassionate, or friendly makes one prodigal, 
obsessively concerned, or obsequious. Finding the midway point between these 
extremes implies virtuousness. 
 
Where the mean between extremes lies depends on the situation at hand, the person 
acting in its context, and what the situation requires from that individual. Take the 
virtue of bravery. In the military soldiers are required to carry out orders from their 
superiors. Being able to do so, even under chaotic and life-threatening circumstances, 
can testify to bravery. But sometimes disobeying a direct order can be brave: for 
example, when a soldier risks his or her own life to save others despite a command to 
retreat from the battle zone. However, that very same disobedience can under different 
circumstances be considered foolhardy. Similarly, retreating from a battle zone is 
sometimes a cowardly act, and other times a tactful choice. What bravery consists of in 
the context of war also depends on personal circumstances: a soldier might be 
considered brave if he or she engages in battle, whereas a parent might be considered 
brave if he or she flees from a conflict area to bring others to safety. It requires good 
judgement to determine where the mean between extremes lies in practical situations. 
This will be expounded upon in the section on phronēsis and deliberation. 
 
Which traits of character are commendable also differs, depending on profession, role, 
and environment. With regard to profession, take Rachels’ and Rachels’ (2010: 160) 
example of a teacher and a car mechanic: from a teacher one expects knowledgeability, 
articulation, and patience, but from a car mechanic one expects skilfulness, honesty, and 
conscientiousness. This is not to say that a car mechanic can be impatient, let alone that 
it is good for a car mechanic to be impatient. However, for a person in that profession 
the virtue of patience is not considered the most important: it is more commendable for 
a car mechanic to be skilful. Something similar can be said pertaining to role: for 
example, the role of a friend and the role of a neighbour demand a different set of 
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virtues. One wishes a friend to be compassionate and loyal, whereas one would want a 
neighbour to be considerate and fair. The environment also influences which virtues are 
important. Take an emergency room and an office canteen: the first setting asks for 
decisiveness and prudence, the latter for moderation and friendliness. 
 
But even though different virtues, and expressions of those virtues, are relevant 
depending on individuals, circumstances, professions, roles, or environments, moral 
virtues in general are habitual traits of character that are good for any person to have. 
Moral virtues do not merely make a certain car mechanic skilful or a certain teacher 
articulate, but make a person in general a good human being. Rachels and Rachels 
(2010: 161, 166) relay Aristotle’s argument that virtues are good to have because 
virtuous persons will fare better in life: virtues are moral qualities that enable one to 
flourish and live successfully. Virtuous persons are responsible and prudent individuals; 
hardworking and tactful professionals; fair and cooperative community members, etc. 
Honourable motivations 
An appealing aspect of virtue ethics is that it can explain why motivations are important 
in ethics. Rachels and Rachels (2010: 168) discuss the following illuminating example: 
 
You are in the hospital recovering from a long illness. You are bored and 
restless, and so you are delighted when Smith comes to visit. You have a 
good time talking to him; his visit is just what you needed. After a while, 
you tell Smith how much you appreciate his coming – he really is a good 
friend to take the trouble to come and see you. But, Smith says, he is 
merely doing his duty. At first you think he is only being modest, but the 
more you talk, the clearer it becomes that he is speaking the literal truth. 
He is not visiting you because he wants to or because he likes you, but 
only because he thinks he should “do the right thing.” He feels it is his 
duty to visit you, perhaps because he knows of no one else who is more 
in need of cheering up. 
 
As the authors remark, there is nothing wrong with Smith’s actual action of visiting you 
in hospital. There is however something seriously lacking with regard to his motivation, 
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namely, that he visited you because it is his duty to cheer you up and be a good friend. 
Doing the right thing simply because one is obliged to do so negates its rightness or 
goodness, or simply its value. Virtue ethics then opposes the deontological 
argumentation that one should not harm others purely because it is one’s duty: instead, 
not harming others should come from a place of care. Virtuous persons are not ethical 
robots programmed with the ability to understand what abstract ethical rules require 
them to do, under what conditions, and at what time. On the contrary, they are sensitive 
to their circumstances, care about the quality of their own will and character, and are 
invested in their relationships with others. They aim to be good and do good out of 
honourable motivations. In short, they respond appropriately to the “demands of the self 
and the demands of the world” (Swanton 2003: 193). 
A developmental notion 
The definition of virtue as a habitual trait of character implies that one instance of 
excellent judgement and behaviour does not make a person virtuous: a virtuous person 
sustains virtuous behaviour over time. Similarly, one instance of bad judgement or 
behaviour, or failing to be continuously virtuous, does not necessarily make a person 
wicked or immoral. A virtue is not a static state or condition that one can achieve and 
retain, but rather a dynamic capacity to make quality judgements in various situations, 
i.e. judgements that are expressive of a good character. A virtue then is, as Julia Annas 
(2011: 38) states: “an essentially developmental notion”. As people encounter new 
situations and face new challenges, their understanding changes of what a specific 
virtue entails. Annas gives the example of a boy who first associates situations of war, 
sports, and fighting with bravery. That is the understanding he has adopted from movies 
and magazines. Later he encounters other expressions of that virtue, like a friend who is 
diagnosed with cancer and bravely deals with painful situations in hospital. Through 
these experiences the boy’s understanding of what bravery can amount to becomes 
richer, and he learns to not associate it narrow-mindedly with conflict, but more 
generally with perseverance and endurance in the face of adversity (ibid.: 37). 
8.3.2 Phronēsis 
Let us return to the example of Smith’s hospital visit. The example was first suggested 
by Michael Stocker in his essay The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories (1976). 
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As the title indicates, Stocker argues that modern normative philosophy, with its 
obsessive focus on rules, principles, and right actions, resembles a schizophrenic patient 
who, because of an impaired connection between behaviour, thoughts, and emotions, 
has lost touch with reality, experiences delusions and misguided feelings, and acts 
inappropriately. To live in accordance with ethical rules simply because they are rules, 
without allowing exceptions or seeking a deeper understanding of those rules, is 
inconsistent with, and even contradictory to, the heart of ethics. There is nothing wrong 
with ethical rules per se, as they aim to capture deep-rooted convictions about what is 
good, right, fair, or just. However, they must always be applied to actual, often intricate, 
complex, and messy situations. The ability to do so is captured in the Aristotelian notion 
of phronēsis, translated as ‘practical wisdom’ or ‘prudence’. 
Deliberation  
Deliberation is vital for practical wisdom. To see why this is so, let us consider 
Aristotle’s distinction between phronēsis, episteme, and techne. Episteme is generally 
translated as ‘science’ and concerns scientific discovery of the universal laws of nature, 
or so-called ‘know-why’ knowledge.  Techne is generally translated as ‘art’, and 
concerns technical or artistic knowledge about crafting and otherwise making objects, 
or so-called ‘know-how’ knowledge. Phronēsis, practical wisdom or prudence, 
concerns good choices and actions with the overall aim of living well. Aristotle (2011: 
120 [1139a25 – 1140b5]) writes: 
 
[W]e might grasp it [prudence] by contemplating whom we say to be 
prudent. It seems to belong to a prudent person to be able to deliberate 
nobly about things good and advantageous for himself, not in a partial 
way – for example, the sorts of things conducive to health or to strength 
– but about the sorts of things conducive to living well in general. A sign 
of this is that we say that people are in fact prudent about something 
whenever they calculate well with a view to some serious end in matters 
of which there is no art. As a result, the person skilled in deliberating 
would in general also be prudent. But nobody deliberates about things 
that cannot be otherwise, or about things that he himself cannot act on. 
[…] prudence [is] not a science or an art. […] prudence is a true 
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characteristic that is bound up with actions, accompanied by reason, and 
concerned with things good and bad for a human being. 
 
Now under conditions of certainty, where there is no need or room for personal choice 
or influence, phronēsis is irrelevant. Aristotle (ibid.: 1139a30) writes: “nobody 
deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise, or about things that he himself cannot 
act on”. It is however much needed under conditions of uncertainty, when one must 
choose between alternative courses of action. Making a prudent choice between such 
alternatives requires more than the understanding of abstract and technical rules 
(Aristotle 2000: xxiv – xxvi). It requires one to deliberate rightly and make quality 
judgements about what one should do in a particular situation, coupled with appropriate 
motivations. This then implies a to-and-fro movement between adhering to moral rules 
and dealing with concrete situations. Richard Bernstein (1986: 99, original italics) 
notes, in his discussion of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s appropriation of Aristotle’s ethics, 
that “phronesis [sic] is a form of reasoning and knowledge that involves a distinctive 
mediation between the universal and the particular. […] phronesis is a form of 
reasoning […] in which both what is universal and what is particular are co-
determined”. 
 
Abstract rules continuously find different and new expressions and interpretations when 
they are applied to concrete situations. To be practically wise, to be prudent or virtuous, 
is then to be able to deliberate what understanding of a rule is appropriate in a given 
context. The virtuous person walks along the medial line between two extremes, and 
acts in a way that is not excessive or deficient, but just right, taking into consideration 
all the relevant aspects of the context in which he operates. The idea of prudence was 
already discussed in Chapter 1, where I explained it as the virtue of foresight, the ability 
to foresee how the future will unfold – sometimes based on knowledge of the past and 
present – and to choose wisely between alternative outcomes that can be reasonably 
expected. Prudent deliberation under conditions of uncertainty naturally brings us back 
to the main focus of this research, which is to determine how one can justify performing 
actions that might have negative outcomes for others, embedded in the broader question 
of how one should act when the outcomes of one’s actions are uncertain. In the next 
sections I will relate the notion of virtuous and practically wise decision-making to the 
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notion of responsibility, and develop an understanding of acceptable risk impositions in 
terms of that relation. 
8.4 Virtuous response-ability 
I propose to understand virtuous decision-making and acting with regard to an uncertain 
future in terms of responsibility: a virtuous decision is a responsible decision. The 
decision to act – or simply to act – in a way that exposes others to risk then, can be 
considered acceptable if one chooses and acts responsibly. I further propose to 
understand responsibility as answerability, i.e. the ability to answer for one’s actions, 
and/or to be perceptive and responsive to one’s context. The meaning of responsibility 
as answerability is captured in the English word: response – ability, i.e. the ability to 
respond. The Oxford Living English Dictionary (2016, s. v. ‘responsible’) traces the 
origin of the word back to the late 16th century, in the meaning of ‘answering to’ and 
‘corresponding’, coming from obsolete French responsible, which in turn is derived 
from the Latin root respons– and the verb respondere, meaning ‘answering’ or ‘offering 
in return’. Interestingly, the word for ‘response’ or ‘answer’ is part of the word for 
responsibility in other languages as well: not only in some Indo-European languages, 
but for example also in some African languages. Consider the French words response 
and responsabilité, the Afrikaans and Dutch words antwoord and 
verantwoordeli(j)kheid, the Swedish words ansvar and svar, the Sesotho words 
karabelo and boikarabelo ba, and the Swahili words majibu and wajibu. This is, of 
course, merely an illustration of the relation between responsibility and giving answers: 
the relevance, or applicability, of understanding responsibility as answerability should 
not be limited to languages or cultures in which the words for these concepts share a 
common root. 
8.4.1 Addressing and responding 
One can be answerable for one’s actions, and in particular one’s actions that impose 
risks on others, in different ways. This has to do with the fact that there are different 
kinds of answers: one can react to a need, heed a call, or satisfy a demand. But all 
answers are replies to questions. Responsibility as answerability then has a 
conversational character: it is an interactive process of address and response. I take this 
idea from, amongst others, Emmanuel Levinas (1985), who explains moral 
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responsibility as answering the ‘call of the other’. In a face-to-face encounter, the other 
addresses a person, the other calls out to that person. By being addressed, and by 
responding to this call, one develops an understanding of one’s own self, as being 
different from, but related to, the other. Here it must explicitly be noted that for Levinas, 
the ethical relation between persons is utterly asymmetrical: one has an unaccountable, 
incremental, and infinite responsibility for others. I, however, believe responsibility is 
an interactive concept. I am indebted to Levinas for inspiring me to think of 
responsibility in terms of call and response, but will develop an understanding of 
responsibility that is radically different from his. My view aligns more with that of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, who states that “what we truly are, what is most characteristic of 
our humanity is that we are dialogical or conversational beings” (Bernstein 1986: 113). 
 
Drawing on these observations, I understand responsibility essentially as an interactive 
concept. To be responsible in the sense of giving an answer, one must first be asked, 
and listen to, a question (Turoldo 2010: 174, 178; see also Ferrari & Marin 2014: 28). I 
believe responsibility in situations involving risks to others is born from an interactive 
process of call and response, of request and consideration. To determine the 
acceptability of a risk imposition, an agent must then not only deliberate internally with 
herself, but also interactively with others. This does not mean that an agent has to 
literally converse with others, or that she has to be in the physical presence of others. 
However, she should try to envision how the actions she performs – or in which she 
partakes – might affect others. Subsequently, she should try to imagine how these others 
might address her, and how she might respond in return. It is vital for responsibility to 
be able to give an account of one’s decisions and actions to others: only in interactive 
conversation can reasons, values, facts, interpretations, and stories be critically reflected 
upon and evaluated. 
 
Michael McKenna (2012) also develops a conception of responsibility based on the 
interpersonal process of addressing and responding. McKenna builds on Gary Watson’s 
(1987, 2013) idea of an ‘expressive theory of moral responsibility’ to create his own 
‘conversational model of moral responsibility’ (2012). Both authors, falling back on 
Peter F. Strawson (1962), argue that people express certain attitudes in their practices of 
ascribing responsibility and holding responsible, which in turn express how they 
interpret or evaluate the quality of the will of others towards them. If someone 
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knowingly performs an action that will or can harm another person, that person might 
express indignation or resentment, anger or outrage, or feel hurt or disrespected. If 
someone acts in a way so as to please, protect, or benefit another person, that person 
might express thanks or gratitude, happiness or love, forgiveness or compassion. 
 
McKenna understands the practices of holding responsible on the one hand and being 
responsible on the other as intimately linked, and argues that they can be seen as a 
conversation between the person ascribing and the person taking or refuting 
responsibility. He breaks down this conversation into four phases, which he clarifies 
with the example of Leslie telling a prejudiced joke to Daphne. Firstly, there is the 
Moral Contribution: Leslie makes a prejudiced joke. Secondly, there is the Moral 
Inquiry: Daphne inquires whether she has heard Leslie correctly. Thirdly, there is the 
Moral Address: Daphne morally addresses Leslie by blaming her for her action. And 
fourthly, there is the Moral Account: Leslie gives an account of her conduct to Daphne 
(McKenna 2012: 89 – 91). If Leslie gives an account in which she acknowledges her 
offense, offers an excuse, shows remorse, or asks for forgiveness – and Daphne accepts 
her apology – the conversation can be over. The conversation might also be closed at 
the earlier stage of the Moral Inquiry, if Leslie can convince Daphne that she 
misunderstood, that her joke was not prejudiced but merely sarcastic for example. The 
conversation continues however, if at the stage of the Moral Account, Leslie sticks to 
her prejudices and refutes the validity of Daphne’s indignation. 
8.4.2 Threefold answerability for risk impositions 
The general idea of responsibility as an interactive process of addressing and 
responding, and in particular McKenna’s conversational phases of the practice of 
responsibility, can illuminate the evaluation of risk impositions. This conversational 
process, namely, unfolds before, during, and after a risk-imposing action. How a risk-
imposing agent seeks to answer to those whom she exposes to risk determines whether 
she has the virtue of responsibility as answerability. Subsequently, the quality of her 
answer determines whether the risk she imposes is acceptable. 
 
A risk imposition is not an isolated moment in which a decision is made to impose a 
risk, or an action is performed that is potentially risky. In fact, a risk imposition 
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comprises a concatenation of decision-making moments: it is a process of deciding, 
acting, and responding. Consider the decision of the South African government to 
implement water restrictions. These restrictions are implemented to ensure reliable 
water supply to its citizens and protect the country against the worst effects of the on-
going drought. However, the Water Research Commission warns that prolonged water 
restrictions can negatively affect the sewage system: if the amount of organic waste 
stays the same, but the amount of water decreases, the lack of water can lead to 
accumulations of waste and blockages in the system (Moolman 2016). Water 
restrictions are then not without risks, and the acceptability of their implementation and 
enforcement must be assessed continuously. Also, if these foreseen risks, or other 
unforeseen risks, materialise, a response can be expected from the government. For 
example, it has to temporarily relax the restrictions, initiate the restoration of the sewage 
system, or compensate those affected by water contamination. 
 
The evaluation of decisions and actions that involve risk to others can then not be 
limited to an isolated moment. Risk impositions generally comprise three moments of 
evaluation: before (a decision to impose a risk), during (a risk-imposing action), and 
after (a response to and management of the arising situation). To continue with the 
example, first there is the decision to restrict water usage, followed by the 
implementation of restrictions, and then the response to consequences of these 
restrictions. The acceptability of any risk imposition then depends on whether the risk-
imposing agent is responsible, in the sense of being responsive, throughout the process. 
The agent should strive to be answerable for making the decision to impose a risk, 
during the risk imposition itself, and with regard to its consequences. 
 
I believe these moments of evaluation can roughly be matched with three types of 
answerability: this then is a threefold concept. Firstly, there is answerability as reason-
giving, which entails providing convincing reasons for, and explaining, one’s actions to 
others. This type of answerability is mostly relevant before and during a risk imposition, 
i.e. when the decision is made to impose a risk, and the risk is imposed. Secondly, there 
is practical answerability, which entails responding adequately to the concrete situation 
arising once a risk has been imposed, and managing the practical consequences of that 
action. This type of answerability is mostly relevant during, and after, a risk is imposed. 
And thirdly, there is attitudinal answerability, which entails having appropriate attitudes 
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with regard to others. This type of answerability is important throughout the process: 
from the moment in which the decision is made to impose a risk, to its aftermath. The 
virtue of answerability then consists of a combination of abilities and dispositions that 
enables one to make morally justifiable decisions the face of an uncertain future. 
Responsible reasons for acting 
The first type of answerability, answerability as reason-giving (AR), entails the ability 
to adequately answer the question ‘why do you X?’, in which X stands for a choice, 
action, or omission that involves risks to others. I understand McKenna’s four 
conversational phases of responsibility – contribution, inquiry, address, and account – to 
make up the process of asking ‘why do you X?’ and responding to that question. Being 
able to provide reasons for a risk imposition requires an agent to: 
(1) think through the possible consequences of her actions – as far as can reasonably 
be expected, taking into account her socio-economic position, mental abilities, 
and time (AR1); 
(2) account for, defend, or explain her reasons for acting (AR2); 
(3) discern between right and wrong reasons for acting (AR3); 
(4) be motivated by right reasons (AR4); 
(5) keep a critical and open mind, and adjust her reasons, and the actions based on 
them, in the light of new information or convincing counterarguments (AR5), 
and/or; 
(6) extend sound trust when she depends on others for information about the 
possible consequences of her actions, or appropriately use other decision-
making strategies (AR6). 
Responsible management 
As stated earlier, risk impositions cannot be evaluated in isolation but have to be 
assessed continuously. The second type of answerability, practical answerability (PA), 
is mostly relevant after the decision has been taken and a risk is imposed. It entails all 
the ways in which possible harm to others can be managed, controlled, mitigated, 
reduced, minimised, or avoided. Necessary for this type of answerability is the capacity 
to respond effectively and appropriately to a situation that involves possible harm to 
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others. It comprises adequate management of concrete situations and requires a risk-
imposing agent to: 
(7) inform, and obtain consent from, risk-bearers where possible, required, or 
appropriate (PA1); 
(8) put safety measures in place (PA2) and/or; 
(9) act with caution (PA3); 
If a risk imposition has resulted in unqualified harm – foreseen or unforeseen, intended 
or unintended – the risk-imposing agent can be expected to manage and ameliorate that 
harm in some way. She is then required to: 
(10) act so as to avoid, minimise, or at least reduce further risk or harm (PA4) and/or; 
(11) aim to provide compensation or restitution (PA5). 
Responsible attitudes 
The third type of answerability, attitudinal answerability (AA), entails having 
appropriate attitudes, feelings, and emotions with regard to the possibility of harm and 
harm itself, that express a good quality of one’s will towards others. People do, and 
should, care about the extent to which their actions show respect, regard, or concern for 
others. Vice versa, it matters just as much “whether the actions of other people – and 
particularly some other people – reflect attitudes towards us of good will, affection, or 
esteem on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other” 
(Strawson 1962: 5, original italics). When exposing others to risk, one should then 
acknowledge that others might suffer harm, and that this must not be done without 
qualification. Irrespective of whether harm results, and even if a risk is imposed for the 
right reasons and with honourable intentions, the risk-imposing agent needs to: 
(12) be able to evaluate harm as something mostly negative, something she wants to 
avoid, manage, or at least justify (AA1); 
(13) be motivated not to act in ways that do, or could, harm others without 
qualification (AA2), and; 
(14) act out of care and respect for the integrity, wellbeing, and safety of others, and 
empathy with their fate (AA3). 
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Now if harm does result, or if the risk was imposed because of flawed reasons, or 
motivated by wrong attitudes or emotions, it might be expected from the risk-imposing 
agent that she: 
(15) experiences some form of regret, remorse, shame, guilt, and embarrassment 
(AA4); 
(16) accepts some degree of (self-)blame (AA5), and/or; 
(17) offers an honest apology (AA6). 
Creation and management of risk 
These different forms of answerability for risk impositions tie in with the distinction 
made in Chapter 1 between risk creation and risk management. There I argued that the 
presence of human choice is what defines risk as risk, and not as danger. One can speak 
of risk if there is an element of choice in the creation or occurrence of possible harm, or 
in the management or control of possible harm. This means then, that answerability can 
be ascribed for man-made risks, but also for natural risks if people have possibilities to, 
for example, avert, minimise, or redistribute them. Risk creation requires that one is 
able to give reasons for one’s actions and adequately answer the question ‘why do you 
X?’: why do you act in a way that carries the possibility of harm to others? Risk 
management comprises a fitting practical response to a situation in which others are 
exposed to potential harm, and that falls under one’s sphere of influence or authority. 
This means that sometimes an agent can be reasonably expected to manage risks or 
resulting harms even if that agent (1) did not know he caused or contributed to the 
(potential) harm, or had no other option but to act the way he did; or (2) did not cause or 
contribute to (potential) harm in the first place. In risk creation as well as risk 
management an agent can be required to have an appropriate attitude to exposing others 
to the possibility of harm: attitudinal answerability is vital in both cases. 
 
Consider a defect in a drilling rig, causing an oil spill into the ocean. The company 
owning the rig is the creator of the risk of an oil spill, or at least its main contributor, for 
by operating the rig the company enables, or increases, the possibility of a manmade oil 
leak. The company can then legitimately be asked to provide reasons for their actions, 
i.e. be reasonably answerable, and to account for what happened: was the site properly 
maintained, was the drilling authorised, were the workers adhering to safety 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 175 
regulations? Even if the oil spill had a natural cause, and is for example the result of a 
storm that damaged the rig, the company still carries a responsibility to manage the 
consequences. They should try to stop the spill as soon as possible, clean the ocean, and 
compensate potential victims.  
 
This practical responsibility is partly shared by local governments and citizens, who can 
be expected to initiate or help out with cleaning projects. They have these 
responsibilities irrespective of how one understands their role with regard to drilling for 
oil and the risk of an oil spill. One might consider them contributors to this risk as 
customers of the oil industry. It might be a step too far to consider individuals 
answerable as risk creators, and demand from them that they justify why they buy oil 
products, such as gasoline, kerosene, and electricity. Within the context of an 
industrialised, modern lifestyle, it is very difficult, if not impossible, not to buy any 
products produced by this industry. 49  It might make more sense to consider 
governments answerable as risk creators, as they are in a better position to facilitate a 
reduction in the overall consumption of oil products. They could for example invest in 
safe and efficient public transport and sustainable energy grids, making it easier for 
citizens to reduce their impact on the environment. But regardless of whether citizens 
and governments are answerable as risk creators, they are answerable as risk managers. 
For whether or not they have choice when it comes to contributing to (potential) 
environmental damage – in this case an oil spill – they carry some responsibility when it 
comes to compensating for, reducing, or minimising that damage – for example by 
getting involved in cleaning projects. Even if a modern lifestyle leaves one no other 
option but to make unsustainable choices, one has a responsibility to adequately, or to 
the best of one’s abilities, manage the consequences of those choices.50 
 
All those involved in, and affected by, the oil spill, are motivated to do their part if they 
have appropriate attitudes towards others and their environment. They can be expected 
to care, at least to some extent, about the safety, wellbeing, and flourishing of others, 
and to care, again to some extent, about environmental health, cleanliness, and 
sustainability. The representatives of the drilling company can then be attitudinally 
                                                
49 More than 6000, mostly commonly used, products are made from petroleum or its waste products: 
plastics, fertilisers, nylon, cosmetics, and drugs are just a few examples (Hyne 2014: 378). 
50 Other examples of this practical responsibility are paying an extra fee that goes to planting trees when 
one buys an airplane ticket, or emission taxes. 
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answerable by showing honest regret over the disaster and offering apologies to those 
affected. Others can also play a role in attitudinal answerability by holding the right 
people accountable, and as such sounding the call to which the company and other risk 
creators must respond. This might be the responsibility of victims of the oil spill, such 
as local fishermen, but also of others who give a voice to the vulnerable or suffering, 
such as environmental activist groups and international aid organisations. Responsibility 
is then often shared between different agents. 
8.5 Why did you x? Giving reasons for acting 
The first type of answerability is to give reasons for acting, or to be in a position in 
which one can rightly be asked to give one’s reasons for acting. Understanding 
responsibility as answerability, and in turn understanding answerability in terms of 
providing reasons for acting, is not a new philosophical insight. I take the notion of 
answerability from the article Reflection and Responsibility by Pamela Hieronymi 
(2014), who takes it roughly from the work Intention by Elizabeth Anscombe (1957). 
Anscombe elaborates on intentional action, and argues that if one has an intention when 
performing an action, one can rightly be asked why one acts the way one does. One can 
then, in Anscombe’s terms, be asked: ‘Why are you j-ing?’ (in which j stands for an 
intentional action). The answer one gives to this question comprises one’s reason for 
acting: ‘why do you drive a car?’ – ‘because I want to be mobile’. Hieronymi (2014) 
develops this idea of giving reasons for acting in terms of responsibility, and focuses on 
the question as to when one can be rightly asked to provide those reasons. She argues 
that to be in a position or state in which one can rightly be asked for one’s reasons for 
acting, is to be responsible in the most fundamental sense, namely, to be answerable. 
Hieronymi (2014: 9, original italics) writes: “[…] a why-question is, in Anscombe’s 
terms, given application whenever one acts intentionally. Drawing on her insight, I will 
say that one is answerable for one’s intentional actions, where one is answerable just in 
case a request for one’s reasons is given application”. 
8.5.1 Intentional risk impositions 
Hieronymi (ibid.: 4) notes that “We are […] responsible for our intentional actions, if 
we are responsible for anything. […] Intentional action […] seems to involve […] a 
certain sort of “having in mind.” […] we act intentionally by first deciding what to do 
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and then doing what we decided”. Intentional actions are then mostly paradigm cases of 
actions for which one is, and can be held, responsible. In the context of risk impositions, 
an agent is most obviously responsible for those risks he imposes intentionally. To 
intentionally impose a risk is to foresee the possibility of harm and willingly and 
knowingly expose others to that possibility. As discussed, this is not wrong per se, for if 
it were, no human action would be permissible. However, others should not be exposed 
to risk without qualification. There has to be a reason, a justification, for doing so: the 
risk might be unlikely, negligible, beneficial, consented to, etc. 
 
One is morally required to be able to give reasons for imposing risks on others, just as 
one is morally required in general to be able to provide reasons for one’s actions that 
affect others. As Strawson argued in his work Freedom and Resentment (1962), the 
whole process of acting, i.e. the development of intentions and reasons into decisions 
and actual conduct, expresses something about a person: it is an indication of the quality 
of his or her will, specifically as it concerns others. A bad, indifferent, or good will 
towards others, expressed in one’s actions, is something others can question, judge, 
praise, or blame, and for which one is ultimately responsible. This ties in with Angela 
Smith’s claim that one’s actions convey an implicit prioritisation of values and 
assessment of reasons for acting. In principle, one can always be called upon to defend 
one’s actions “with reasons and to acknowledge fault if an adequate defense [sic] cannot 
be provided” (2008: 370). Anton van Niekerk and Nico Nortjé (2013: 28) develop a 
similar argument, stating that responsibility entails that one is “accountable for 
whatever decisions are taken, on the basis of the assumption that reasons can be 
provided, that they have been thought through, and even though they might be fallible”. 
I take these statements as supporting my claim that responsibility, or answerability, for 
risk impositions requires one to think about what harm others might suffer as a result of 
one’s actions, and to justify exposing others to that harm by providing reasons. 
Looking ahead and looking back  
To grasp how this might be done, let us take a look at Hansson’s (2013) Foresight 
Argument. The argument refers to the attempt to “think through beforehand how we 
will, in the future, view the decisions we make now. […] to see things the way we will 
see them at some later point in time” (ibid.: 61, 63). This captures a common-sense 
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understanding of what it means to be responsible. Children are taught that in order to 
become responsible adults, they must think before they act. ‘Tomorrow you will regret 
eating all the chocolate!’ ‘Look both ways before crossing the road!’ As such they learn 
that one should not act on a whim but carefully consider how one’s actions influence the 
future. Moreover, they learn that one can always be asked to defend one’s actions, 
especially when these affect others. ‘Why did you not share the ice cream with your 
brother?’ ‘Why were you late and why did you make everybody wait?’ Building on this 
natural learning curve of responsibility, Hansson develops a way to make prudent 
decisions with regard to the future. He proposes to take a future vantage point of 
‘hypothetical retrospection’, from which one can look back at, and evaluate, the 
decision leading up to that vantage point. Hypothetical retrospection entails thinking 
through the possible futures that might result from an action, setting a comparable 
reference point on each of these ‘alternative ‘branches’ of future development’, and then 
assessing and comparing the options (ibid.: 61 – 73). To crudely rephrase this: one 
should try to foresee how one will look back. By consciously contemplating future 
outcomes of one’s actions in the present, one becomes more insightful about making 
prudent decisions (ibid.: 62). 
 
By combining forward-looking and backward-looking techniques of judgement, 
Hansson’s Foresight Argument can adequately explain how people tend to make 
decisions under uncertainty, and what risks they are willing to take and expose 
themselves to. However, the argument fails to make adequately explicit an aspect 
crucial to the evaluation of risk impositions: namely, that such actions involve, and 
potentially affect, other people. The presence of others – be it actual or possible – 
demands from a risk-imposing agent that he provides reasons for his actions to those 
others. Hansson’s hypothetical retrospection is an internal process of deliberation within 
a risk-taking agent. I propose to extend the deliberation to accommodate all those 
involved, and see it as a process of addressing and responding, i.e. demanding and 
providing reasons for risk impositions. 
Moral imagination 
Answerability as reason-giving requires one to think through the possible consequences 
of one’s actions (AR1), and to account for, defend, or explain one’s reasons for acting 
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to others (AR2). But what does it mean to ‘think through’ possible consequences? What 
does it mean to ‘foresee’ how one will look back and account for one’s present action? I 
believe thinking through and foreseeing can be understood in terms of envisioning, 
conceiving, or imagining the possible results of one’s actions, and exploring the ways in 
which others might be affected. It is on the basis of these consequences that others can 
address one in the future, and which one should be able to explain, justify, and defend 
with reasons. These reasons do not always have to be rational or conscious, and are 
fallible: I will return to these statements in later sections. However, when exposing 
others to risk, an agent is required to at least give attention to possible future outcomes. 
I then agree with Nihlén Fahlquist (2015: 192) that moral imagination is vital for 
responsibility as a virtue: it is “the emotional ability to morally imagine what [the] 
effects could be like and what risks might be involved in [the] activities”. I believe it 
should be stated explicitly that a prudent person can imagine not only what the effects 
of his actions could be, but also how others could experience them. I build on 
Gadamer’s (2013: 332 – 333) claim that a “person who is understanding does not know 
and judge as one who stands apart and unaffected but rather he thinks along with the 
other from the perspective of a specific bond of belonging, as if he too were affected”. 
A person who makes virtuous and responsible decisions when it comes to exposing 
others to risk has the future-oriented ability to imagine a) what consequences might 
result from his actions; b) how others might experience these consequences; and c) how 
he and others will later view his present actions; and is on the basis of this imagination 
able to provide reasons for his actions to others. 
 
One is, and has to be, answerable for those risks one foresees and imposes intentionally. 
One is also answerable for risks one should have foreseen, but did not. But what about 
risks one could not have foreseen? Throughout this research I have questioned the 
possibility to foresee what will happen in the future, and I acknowledge that it is not 
always feasible to provide adequate reasons for acting based on one’s predictions. 
However, this does not mean that one is never, or can never be held, responsible for 
outcomes that one could not foresee. In later sections I expand the notion of virtuous 
answerability beyond giving reasons for acting to incorporate attitudinal and practical 
answerability. These types of answerability enable one to have appropriate attitudes to 
unforeseeable harm, and, where possible, adequately manage such harm. 
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8.5.1 Reasons for acting 
Reasons for acting are, according to Hieronymi (2014), not necessarily mental states, 
such as desires and beliefs, that logically explain why one acted the way one did. Nor 
are they objective facts that justify the action. Reasons are “those considerations (that is, 
those facts or purported facts) that the agent took to count in favor [sic] of acting, the so 
taking of which (in part) explains the action” (ibid.: 12). However, what an agent 
considers to count in favour of acting the way she does – as adequate answers to the 
question why she acted so-and-so, as reasons that sufficiently explain her actions – 
might not be good reasons. If one is to be considered answerable for imposing a risk, 
surely one has to provide good reasons for the imposition: recall that answerability as 
reason-giving entails the ability to discern between right and wrong reasons for acting 
(AR3), and to be motivated by the right reasons (AR4). Athanassoulis and Ross (2010: 
220) state that the acceptability of risk impositions depends on their reasonableness: 
“Choices are made for reasons and virtuous choices are those that are made for good 
reasons”. However, the authors do not further explicate what qualifies as a good reason 
to expose others to risk. 
 
The branches of ethical theories discussed in the previous chapters draw attention to, or 
focus on, a variety of reasons that can make it acceptable to impose risks. In other 
words, there are various ethical considerations that can influence the acceptability of 
risk impositions. In some cases, it matters how likely or severe the risk is, whether the 
risk is imposed to achieve some benefit, or how many people stand to gain or are 
exposed to harm. In other cases, it matters how the benefits and harms are distributed, 
or who is involved in the decision to impose a risk. And yet in other cases, it matters 
whether consent has been given to the risk exposure, or whether it is possible to 
compensate a risked harm. Different considerations are important under different 
circumstances and to varying degrees. A convincing ethical approach to the 
acceptability of risk impositions then needs to accommodate all these considerations 
into a holistic perspective, balancing consequentialist rules with non-consequentialist 
principles. As such, the approach acknowledges that risks cannot be altogether 
prohibited or altogether permitted, but that certain risks are unacceptable. In the words 
of Stephen Perry (2001: 78): “consequential justification must take place within 
permissible deontological bounds”. 
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In his notion of phronēsis, Aristotle seems to unify consequentialist and deontological 
reasoning avant la lettre. Practical wisdom requires consequentialist reasoning about 
actions and their possible outcomes, as it involves distinguishing good or desired from 
bad or undesired outcomes, and realising or avoiding those. It also requires 
deontological reasoning about what kind of things are good, not only for the 
deliberating individual but for people in general. As Aristotle (2011: 120 – 121 
[1140b5]) notes, prudent persons “are able to observe the good things for themselves 
and those for human beings”. This indicates taking others into account and acting so as 
to respect and aid their flourishing. I argue that a virtue-ethical understanding of 
responsibility, as the virtue of answerability and with the notion of phronēsis at its core, 
allows consequentialist reasoning to be circumscribed by deontological reasoning, and 
consequently can accommodate the various ethical considerations that can influence the 
acceptability of risk impositions. 
 
As discussed, reasons for risk impositions are formulated in response to the question 
‘why do you X?’ A responsible agent continuously considers whether he can answer this 
question: before, but also while and after, imposing a risk. Good answers, and therefore 
good reasons to impose risks, can refer to different ethical standpoints and 
considerations. A good reason to expose others to risk, for example the risk associated 
with letting one’s children take the bus to school, might be that harm is unlikely, the 
benefits are great, and accrue to the risk-exposed, i.e. the children – primarily a 
consequentialist reason. A good reason to impose another risk, for example the risk 
associated with a medical procedure, might be that the person who carries the risk 
consents to the exposure – primarily a deontological reason. The normative perspectives 
discussed in Chapter 3 to 6, and the main considerations they draw attention to, require 
agents to ask themselves several questions with regard to the risks they impose on 
others, and as such they offer the basis for reasons that might explain or justify risk 
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Ethical perspective Consideration Question 
Utilitarianism Severity of negative effects (harms) How bad can the outcome(s) be? 
What can be lost? 
Utilitarianism Extent of positive effects (benefits) 
 
How good can the outcome(s) be? 
What can be gained? 
Utilitarianism Likeliness (or probability) of harms How likely is/are the bad 
outcome(s)? 
How likely is the loss? 
Utilitarianism Likeliness (or probability) of 
benefits 
How likely is/are the good 
outcome(s)? 
How likely is the gain? 
Deontology Recognition of duty not to harm 
without qualification 
If the bad outcome occurs, will a 
duty be left unfulfilled? 
Deontology Recognition of duty not to impose 
unreasonable risk 
 
If the bad outcome does not occur 
(and/or the good outcome does 
occur), will a duty be left 
unfulfilled? 
Rights theory Respect for right not to be harmed 
without qualification 
If the bad outcome occurs, will a 
right be violated? 
Rights theory Respect for right not to be exposed 
to unreasonable risk 
 
If the bad outcome does not occur 
(and/or the good outcome does 
occur), will a right be violated? 
Rights theory Possibility and availability of 
compensation or restitution for risk 
or harm 
Is there adequate compensation 
possible and available to the person 
exposed to risk/suffering harm? 
Contractualism Distribution of harms  Who will be affected by the bad 
outcome(s)? Who will lose? 
And is this the same agent as the 
beneficiary and/or the one making 
the decision? 
Contractualism  Distribution of benefits Who will be affected by the good 
outcome(s)? Who will gain? 
And is this the same agent as the 
one harmed and/or making the 
decision? 
Contractualism Availability of alternatives 
 
Are there alternative courses of 
action that have the same possible 
benefits but fewer risks? 
Table 4: Overview of ethical perspectives, considerations, and questions relevant for the evaluation of 
risk impositions. 
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If one does not know with certainty which consequences will materialise from one’s 
actions, one needs to oscillate between the things one does know at the time of decision-
making and an uncertain future. I understand phronēsis with regard to risk impositions 
as a movement between judging concrete situations in the present and foreseeing the 
consequences that might result in the future. This entails the ability to know which 
ethical principles are important in particular situations involving risk to others, and how 
these principles should be interpreted. Subsequently, it is the ability to ask the 
appropriate questions, and to evaluate whether the answers to those questions are good 
reasons, i.e. reasons that justify the risk exposure. However, as will be discussed in the 
following paragraph, determining the nature, and justifying force, of reasons, i.e. 
determining whether a reason does or does not render a risk imposition acceptable, is 
not something one does in isolation: it is a communal endeavour. 
Situated answerability 
Answerability as reason-giving might entail the ability to identify what the right reasons 
are to impose risks on others, and to be motivated by such reasons, but it is important to 
note that I do not believe any one person is always able to do this. I then do not fully 
endorse the Aristotelian ideal of the phronimos, the prudent person, or the wise 
(wo)man. Athanassoulis and Ross (2010: 218, original italics) do endorse this ideal: 
they claim that “reasonable risks will turn out to be the sorts of risks that a virtuous 
person would take and responsibility for risk will be determinable by reference to what 
a virtuous person would have chosen and why, i.e. in accordance with the orthos logos”. 
In general, the authors rely heavily on Aristotelian ethics, which can be read as 
describing the ideal person who is simply virtuous: someone who is not only a 
competent decision-maker in a certain role – as a parent, friend, entrepreneur, or 
politician for example – but with regard to every aspect of life. As Kristen Inglis (2014: 
266 – 267) writes: 
 
According to what has become known as the “Grand End” reading of 
phronēsis, the phronimos deliberates with a view to an articulate and 
reasoned vision of the good (a “Grand End”). In the case of the 
phronimos, this Grand End will be the picture of the human good […] 
whereby happiness is the active life of complete virtue. […] the 
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important point for Grand Enders is this: the phronimos […] deliberates 
with a view to a substantive, comprehensive, and articulate picture of 
happiness […] [and] aims at a life of virtuous activity. 
 
I believe however, that this ultimate Grand End of universal happiness is too abstract a 
goal to provide guidance in practical decision-making situations. Moreover, the ideal of 
the phronimos is too far removed from reality. In real life – and especially under 
conditions of uncertainty and complexity – it seems impossible to have so much 
foresight and practical knowledge that one is able to make wise, good, and right 
decisions at all times and in all circumstances. Through upbringing and education, 
people can acquire good dispositions such as being fair or honest; and through training 
and experience, they can become competent decision-makers in certain areas, such as 
politics or business. They might then be able to make prudent decisions in some area(s), 
and perhaps even most of the time. But people are not simply good without qualification 
(Brännmark & Sahlin 2010). 
 
In the context of risk then, someone might be able to make responsible choices 
involving risks to others in one domain, but fail to be answerable in another. A risk 
imposition is acceptable or justifiable not because the risk-imposing agent is virtuous 
all-round, but because she can answer for her actions within the specific context in 
which she operates. Answerability is then always situated. This ties in to Garrath 
Williams’ (2008) argument that plurality is central to responsibility. He argues that 
situations in which one cares about responsibility are defined by plurality: there are 
different normative demands, conflicting interpretations of those demands, various roles 
and relationships and the opposing demands posed by those, and the imperfect contexts 
of real life in which these conflicts occur (ibid.: 460 – 461). Responsibility entails the 
ability to skilfully negotiate between these oppositions, and “represents the readiness to 
respond to a plurality of normative demands” (ibid.: 459). Because the demands placed 
on agents are often so multifarious, I think it is virtually impossible to be responsible in 
every aspect of life. Or to be “a man for all seasons”, as Johan Brännmark and Nils-Eric 
Sahlin (2010: 156; also see [Whittinton 1520 in] Bolt 2013) remark in reference to a 
description of the Renaissance humanist Thomas More. Another part of that description 
reads: “I know not his fellow” ([Whittinton 1520 in] Bolt 2013). This indicates that the 
author of the description realises that it is an unattainable ideal for most people. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 185 
 
Most agents are not the likes of More; not phronimē across the board. They often 
experience the realities in which they are situated as complex, their relationships as 
intricate, and the different normative demands they must respond to as conflicting. 
Moreover, and this is important for responsibility in the face of uncertainty, adequately 
responding to multiple demands is complicated by the fact that knowledge about 
eventual consequences of actions is always limited. Actions and their consequences 
feed into many different aspects of many different lives and cause-and-effect relations 
are often far more complicated than one can comprehend individually. G. Williams 
(2008: 461) therefore argues that “which of these claims or interpretations should really 
guide thought and action—this is something the responsible agent must negotiate with 
those around her”. Only by reaching out to, and engaging with, others can an agent 
enlarge her understanding of factual information, and the rich background of beliefs and 
values against which that information is interpreted. In, and through, conversation 
people have to arrive at an understanding of the demands they are entitled to make on 
others, and vice versa. Therefore, understanding answerability conversationally – as an 
on-going process of address and response – is vital for responsible conduct in life’s 
inherently uncertain context. 
 
What, exactly, are then considered adequate answers to the questions in Table 4, and 
therefore good reasons for imposing risks, depends on the situation under scrutiny, and 
the people scrutinising that situation. Different persons will attach different weight to 
different ethical considerations in different situations. One cannot determine what is the 
responsible thing to do in a concrete situation by adhering to an abstract ideal of the 
phronimos, asking oneself what a virtuous person would decide in pursuit of the “Grand 
End [of] substantive, comprehensive, and articulate […] happiness” (Inglis 2014: 267). 
This does not mean that anything goes, that morality is only relative, and that the person 
with the strongest voice or the most power can overrule the demands of others. It means 
that an adequate answer can only be formed through a conversational process in which 
each participant has a voice and is heard. Actual or imagined participants to this 
conversation must acknowledge their differences and subsequently engage in explaining 
and justifying their standpoints to one another. Those involved in risk impositions – 
decision-makers, executors, those benefitting from risk impositions, and those 
negatively affected by them – have to form, despite their differences, an understanding 
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of what is acceptable. This understanding needs to be (re)defined and (re)negotiated in 
every situation involving risk to others: it is a dynamic and open-ended conversation. 
The requirements for such a conversation resemble those for a hermeneutic dialogue as 
described by Gadamer (Bernstein 1986: 113): “the mutuality, the respect […], the 
genuine seeking to understand what the other is saying, the openness to test and 
evaluate our own opinions through such an encounter”. 
 
To give substance to these claims, let us consider the distribution of possible harms and 
benefits, and the weight given to this consideration in different situations involving 
different stakeholders. In some cases, this has to be an equal distribution in order to 
qualify as fair, in other cases an unequal distribution can be acceptable. Consider the 
construction of a factory near a settlement, and the risks of inhaling polluted air 
imposed on the inhabitants of that settlement. On face value this is probably an 
unjustifiable distribution and an unacceptable risk imposition. But this can change if the 
inhabitants are offered the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, 
alternative housing, sponsored health care, or a share in the profits. However, seeking 
consent or adding benefits to the equation do not immediately make the scales of the 
distribution tip from unfair to fair. The inhabitants can have reasons to reject these 
offers: perhaps their community regards the site as sacred ground, and they cannot 
move away or accept any form of construction. Obviously, their claims to the site would 
have to be validated, and the question of ownership discussed, which can be an 
extremely difficult and sensitive issue in its own right. But what the example indicates 
is that the decision to construct the factory can only be considered justifiable, and its 
associated risks responsibly imposed, if the stakeholders engage in a conversation 
characterised by mutual respect. 
 
Now consider a different case, in which an unequal distribution of possible harms and 
benefits can more straightforwardly qualify as justifiable. A physician practicing in a 
remote village only has enough medicine to treat a part of the local population against a 
certain disease common in the area. He decides to treat some but not others, basing his 
decision on age, general level of health, and future survival prospects. His decision 
distributes possible harms and benefits in an unequal fashion, as some enjoy the benefits 
of the medicine while others remain exposed to risks of disease. However, the 
unavailability of alternatives, i.e. the scarcity of medication, renders such a distribution 
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fair, or at least justifiable. Moreover, an important difference between this and the 
previous case is that the physician does not increase the level of risk exposure of 
untreated patients, whereas the management of the factory creates the risk to which 
local residents are exposed. The management then has to answer for the creation, and 
subsequently the management, of risk, whereas the former only has to answer for the 
way in which he manages an existing risk. 
 
These examples indicate that there is not one standard acceptable distribution of harms 
and benefits, and not one interpretation of responsible conduct. Answerability for risk 
impositions is a matter of deliberation and conversation between the risk-imposing 
agent and others. I then partly disagree with G. Williams (2008: 462; see also Fingarette 
1967), who states that to be responsible is to accept the demands one faces; it is not 
something others can command or instruct. I on the contrary argue that one is only 
responsible in response to others, and that responsibility is born, and developed, in the 
process of address and answer between agent and others. I meet with G. Williams 
(2008: 469) again on the point that “Responsibility reveals […] our moral 
interdependence”. 
The limits of knowledge and fallibility of reasons 
Recall that answerability as reason-giving entails the ability to think through the 
possible consequences of one’s actions (AR1). However, the extent of this type of 
answerability is delimited by a couple of conditions: 1) causality; 2) freedom or control; 
and 3) knowledge or awareness. These conditions are also found in traditional accounts 
of responsibility, which argue that an agent can only be considered responsible if she a) 
has caused something to happen; b) had control over her action and could have acted 
otherwise; and c) was aware that she acted and that her action could have certain 
outcomes (Lippert-Rasmussen 2005). However, I argue that even though these 
conditions restrict answerability to a certain extent, answerability is not necessarily 
eliminated in cases where they are not met. With regard to the causality-condition and 
the freedom-condition, I have already noted – recall the example of the drilling rig and 
the oil spill – that even if an agent did not cause, or contribute to, a risk or harm, or had 
no alternative to act otherwise, she sometimes can still be reasonably expected to have 
appropriate attitudes to the results of a risk imposition, and manage those results 
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according to her capabilities. With regard to the knowledge-condition, answerability as 
providing reasons for acting is restricted by what one knows at the time of decision-
making. The more one knows the better one is equipped to answer the questions in 
Table 4: “Inquiry and knowledge can be used to reduce uncertainty and to aid decisions 
in the face of uncertainty” (Ingle 1968: 333). 
 
But what if one has little to no information about, or is partly or completely unable to 
foresee, the way in which one’s actions will unfold? Knowledge about the future is 
always limited, and there is always some degree of uncertainty about future effects of 
present actions. Moreover, the complexity and interconnectedness of modern contexts 
seem to increase the uncertainty surrounding future developments. Consider Martin, a 
father who serves his children a healthy diet according to present nutritional standards. 
However, ideas about healthy food change continuously and he might be exposing his 
children to unforeseen and unintended health risks. For example, processed foods have 
for a long time been regarded as healthy, or at least not particularly unhealthy. But in 
recent years, consumer awareness has grown with regard to the high sugar content of 
processed foods and its alleged relation to obesity, diabetes, and depression. The fact 
that ideas about nutrition and health change continuously, significantly reduce 
consumers’ ability to give reasons for their food choices that remain acceptable over 
time. To what extent can the head of an average household, like Martin, then be 
considered responsible? 
 
However, the fact that reasons can at a future point in time turn out to be wrong does 
not mean that they are unacceptable in hindsight. Agents have to act based on what they 
know and understand at the time of decision-making, and they can always be asked 
‘why do you X?’ The possibility of this future address should incentivise them to think 
through their reasons for acting, notwithstanding that those reasons might turn out to be 
no longer justifiable when new information becomes available. Uncertainty means that 
one’s reasons for acting are inherently fallible. Van Niekerk and Nortjé (2013: 29) write 
that the ethics of responsibility (ER): 
 
[…] is an ethics of fallibility. At some point, we must make a decision in 
order to move forward, but that decision can be wrong and can have dire 
consequences. Yet, not taking the decision or preventing some action can 
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have equally disastrous consequences. We have to accept responsibility 
for whatever we decide, but certainty cannot be demanded of us. […] 
Thus, when engaging in an ER, we have no assurance of correct moral 
behaviour, but we do have assurance of responsible moral behaviour. 
The latter is mostly what can realistically be expected from moral agents. 
 
To return to Martin, he can either think through the consequences of his food choices to 
the best of his abilities, or he cannot. It is more likely that Martin imposes health risks 
on his children if he has no clue what he is serving them. So surely it is better to make 
informed decisions, even if that information later proves to be invalid. One should at 
least be able to provide reasons for one’s choices that were valid at the moment of 
decision-making: the fact that those reasons can turn out to be wrong does not reduce 
the degree of responsibility with which they were formed. Because reasons are 
inherently fallible, a requirement for answerability as reason-giving is that a risk-
imposing agent adjusts his reasons, and the actions based on them, in the light of new 
information or convincing counterarguments (AR5). Another requirement is that the 
agent thinks through the possible consequences of his actions as far as can reasonably 
be expected, taking into account his socio-economic position, mental abilities, and time 
(AR1). In Martin’s case, this means that he has to think about reasons for making 
certain food choices, but that the extent to which he is required to do so depends on his 
personal situation. If Martin is well off and educated, the extent to which he must 
answer for his food choices is probably higher than if he is battling to make ends meet 
and cannot read. 
Non-rational reasons 
Van Niekerk and Nortjé (ibid.) also state that: “What can be demanded […] is the full 
catalogue of our reasons and the arguments supporting them”. However, I want to 
caution against an overly rationalistic interpretation of envisioning possible outcomes 
and providing reasons for acting. People do not consciously and thoroughly think 
through the possible outcomes of all their actions. Moreover, is not always useful or 
desirable to demand an exhaustive deliberation, or a ‘full catalogue of reasons and 
arguments’. If this were a necessary requirement for decision-making, it would be quite 
impossible to make many kinds of decisions. 
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Actions that are performed unconsciously, or at least not fully consciously, should not 
be straightforwardly equated to irrational actions. Human beings, namely, have 
developed ways to make decisions in a reflex-like manner, based on decision-making 
strategies that are neither fully rational nor irrational. Zinn (2008: 439, original italics) 
states there are “in between strategies […] to make decisions”. Such strategies are for 
example emotions, intuition, and trust. They are neither consciously deliberated, nor 
irrationally assumed, and enable people “to respond rapidly and effectively to complex 
situation [sic] without conscious deliberation” (ibid.: 444). By using these strategies in 
an effective way, people unconsciously formulate expectations about the future and 
engage with those expectations in order to realise a desired outcome. As modes of 
unconscious, non-rational judgement they are shortcuts to make prudent decisions. 
 
Take an emotion such as fear. Experiencing fear can be ungrounded and irrational, but it 
should not be done away with immediately. It is, namely, a congenital physiological 
experience in the human brain and body that can be conducive to protecting life and 
wellbeing from danger: it makes one run out of burning buildings and away from 
hissing snakes. Intuitions can also be helpful in decision-making, especially if they are 
developed through experiences. Zinn refers to a study of nurses at an intensive care unit 
for prematurely born babies (see Crandall & Getchell-Reiter 1993). These nurses often 
make decisions intuitively, for example to start antibiotics on a neonate before it shows 
symptoms of sickness. They have internalised judgements based on experience, and 
have become receptive to recognising patterns and deviations. As such they have 
developed “an intuitive grasp of situations and the necessary responses” (Zinn 2008: 
444). Intuitions can then facilitate responsible decision-making in the face of an 
uncertain future. 
 
In Chapter 2 the importance of active or sound trust was already discussed, but now it 
can be understood in more depth. Let us return to Martin and his food choices. Food 
bought in supermarkets and consumed by many modern families is often treated with 
chemical preservatives in order to be transported over long distances and remain edible 
until it reaches the dinner table. Information about the origin and quality of food is not 
always easily accessible, and furthermore not easily understandable for most laymen. 
The obscurity and complexity of information makes it difficult for most consumers to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 191 
think through the consequences of their food choices. Can Martin be reasonably 
expected to consult scientific research and understand the intricate workings of the food 
industry? Probably not, but this does not negate the necessity to make choices: Martin’s 
family needs to eat. He can however let his choices be guided by his trust in others: for 
example, the government can give recommendations based on independent nutritional 
research. Carefully placed trust can then enable him make responsible food choices. 
 
It is necessary to make decisions despite limited knowledge, but it is just as necessary to 
trust others in order to make choices for which one can be answerable. People’s finite 
mental capacities and time often make it impossible for them to sufficiently think 
through the consequences of their actions on their own. People have to reach out to, and 
trust in, others to get a better understanding of the world around them, and to learn how 
their actions might influence the lives of others. Vice versa, others are obliged to engage 
in conversation with those that reach out to them, to share what they believe and know. 
Only in conversation with others can one make sense of answerability and acceptability 
in a given context: these concepts are fundamentally shared and interactive. 
 
Recall that a requirement for answerability as reason-giving is that an agent extends 
sound trust when she depends on others for information about the possible 
consequences of her actions, or appropriately uses other decision-making strategies 
(AR6). Actions incentivised by fitting emotions, experience-based intuition, or sound 
trust are deliberated in a way, even if deliberation is not performed rationally or 
consciously. If such actions involve risk to others, as in the example of a nurse 
administering antibiotics to a prematurely born baby or a father feeding its child, these 
risk impositions might well be justified. The in-between strategies can then provide 
non-rational reasons for acting. Naturally, non-rational reasons can turn out to be 
misguided. But again, the fallibility of reasons does not immediately negate the 
acceptability of risk impositions based on such reasons. Fallibility is just another reason 
why the content of acceptability and answerability needs to be continuously reassessed 
and renegotiated. Also, the notion of phronēsis can accommodate in-between decision-
making strategies as ways to arrive at prudent choices. Instead of having to always 
consciously interpret moral rules in concrete situations, one can use in-between 
strategies as shortcuts that enable a swift, smooth, and efficient oscillation between the 
universal and the particular. 
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8.5.3 Conversational stages of responsibility 
I stated earlier that I interpret McKenna’s four conversational phases of responsibility as 
stages in the process of asking and responding to the question: ‘why do you X?’ I also 
argued that the ethical considerations discussed in earlier chapters can provide the basis 
for answers to that question, and thus for good reasons for acting. In the following 
sections I will elaborate on these statements by running through the stages of the 
address-and-response process, namely, contributing to, inquiring after, addressing, and 
accounting for a risk imposition. 
The contribution 
For a risk imposition to be evaluated, an action that exposes others to risk must first be 
considered or performed: this is the contribution that sparks the conversation of 
responsibility. Preferably, the risk imposition is considered before it is performed, and 
the process of addressing and responding is run through, perhaps in an imaginary 
fashion. The risk-imposing agent engages in a conversation with those exposed to risk 
about the acceptability of the action that he performs, or is planning to perform at a later 
point in time. Before one goes on to judge the contribution, one should make an 
“inquiry as to whether the facts are as we take them to be” (McKenna 2012: 90). 
The inquiry 
In the context of risk impositions, the inquiry can comprise various activities. Firstly, 
one needs to determine the risk that is imposed. To be answerable, one needs to have an 
understanding of what one is answerable for. When there are clear connections between 
causes and effects, actions and outcomes, the object of answerability can be established 
without too much controversy. Oftentimes however, whether “the facts are as we take 
them to be” (ibid.) is the source of deep disagreement. Consider the relation between the 
MMR vaccine and autism: this claim has been studied time and again and has never 
been confirmed in biomedical epidemiological studies. Nevertheless, many parents, as 
well as a wider public, are convinced of the relation, and the claim is continuously 
repeated in debates on vaccinations. The possibility of such disagreements over facts 
invites the question whether there should be epistemic constraints on the reasons and 
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factual views presented in conversations about acceptable risk impositions.51 Obviously 
farfetched and demonstrably non-existent connections between causes and effects have 
to be excluded, but establishing the tenability of facts can prove to be challenging. 
 
A next challenge is to determine who fulfils which role with regard to the risk exposure. 
Hermansson and Hansson (2007) develop a ‘Three-Party Model’ and distinguish the 
one making the decision to impose a risk, i.e. decision-maker, from the one benefitting 
from the exposure, i.e. the beneficiary, and from the one on whom the risk is imposed, 
i.e. the risk-exposed.52 Another role can be added to this model, making it a ‘Four-Party 
Model’: the one performing the risk imposition, i.e. the executive. It is important to 
distinguish the executive from the decision-maker, for if these roles are not fulfilled by 
the same agent – for example, when a nurse administers a medicine on doctor’s orders, 
or a construction company builds a highway commissioned by the government – the 
question can be rightly asked if, and how, responsibility for a risk imposition is shared. 
Also, the causal links between the risk-imposing agent (be it decision-maker or 
executive) and risk-exposed others must be established: to what extent can the harm 
possibly suffered by those exposed to risk be related to the actions of an identifiable 
agent? Recall the earlier mentioned Problem of Many Hands, in which a risk or harm is 
created by the combined actions – which in isolation are negligible – of multiple actors. 
In such cases, responsibility is diffused, and it is difficult to determine who has to 
justify which actions (answerability as giving reasons for acting), and who should 
manage resulting harm (practical answerability). 
 
Anyone can perform such inquiries, but I believe the risk-imposing agent has the 
biggest responsibility to deliberate about the acceptability of his actions. Also, it is 
necessary to roughly identify a risk-imposing agent, even if this agent only marginally 
contributes to the risk in question (as in Problems of Many Hands). In the absence of a 
risk-imposing agent one cannot truly speak of a risk imposition, for there would be no 
one actually imposing anything: one would probably speak of a possible danger or 
                                                
51 Again, I am indebted to Marcel Verweij for providing the example, as well as for suggesting the 
problem of establishing the facts in the inquiry component of the conversation about the acceptability of 
risk impositions. 
52 Athanassoulis and Ross (2010: 221) make the same distinction between the decision-maker, the harm-
bearer, and the potential beneficiary. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 194 
threat, but not of a risk imposition. Moreover, without a risk-imposing agent there is no 
one who can be morally addressed on, asked to defend, change, or stop his actions. 
 
It seems less problematic if the risk-exposed cannot be identified, as long as one knows 
that there will be someone exposed to risk. Some philosophers argue that the identity of 
the risk-exposed is in fact totally irrelevant (Reibetanz Moreau 1998; Fleurbeay & 
Voorhoeve 2013). Johann Frick (2015: 195) calls this the Argument from Irrelevant 
Information, and explains: “Proponents of the Argument from Irrelevant Information 
assume that […] It is morally irrelevant […] that we cannot know who will be harmed 
by the risky action, as long as we know that some persons will be harmed”. I agree that 
it is indeed absolutely necessary to be able to imagine another person who will be 
exposed to risk, and who can demand a justification for the exposure. I also agree that 
specific information about the identity of the risk-exposed is not required to start 
evaluating a risk imposition. However, such information cannot be completely 
irrelevant, for differences between persons alter their vulnerability to certain risks. 
Consider for example an increase in taxes: this will affect a successful entrepreneur 
differently than a struggling mother of three. People are resilient to various degrees 
when it comes to dealing with risk, and their level of vulnerability influences the 
acceptability of exposing them to risk. Information about the identity of potential 
victims, when it is available, should then be taken into consideration in the evaluation of 
risk impositions. 
The address 
After it has been sufficiently established that “the facts are as we take them to be” 
(McKenna 2012: 90), the risk-imposing agent can be addressed. This can be done in the 
form of a moral judgement, as in the example of Daphne blaming Leslie for her 
prejudiced joke. But blaming is only an appropriate address if one knows that it is likely 
that harm will result from a risk imposition, or this harm is considered to be severe. If 
there is no, or very limited, information available about the negative impacts of an 
action on the lives of others, there is no solid ground for blame, and such judgements 
would be unfitting, or even unfair. But uncertainty does not defeat the possibility of 
continuing the process of addressing and responding. The risk-exposed can still ask the 
risk-imposing agent why she would want to perform an action that might result in harm. 
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In turn, the risk-imposing agent can justify her action by proceeding with caution.53 
Also, she can promise to stop or change her course of action when new information 
becomes available, e.g. about the likeliness and severity of harm, or the identity of the 
risk-exposed. 
The account 
In response to the address of the risk-exposed, the risk-imposing agent gives an account: 
a catalogue of her reasons for acting. To have an idea of how this might be done, let us 
consider the following example. Adriana (A.) wants to invest the money she saved for 
the tertiary education of her son Benjamin (B.). To determine whether this is a decision 
she is able to adequately justify, she can run through the address-and-response process. 
 
Firstly, there is the risk-imposing contribution of investing the savings. A. could leave 
the money in her savings account, but the interest on that account is negligible. She 
could also invest the money, but this option carries more risk. She could lose some of 
the money and worsen B.’s opportunities to enjoy good higher education. Or worse, she 
could lose all the money and deny him the possibility to go to university altogether. 
However, investing also holds the possibility of increasing her funds and improving 
B.’s opportunities. 
 
Secondly, there is the inquiry into what is known about the risk and the circumstances 
in which the risk is imposed. At first glance, A. seems to be the decision-maker and the 
executive of the risk imposition, and B. the risk-exposed as well as the potential 
beneficiary. In a less obvious way, A. could also be affected by the outcomes of the 
decision to invest the money, as B.’s education, or lack thereof, can in some way reflect 
back, or have an impact, on her. The more information one has about the particularities 
of the situation mother and son find themselves in, the better one is equipped to 
determine the acceptability of the risk imposition. 
 
                                                
53 It seems to depend on the context whether actions should be more or less restricted by precautionary 
measures. In medical contexts for example, slightly unrestricted action is seen as reckless, whereas in the 
informal setting of everyday life, where people are also uncertain about how their actions might affect 
others, it is considered less problematic. Risk seems to be more accepted, and acceptable, in uncontrolled, 
or uncontrollable, settings than in controlled, or controllable, settings. 
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Consider the following scenario: A. and B. come from a disadvantaged family, in which 
all the adult members have to contribute to the household and work hard to make ends 
meet. If B. gets a good education, he will increase his chances on the labour market, and 
therefore his family’s chance at a more comfortable life. The quality of education at the 
public universities in the country where A. and B. live is terrible, and at present A. has 
not saved enough money to send B. to a private college. A is desperately looking for a 
way to quickly increase her funds. She has no experience when it comes to investing, 
but has a good friend, Calvin (C.), who is a successful investment banker. C. advises A. 
to buy some very promising stocks. According to C.’s forecasts, chances are high that, 
if A. invests, she will be able to send B. to a private college. But, he warns, there is also 
a small chance that A. will lose some, and perhaps all, the money and will not even be 
able to pay the tuition fees of a public university. If A. does not invest, B. can at least go 
to a public university, which, under the circumstances, is still better than no higher 
education at all.  
 
Now consider another scenario: A. has done well with her own business. She can 
comfortably sustain her family and has enough savings to send B. to a private college. 
B. is not expected to provide for his family, so whether B. enjoys higher education, and 
the quality of that education, only has bearing on B.’s individual future prospects. A. 
wants to invest the funds for B.’s education in the stocks that C. considers so promising. 
In this scenario however, A. wants to use whatever extra money she makes from the 
investment to install a swimming pool. If A. does not invest, B. can go to a private 
college but she will not be able to pay for the construction of the pool. If she invests, 
chances are high that she will be able to send B. to a private college and install the pool. 
But again, there is also a small chance that she will lose some of the money, perhaps 
even all of it, and will only have enough left to send B. to a public university. 
 
In both scenarios, there is choice between a gamble, i.e. investing, and an assurance, i.e. 
not investing. In scenario 1, the gamble has a high chance of a good education 
combined with a small chance of no education, while the assurance is a bad education. 
In scenario 2, the gamble has a high chance of a good education combined with a small 
chance of a bad education, while the assurance is a good education. In both scenarios, 
much can be lost in the gamble: in scenario 1, B. runs the risk of not being able to study 
at all, and in scenario 2 he runs the risk of receiving a bad one. But only in scenario 1 is 
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there a lot to be won from the gamble, namely, a good education for B. In scenario 2, B. 
is already assured to receive a good education, and this starting position will not be 
improved by A.’s decision to invest. Moreover, in scenario 1 the gamble is taken to 
increase the chances that B. gets a good education and can support his family. In 
scenario 2 the stakes are much lower and the only added benefit potentially gained from 
the gamble is the luxury of a swimming pool. 
 
Now A., pondering the investment, can envision a future B. calling out to her, 
addressing her, asking her why she made the decision to invest the money. In scenario 
1, B. can reasonably ask A. why she invested, but only in scenario 2 would it be 
appropriate for B. to blame A. Note that he can blame her irrespective of the outcome: 
even if the gamble turns out profitable and A. secures funds for both B.’s education and 
the installation of the swimming pool, he can still blame her for speculating with the 
quality of his education and future prospects. In response, a future A. can formulate an 
account of why an earlier A. decided to act the way she did. She can do so by 
responding to the general ethical questions relevant for the evaluation of risk 
impositions, summarised in Table 4. In Table 5, shown below, a column has been added 
with answers to these questions in both scenario 1 and 2. Table 5 then captures A.’s 




Consideration Question Answer 
Scenario 1              Scenario 2 
Utilitarianism Severity of 
negative effects 
(harms) 
How bad can the 
outcome(s) be? 
 
No education Bad education 
Utilitarianism Extent of positive 
effects (benefits) 
How good can the 
outcome(s) be? 
Good education for 
B. and better 
prospects for more 
comfortable life for 
whole family 
Good education for 
B. and swimming 
pool for whole 
family 
Utilitarianism Likeliness (or 
probability) of 
harms  
How likely is/are 
the bad outcome(s)?  
Unlikely  Unlikely 
Utilitarianism Likeliness (or 
probability) of 
benefits 
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Deontology Recognition of 




If the bad outcome 
occurs, will a duty 
be left unfulfilled? 
Parental duty to 
enable child’s 
proper education 
Parental duty to care 
for, and act in, 
child’s best 
interests, as well as 
parental duty to 
enable child’s 
proper education 
Deontology Recognition of 
duty not to impose 
unreasonable risk 
of harm 
If the good outcome 
occurs, will a duty 
be left unfulfilled? 
No Parental duty to care 
for, and act in, 
child’s best interests  
Rights theory Respect for right 
not to be harmed 
without 
qualification 
If the bad outcome 
occurs, will a right 
be violated? 
Child’s right to 
proper education 
Child’s right to 
parental care and 
consideration, as 
well as child’s right 
to proper education 
Rights theory Respect for right 
not to be exposed 
to unreasonable 
risk 
If the good outcome 
occurs, will a right 
be violated? 
No  Child’s right to 
parental care and 
consideration 
Rights theory Possibility and 
availability of 
compensation or 
restitution for risk 
or harm 
Is there adequate 
compensation 
possible and 
available to the 




Contractualism Distribution of 
harms  
Who will be 
affected by the bad 
outcome(s)?  
A., B., and the rest 
of the family 
B. 
Contractualism  Distribution of 
benefits 
Who will be 
affected by the 
good outcome(s)?  
A., B., and the rest 
of the family 
A., B., and the rest 
of the family 





of action that have 
the same possible 
benefits but fewer 
risks? 
No Roughly: not 
investing 
Table 5: Overview of Adriana’s answers to ethical questions relevant in risk evaluation. 
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If A. decides to invest in scenario 1 and the risked harm materialises, i.e. no higher 
education for B., she must acknowledge that she has failed to fulfil her parental duty to 
enable him to continue with his education. However, this deontological consideration 
against the decision to invest seems to be offset by other considerations. For if the 
chance of benefit materialises, i.e. a good education for B. as well as better prospects for 
a more comfortable life for the whole family, A. has not only succeeded in granting B. 
the right to proper education, but also in improving the chances of a brighter future, not 
only for B. but for the rest of the family as well. Apart from this rights-based 
consideration, there are utilitarian considerations: it is very unlikely that B. will not be 
able to study, and it is very likely that he will be able to enjoy a good education. 
Moreover, there is the contractualist consideration that the possible harms and benefits 
accrue equally to A. and B. (and the rest of the family). Also, there seems to be no 
reasonable alternative at hand that involve no, or less, risks, and can yield similar 
benefits in the same period of time. 
 
If A. decides to invest in scenario 2, she might argue that B. has a high chance of a good 
education. However, this utilitarian consideration cannot justify the risk imposition, first 
and foremost because the same good outcome for B. is already secured: A. does not 
need to engage in risky investment activities in an attempt to realise this outcome. If 
A.’s investment is profitable and B. can still go to a private college, she fulfils her 
parental duty to aid in her son’s flourishing and enable him to enjoy proper education. 
Nevertheless, she has used the funds dedicated to his education as a means to another, 
less valuable end, and has therefore failed to fulfil her parental duty to act in her child’s 
best interest. What is more, the risk imposition might have positive results for all those 
involved – B. can go to a private college and the whole family can jump in the pool on 
hot days – but the expected loss falls only on B. If that bad outcome materialises, i.e. B. 
will have to go to a public university, A. has lost the opportunity to install a pool, and 
perhaps suffers loss of face as a result of not investing properly. But this is not a harm to 
her in the way the lost opportunity to enjoy good quality education is a harm to B. A.’s 
life, and that of her family, will still be the same without the pool, whereas B. will be 
worse off than he would have been. A. will then have failed to fulfil her parental duty to 
act in her child’s best interests and enable him to receive quality education she can 
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afford.54 Moreover, she will have violated B.’s rights to care and consideration. These 
reasons based on deontological, rights-based, and contractualist considerations make for 
a convincing argument against the risk imposition. All in all, only in scenario 1 can A. 
provide reasons that justify the risk imposition on B., can the risk imposition be 
considered acceptable, and can A. adequately answer for her action. 
 
And what about the role and responsibility of C., the investment banker who offers 
advice to A.? C. is more knowledgeable than A. when it comes to the stock market and 
investments: compared to her, he is an expert. Moreover, C. is successful, and he is A.’s 
friend, so his advice can be expected to be reliable and given with her, and her family’s, 
best interests in mind. The trust that A. extends to C. can then surely be considered 
sound. Is C., because he is an expert and A. is not, responsible for the outcomes of A.’s 
decision to invest? I believe this depends on the quality of the information he gives to 
A.  I believe that C. is responsible for providing clear, understandable, and truthful 
information to A. If he has given her such information, he is not responsible for the 
outcomes of her decision to invest, or at least not to the extent that A., or others, can 
rightly blame or praise C. for any results of the investment. 
 
However, if he has not acted responsible in his role as informant, he might be held 
accountable for negative results of the investment. If it for example turns out that C. 
deliberately misinformed A., he can be demanded to answer for his actions. If A. can 
prove C.’s misconduct, she can hold C. legally accountable by taking him to court. If 
she only has a strong suspicion, she can still hold him morally accountable by 
demanding his reasons for acting the way he did. The interpersonal process of address-
and-response can then explain why A. is entitled to know, and C. is obliged to answer. 
If C. did not knowingly misinform A., but should have known that his information was 
incorrect – for example, he should have foreseen that the stocks he was advising her to 
invest in would plummet in the near future – he can still be answerable and act in an 
answerable way if the investment has a bad outcome. At the bare minimum, he can be 
                                                
54 I believe that the content of duties differs according to personal conditions and capabilities. If A. has 
the financial means to send B. to a public university, she has the duty to offer him that opportunity. If she 
has the means to send him to a private college, she has the duty to offer him that opportunity. If she has 
no means to enable him to enjoy tertiary education whatsoever, she might have a strong claim on, perhaps 
even a right to, financial assistance from the government and higher education institutions. A.’s financial 
situation then determines the content of the obligations she has with regard to her family, but not 
necessarily how many such obligations she must fulfil. For example, she has a duty to enable her children 
to get educated if she can afford that, but not a duty to enable them to swim in pools. 
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expected to apologise to his friend: a form of attitudinal answerability. Depending on 
the circumstances, he might also be expected to compensate the money A. lost because 
of the investment: a form of practical answerability. I will discuss these types of 
answerability in the next sections. 
8.6 Answerability as practical and attitudinal responsiveness 
Athanassoulis and Ross (2010: 218) state that the moral quality of decisions that involve 
risk depends crucially upon “the responsiveness of the risk-taker to […] contextual 
features”. The authors (ibid.: 225) interpret such responsiveness in terms of the 
decision-makers’ ability to provide “reasons for risking”, and argue that such reasons 
should be based on more than just probability estimates of desired and undesired 
outcomes. In the previous sections I discussed what such reasons for risking might be, 
apart from utilitarian ones, and how one can formulate them by going through the stages 
of the address-and-respond process. But I extend the notion of responsiveness beyond 
giving reasons for acting: virtuous answerability includes other types of responsiveness 
as well, namely, practical and attitudinal answerability. 
8.6.1 Practical answerability 
As stated earlier, risk impositions have to be continuously assessed: from decision to 
action, and from action to aftermath. In every timeframe, there are different ways in 
which a risk-imposing agent can be practically answerable. Recall that practical 
answerability (PA) entails all the ways in which possible harm to others can be 
managed, controlled, mitigated, reduced, minimised, or avoided: informing, and 
obtaining consent from, risk-bearers where possible, required, or appropriate (PA1); 
putting safety measures in place (PA2); acting with caution (PA3); acting so as to avoid, 
minimise, or at least reduce further risk or harm (PA4); and aiming to provide 
compensation or restitution (PA5).55 
 
In the timeframe between decision and action, a risk-imposing agent can first of all be 
practically responsible by informing those he wants to expose to risk, and striving to 
obtain consent from them (PA1). Of course, it has to be possible or necessary to obtain 
                                                
55  Compensation entails the replacement of what was lost with a different thing with equal value. 
Restitution entails the replacement of what was lost with a similar thing with equal value. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 202 
consent for risk exposure. As was discussed in Chapter 5, it can be literally impossible 
to obtain consent for risk impositions, for example from unidentified or unidentifiable 
risk-bearers, future generations, children, or mentally impaired persons. It can also be 
practically impossible to obtain consent for risk impositions, for example from large 
groups. Moreover, obtaining consent is sometimes unnecessary, as is the case with 
actions that impose a negligible risk on others. This is not to say that in these instances 
the consent requirement can simply be ignored, but that it, depending on the 
circumstances in which a risk is imposed, can be overruled by other considerations. 
Secondly, a risk-imposing agent can put safety measures in place that will reduce, or at 
least not add to, the possibility that others will come to harm as a result of his actions 
(PA2). Consider a car owner who brings his vehicle in for a yearly service, or a smoker 
who only smokes in designated smoking areas.  
 
In the timeframe that comprises the risk imposition itself, practical answerability can 
require an agent to act with caution and be attentive to the circumstances in which he 
acts (PA3). Consider the car owner from the previous example: when he drives his car, 
he should adhere to the rules of the road and drive carefully. The circumstances 
influence the appropriate level of caution: for example, on a dirt road he must drive at a 
lower speed than on a tarred road. 
 
In the timeframe between the risk imposition and the materialisation of its 
consequences, practical answerability entails the capacity to respond adequately to, or 
appropriately manage, the arising situation. For once a risk is imposed, new information 
might become available that influences the acceptability of the imposition. In the light 
of such information, one might have to adjust one’s course of action. Consider a 
university student researching the experience of patients in a hospital ward. It turns out 
that the student’s questionnaire adds to the anxiety the patients already experience by 
being in hospital. Practical answerability can then require the student to put his research 
on hold, and think of other ways in which he might obtain the information he needs. In 
order to prevent further harm, he must at least reduce or minimise his role in their 
anxiety, and preferably altogether avoid adding to the patients’ negative experiences. 
Note here that practical answerability can overlap with answerability as giving reasons 
for acting. Both kinds of answerability require the student to stay critical and 
inquisitive, and gather information about the effects of his research. New information 
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enables him to reassess his reasons for structuring and conducting the research in a 
particular way, and if that information makes those reasons unjustifiable, he can no 
longer answer for the risk he imposes on the patients. He then might not be able to be 
answerable in terms of giving reasons for acting, but he can be practically answerable 
by managing the arising situation in an appropriate way, i.e. adjusting his actions to 
reduce further harm or risk (PA4). 
 
In the aftermath of a risk imposition, it can sometimes also be expected of a risk-
imposing agent that he provides compensation or restitution for harm that resulted from 
his actions (PA5). In Chapter 5 I discussed that cases where harm results from imposed 
risk, and where a causal link from identifiable risk-imposer to identifiable risk-bearer 
can be clearly established, the harm generally has to be compensated. 
Managing risk impositions 
Let us explore the idea of practical answerability with an example concerning the risks 
associated with geo-engineering techniques. These are large-scale – for the time being 
still hypothetical – technological interventions in natural systems that aim to reduce, or 
even counteract, anthropogenic climate change. One of the interventions proposed by 
climate scientists is to release sulphur dioxide (SO2) into the atmosphere: a chemical 
compound that is naturally released in the event of volcanic activity. Imitating such an 
event, the SO2 will create a shade shield that can protect the earth from the warming 
sun, thereby slowing down the heating of the climate (Muller 2016). Because ecological 
systems interact in complex ways, some risks are only identifiable once a technique is 
implemented in, and starts interacting with, the local natural systems. Geo-engineering 
techniques are therefore expected to have unforeseen risks. At the time of decision-
making, it is impossible to determine the acceptability of consequences one cannot or 
does not foresee: those can only be evaluated once they are foreseen, or have 
materialised. But one can evaluate possible harms one can foresee: do the risks 
associated with a rapidly warming climate – unusual weather events, crop failure, food 
and water crises, biodiversity loss, climate wars, climate refugees, etc. – justify any 
harms that might result from implementing geo-engineering techniques? 
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This is a pressing question that deserves attention in its own right. But let us for the sake 
of the following example assume that the international scientific consensus is that the 
foreseen consequences of climate change are so dire, that it is acceptable, perhaps even 
mandatory, to create shade shields over certain regions. One of those regions is southern 
Africa, where a persistent drought impedes a reliable supply of water and food, which 
subsequently takes its toll on the lives of people and livestock.56 The decision-making 
authority – perhaps a board of government representatives from all southern African 
countries – decides to start with the atmosphere above the sparsely populated Kunene 
region in northern Namibia. A shade shield is created and carefully monitored 
(PA2/PA3), and after some time there is sufficient evidence that the shade indeed 
contributes to reducing the heating effects of the sun. However, there is also evidence 
that the lack of sunlight has negative effects on the wellbeing of some members of the 
Himba tribe living in this region. Himba women are known for covering their bodies 
and hair in otzije, a mixture of butter and red clay. This forms a protective layer against 
the scorching sun, but is also an aesthetic expression intrinsically tied up with the 
Himba culture (Nelson 2011: 46). However, now that the sun has disappeared for an 
extensive period of time, some women feel they have lost a reason for applying the clay 
layer, and with it a sense of identity. These women no longer participate and fulfil their 
duties within their separate communities, which leads to tensions within the tribe. The 
negatively affected psychological wellbeing of some Himba women poses a further risk 
to the integrity of the tribal communities.57 
 
Whether or not these consequences were foreseen, the fact that information about them 
now emerges should incentivise the decision-making, and risk-imposing, authority to 
re-evaluate the acceptability of the project. The authority, and perhaps even all others in 
favour of the shade shield, can be called upon to defend their actions and convictions 
with reasons. Practical answerability requires them to consider, or revisit, several issues. 
Firstly, can the actual and foreseen outcomes be compared to each other, and if so, will 
such a comparison ever be fair if the nomadic Himba did not contribute to problematic 
changes in the climate? Secondly, are there alternative geo-engineering techniques, or 
                                                
56  The idea of creating a shade shield over this geographical region is an actual topic of scientific 
discussion (Muller 2016). Also, large parts of southern Africa are battling with droughts. However, the 
rest of the example is fictitious. 
57 Again, this is just an example. It must also be mentioned that there is considerable speculation about 
the origin and meaning of the use of otzije (Nelson 2011: 46). 
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other solutions, with similar benefits but fewer risks? After taking such issues into 
account, the authority might still conclude that it is acceptable to continue with the 
project. There might for example not be any effective alternatives available, and 
foreseen climate problems might be considered worse for everyone, including the 
Himba tribe. However, the actual harms inflicted on the Himba might be practically 
responded to by offering some kind of compensation or restitution, such as relocation to 
a similar but sunnier place (PA5). The future risks of tribal disintegration imposed on 
them might be adequately mitigated by, for example, arranging anthropologically 
embedded psychological support to the affected Himba women (PA4). 
 
As discussed in the previous section, practical answerability sometimes requires a risk-
imposing agent to seek the consent of the risk-bearers. However, as was mentioned in 
Chapter 5: “it is permissible […] not to seek consent if seeking it would be unduly 
onerous” (McCarthy 1997: 216). For practical reasons, the number of people involved 
in the decision to impose a risk, or the number of participants discussing the 
acceptability of any risk imposition, has to be limited, not only to make consent 
possible, but also to enable a productive discussion. In this example in particular, each 
Himba community can be asked to select representatives, such as elders, who can 
engage in the decision-making process on their behalf. Such representatives could give 
or withhold consent to risks associated with the shade shield on behalf of the affected 
women and the rest of the community (PA1). 
 
This draws attention to the general importance of transparent and understandable 
communication with others – first and foremost the potentially affected – as well as 
their active involvement in the decision-making process. Both considerations influence 
the general level of answerability with which risks are imposed: if there are no others to 
communicate and engage with, the address-and-response process of answerability 
cannot take place. For practical responsibility in particular, it is important to note that 
transparency alone is not enough: it is only a means of providing information. True 
communication entails not just providing facts, but offering relevant, intelligible, and 
checkable information (O’Neill 2015). Moreover, the risk-bearer must have the 
opportunity and ability to respond. Decisions and actions should then be open for 
inspection, critique, and revision. 
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Practical answerability can then require the authority in charge of the shade shield 
project to see to it that the Himba representatives develop an understanding of how, 
according to current scientific findings, climate change is expected to affect their 
communities. Also, the authority could offer the tribe a platform to voice their worries, 
offer solutions, and give other local input. This can increase the chance that social and 
individual values, convictions, and attitudes are explicated. In Chapter 3 it was noted 
that these things can influence the perception, experience, and evaluation of risks. 
Awareness and acknowledgement of such differences is an important step towards real 
communication between (representatives of) decision-makers, executives, beneficiaries, 
and risk-bearers. In the context of the example, one might expect that attempts at 
enabling and improving communication with, and involvement of, the Himba, are likely 
to foster better mutual understanding, respect, and trust, which in turn can increase 
support for, and consent to, the project. 
8.6.1 Attitudinal answerability 
The third type of answerability, attitudinal answerability (AA), entails having the 
appropriate attitudes and emotions with regard to the possibility of harm and harm 
itself, that express a good quality of one’s will towards others. Recall that a requirement 
for such answerability is being able to evaluate harm as something mostly negative, 
something one wants to avoid, manage, or at least justify (AA1). This should motivate 
one not to act in ways that do, or could, harm others without good reason (AA2). The 
moral obligation not to harm others without qualification, and the right of others not to 
be harmed without qualification, are abstract ethical principles that capture the mostly 
negative evaluation of harm. But one should not only aim to avoid or justify harm 
because one formally adheres to rules. As the earlier discussed example of Smith’s 
hospital visit indicated, one’s motivation has bearing on the moral evaluation of one’s 
actions. To be truly attitudinally answerable then, one should act with the intention not 
to harm others out of respect for others, care and concern for their integrity, wellbeing, 
and safety, and empathy with their fate (AA3). 
 
I previously argued against the idea of the phronimos, the prudent (wo)man who acts 
wisely without exception: most people sometimes act based on flawed reasons, or 
motivated by the wrong attitudes or emotions. I believe they should not be immediately 
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marked as irresponsible or vicious. Attitudinal answerability offers the possibility to 
react appropriately, or to have fitting attitudes and emotions, to situations that result 
when risks are imposed for the wrong reasons, or motivated by the wrong attitudes or 
emotions. A risk-imposing agent can then still express her respect and care for, and 
empathy with, others, by experiencing some form of regret, remorse, shame, guilt, and 
embarrassment (AA4), accepting some degree of (self-)blame (AA5), or offering an 
honest apology (AA6). In the following sections I will argue that such attitudes and 
emotions can sometimes also be fitting even if risks are justifiably imposed. 
Attitudes and emotions 
Hansson (2013: 64) argues that even when things go wrong, people still “want [their] 
decisions to be morally acceptable (permissible) […]. […] [their] conviction that the 
decision was right should not be perturbed by information that reaches [them] after the 
decision”. If one performs an action that is justifiable at the time of decision-making, 
based on what one then knows about possible or probable outcomes of that action, the 
actual outcomes should not change how the action is perceived in hindsight. This leads 
Hansson (ibid.) to state that regret, and the desire to avoid regret, should not influence 
the moral evaluation of actions: 
 
Regret is a psychological reaction, not an argued moral standpoint. Our moral 
aims when planning for the future cannot be condensed into an injunction to 
avoid such a psychological reaction. Instead, we should aim at avoiding any 
future situation in which it will be our considered judgement that we should 
have acted otherwise. Such a situation is of course accompanied by regret, but 
the two are not identical.  
 
Consider Niko, who has offered to drive his neighbour to the department of Home 
Affairs for an important meeting concerning a visa application. He decides to take the 
N2 highway from Stellenbosch to Cape Town. They are well on their way when a truck 
driver, going in the opposite direction, loses control of the wheel and drives into Niko’s 
car. His neighbour is killed, but Niko walks away unscratched. Most likely he will 
tremendously regret how things have turned out. He might exclaim: ‘If only I had 
known beforehand that this would be the outcome! I would have acted otherwise! I 
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would have left earlier and taken the scenic and winding coastal road instead of the N2!’ 
However, this regret does not negate the justifiability of his choice to take the N2: when 
he made that choice, he just knew that the probability of such a devastating event is 
small, and that his neighbour had an important meeting to attend. Taking these 
considerations into account, it would not make sense to opt for the coastal road. One can 
then experience regret while simultaneously believing that one made a morally 
defensible decision, provided that one acted with the intention not to harm, and given 
the information one had at the time of decision-making about its possible or likely 
consequences. This is not the case when Niko for example drinks excessively before 
driving his neighbour to Cape Town. Niko now exposes his neighbour to a higher than 
normal, or generally accepted, level of risk. Even if they arrive safely, an evaluation of 
Niko’s earlier decision to drive will yield the verdict that he should have acted 
otherwise. 
 
I agree with Hansson that avoiding regret should not be the only action-guiding 
principle one applies when acting under conditions of uncertainty. However, I do not 
agree with his argument that regret has no, or should not have any, bearing on the moral 
evaluation of actions involving risk. On the contrary, I believe that the ability to 
experience regret, just as other attitudes and emotions like remorse, shame, guilt, 
embarrassment, and self-blame, are vital for acceptably imposing risks on others.58 
They are appropriate responses when things turn out differently than hoped or expected: 
they testify of a risk-imposing agent’s humanity, and his acknowledgement of the 
humanity of others. Imagine a Niko who does not at all regret his choices and actions 
that resulted in the death of his neighbour, shrugging his shoulders while saying ‘that’s 
life’ or ‘whatever’. Surely this is not only a highly inappropriate, but also morally 
condemnable reaction. This calls to mind B. Williams’ (1973) example, already 
discussed in Chapter 3, of an unlucky lorry driver who kills a child, and Wolf’s (1990) 
explanation of the difference between a regretful lorry driver and an indifferent lorry 
driver in terms of self-blame. Others expect the lorry driver, who kills a child through 
no fault of his own, to experience regret, and to blame himself even if others will not 
blame him. The same counts for Niko (and even more for the truck driver that drove 
                                                
58 Adam Morton (2013) distinguishes regret-like emotions such as remorse from shame-like emotions 
such as guilt and embarrassment. The unpleasantness of shame-like emotions has to do with the 
experience of being critically judged by others, whereas the unpleasantness of regret-like emotions has to 
do with the fact that the past cannot be changed. 
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into his car, but the example does not focus on him or her). In my opinion, the 
acceptability of Niko’s decision to transport his neighbour is influenced by his ability to 
experience regret and self-blame.  
 
As stated, attitudes and emotions testify of a risk-imposing agent’s humanity, and his 
acknowledgement of the humanity of others: an inability to have or experience them 
indicates a lack of respect for others, a lack of care and concern for their integrity, 
wellbeing, and safety, and a lack of empathy with their fate. Given what one knows at 
the time of decision-making, one’s actions might be justifiable, but their outcomes can 
be undesirable. To then experience some form of regret and self-blame is to show that 
one recognises and acknowledges the connection between one’s actions and their 
undesirable consequences, despite the fact that they were unintended, unforeseen, or 
even unforeseeable. Attitudes and emotions are, as I argued in Chapter 2, indicators of 
what human beings value and care for. Of course, they do not simply coincide, and 
sometimes do not correspond at all, with values: they can be biased and irrational. 
Moreover, the extent to which agents can be expected to experience regret and self-
blame has to be limited, for such attitudes and emotions can be crippling and therefore 
morally undesirable in and of themselves. However, they should be taken seriously as 
they often reveal, or signpost, value judgements. 
 
Consider Naima, who is about to eat the whole slice of cake while her friend visits the 
bathroom, but foresees that she will regret this decision. Examining the origin of her 
expected regret, she realises that she does not want to eat the whole slice because she 
values sharing it equally and fairly with her friend. By acknowledging this future regret 
and not eating the whole slice, Naima does not simply choose to avoid regret, but to 
realise a future in which she upholds her values. With regard to foreseen or expected 
outcomes then, retrospective attitudes and emotions can guide one in making prudent 
decisions. With regard to unforeseen or unexpected outcomes, as is the case with Niko’s 
driving, they enable one to prudently respond to an unfortunate situation by showing 
that one cares. If Niko is regretful to a certain extent, and blames himself partly for the 
death of his neighbour, he is answerable in more ways than one. He is answerable in the 
sense that he can defend his decision to take the N2 with reasons, provided that he drove 
sober. Moreover, he is answerable in the sense that he experiences fitting moral 
attitudes and emotions in response to what has happened. If Niko suffers from some sort 
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of personality disorder that makes it impossible for him to have fitting attitudes and 
emotions, it would obviously not make sense to expect attitudinal answerability from 
him: this can only be expected from him if he is mentally sane. 
 
I believe Hansson (2013) scraps regret from the evaluation of actions involving risk 
because he limits permissible risk impositions to those for which one can provide 
reasons. As suggested, I extend permissible risk impositions to include those that are 
responsibly managed and responsibly reacted to. Permissibility then not only depends 
on the quality of the reasons that a risk-imposing agent can give in favour of acting in a 
way that exposes others to risk (AR), but also on the quality of the way in which he 
manages his actions and their outcomes (PA), and the quality of his will and attitudes 
towards other people (AA). These are all ways in which a risk-imposing agent can 
answer ‘the call of the other’, and together form a threefold concept of conversational 
answerability. Moreover, I argue that attitudes and emotions should not be 
straightforwardly dismissed, but acknowledged and scrutinised. Ignoring their influence 
on moral evaluation unnecessarily desensitises and overly rationalises human 
judgement. 
 
Now are appropriate attitudes and emotions, as expressions of respect, care, and 
empathy, only required in cases where harm has resulted from a risk imposition? What 
can in practice be expected attitudinally from a risk-imposing agent seems to depend, 
amongst other things, on his control over the risk imposition, and the acceptability of 
his decision to impose the risk in the first place. Consider another situation in which 
Niko and his neighbour again face an oncoming truck on the N2, but this time the truck 
shoots past and crashes into the guardrail. Niko might still wish that things turned out 
differently, and that he and his passenger did not have a near-death experience. 
However, it would not be fair of his neighbour, or others, to expect him to blame 
himself for an accident that did not happen, provided that Niko drove safely and without 
the intention or motivation to harm anyone. Now revisit the situation in which Niko has 
been drinking, but he and his neighbour arrive safely in Cape Town despite his 
intoxication. As no harm resulted from the action, this is a pure risk imposition. Niko 
clearly acted with a lack of concern for the integrity, wellbeing, and safety of his 
neighbour as well as other road-users (AA1–AA3). Niko can still be attitudinally 
responsive by experiencing and expressing regret and self-blame (AA4/AA5), and by 
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offering a literal apology to his neighbour – and perhaps even figuratively to other road 
users (AA6).59 
Respect, care, and empathy 
But what is an appropriate amount of regret or self-blame, or of guilt and shame? And 
what is a fitting attitudinal response to actual harm, and the possibility of harm, to 
others? In general, what is the right amount of respect and care for, and empathy with, 
others? The notion of phronēsis, as the ability to find a mean between extremes, can 
again be helpful here. A risk-imposing agent responds in an attitudinally virtuous way 
to harm, and risk of harm, if he exhibits his humanity and concern for others, but is not 
overwhelmed by his feelings of care for others. He is not cold-hearted or indifferent, but 
also not consumed by his (fear of) regret, or crippled by his (fear of) guilt. 
 
It is important to set boundaries in our care for others, otherwise one risks caring too 
much or for too many things. Care then becomes shallow and diluted, or paralysing and 
unbearable. Examples of shallow care are easy exclamations, such as caring about ‘the 
sinking islands in the Pacific!’, ‘poor people living in townships!’, or ‘the future of our 
country!’ without giving much further attention to these problems. An example of 
paralysing care is ‘caregiver burnout’, a condition sometimes experienced by caregivers 
of chronically or seriously ill patients: “A state of physical, emotional, and mental 
exhaustion resulting from the demands of involvement with people over a long period” 
(Pines & Aronson 1988 in Lee, Song & Shin 2001: 114). Forms of superficial and 
paralysing care are bound to be ineffective, or even counterproductive. Nihlén Fahlquist 
(2015) draws attention to an important observation made by Nel Noddings (2002): that 
care should be focused in order to be motivating and effective.60 Phronēsis can then be 
interpreted as the ability to focus one’s care on things and people that deserve one’s 
attention in specific situations, to have an appropriate amount of care for those things 
and people, and to have an appropriate response in terms of attitudes and emotions. 
 
                                                
59 One might even consider the fine Niko has to pay when he is caught driving drunk as a financial 
expression of this apology. 
60  For a good account of care and the virtue of responsibility, see Nihlén Fahlquist (2015). For an 
explication of responsibility as forward-looking and non-reciprocal care for the future under conditions of 
uncertainty, see Groves (2009) and Adam & Groves (2011). 
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The fittingness of an attitudinal response depends on the particularities of the context. It 
matters, for example, how sober Niko should respond to the near-death of his passenger 
if that were a young boy not wearing a seatbelt, or an old man tired of life. In the latter 
case, Niko can still be expected to feel some remorse about the way in which the old 
man almost came to his end. In the former case, he can be expected to feel this as well, 
but also to blame himself partly for the fact that the boy almost lost the opportunity to 
live a life, and fully for not strapping the boy in. In both cases however, Niko’s 
passenger should be the focus of his care and consideration: it would be morally 
inappropriate if he were to fuss over the melting polar ice or tensions in the Middle East 
just after their near-collision. But as discussed, there is, and has to be, a limit to Niko’s 
care for both the boy and the old man, and the regret and self-blame he feels as a result 
of their experiences: after a while there will be other things that deserve his concern.  
 
Here it again becomes clear that the three types of answerability overlap and interact. 
Empathising with others, and experiencing care and consideration with regard to the 
fate of others, namely, motivate one to think through, and deliberate the justifiability of, 
one’s actions and their consequences. It inspires a willingness to provide reasons for 
acting, not only to risk-bearers and victims, but also to others who might evaluate one’s 
actions. Moreover, empathy and care encourage one to manage materialised harm, or 
prepare for possible harm, in the best way possible. 
8.7 Learning how to be answerable 
Aristotle (2000, 2011) stresses that virtuousness and practical wisdom are learnt, and 
are the result of a good upbringing, education, role models, and experience. One first 
needs to learn that there are ethical rules, and be familiarised with various moral 
principles and considerations. One then needs to study and imitate examples set by 
virtuous others, and learn how to apply and interpret abstract rules in the light of 
practical circumstances. Through experience one can come to an understanding why 
there are rules, and why the virtuous are considered virtuous. One then initially has to 
learn that one needs to be virtuous, how to be virtuous, and why one should be virtuous. 
But a proper ethical education does not merely consist in learning what to do, and how 
or why to do it. Eventually one needs to transcend the rules taught by theories, and 
examples set by others, to arrive at virtuous judgements that are truly one’s own (Annas 
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2011: 34).  
 
For example, consider a toddler throwing a toy at someone. Her parents will tell that her 
that she cannot, or should not, do that. When the child is older and bullies a classmate, 
her parents, or other teachers, will not only tell her to stop, but also why she should be 
considerate of others, and how she can express her concerns by being kind to other 
children and apologising if she is not. Now imagine that the bullying child grows into 
an adult woman, who terrorises her colleagues. She eventually stops mistreating her 
colleagues because her psychologist has told her that her behaviour is wrong, why it is 
wrong, and how she can change it. But clearly the woman is not a virtuous person. She 
has a virtuous character only if she is motivated to treat others with respect out of 
honest concern for their wellbeing, and develops this motivation of her own accord. 
8.7.1 Continuing education for uncertainty 
Building on this process of development and growth, I argue that the virtue of 
answerability, which comprises the abilities and dispositions required for practically 
wise decision-making, is a skill and attitude one has to acquire through learning. To be 
answerable for one’s actions – in general for actions one performs under conditions of 
uncertainty, and in particular for actions that expose others to the possibility of harm – 
one firstly needs to learn that one must be answerable, secondly how one can be 
answerable, thirdly why one should be answerable, and fourthly to be motivated to act, 
choose, and be answerable. I believe this is a journey of a lifetime, and moreover, a 
continuous process of learning, unlearning, and relearning. In the words of Dwight Ingle 
(1968: 333 – 334): “The wise application of moral principles requires education for 
uncertainty. […] Education for uncertainty should be a part of continuing education to 
support evolving humanness in a changing world where each person and each cross-
section of existence is unique”.61 Environments, identities, ideas, values, perceptions, 
and situations change continuously, and so one must continuously learn how to 
understand, and respond to, them. Education for uncertainty, which I interpret for my 
purposes as learning how to make responsible decisions involving risk, can then never 
be complete. 
                                                
61 Ingle (1986) does not mention virtue ethics specifically, but his references to the ‘wise application of 
moral principles’, the importance of education, the distinctness of persons, and the particularities of 
situations, clearly match virtue-ethical reasoning. 
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8.7.2 Learning objectives 
To be answerable in a general sense, one first has to experience that life is inherently 
risky, that many actions carry the possibility of harm to other people, and that harm is 
something one wants to avoid, manage, or at least justify. One has to be taught to think 
about the future, and to imagine, envision, foresee, or predict the effects one’s actions 
could, or will, have on others, who might live in different times or places. One has to 
develop a sense of respect for others, a sense of care and concern for their integrity, 
safety, and wellbeing, and the ability to empathise with their fate. 
 
One has to learn that the moral (un)acceptability of acting in ways that expose others to 
risk can be influenced by considerations referring to the likeliness and severity of harm; 
the likeliness and extent of benefit; obligations not to harm without good reason; rights 
not to be harmed without good reason; compensation for, or restitution of, suffered 
harm; consent to risk exposure; and distribution of risks and benefits. One has to learn 
that the weight of these considerations, or the extent to which they influence the 
acceptability of risk impositions, depends on what one does, can, or should know about 
possible and actual consequences, possible and actual victims, relations between cause 
and effect, and relations between decision-makers, executives, and recipients. One has 
to learn to identify particularities of intricate, complex, and changing situations. 
 
To be answerable in the sense of being able to give reasons for one’s actions, one has to 
learn to acquire and gauge information about particularities to determine which moral 
considerations are relevant in a specific context, and what weight they should be given. 
One has to learn to be open to, but critical about, information, and to assess the 
reliability of available information. One has to learn to use that information to rationally 
formulate reasons for acting, or to develop experience-based intuitions, fitting emotions, 
and sound trust that can function as non-rational reasons for acting. To acquire more 
information to formulate better rational and non-rational reasons for acting, one has to 
learn, and develop a willingness, to communicate with, and trust in, others. 
 
To be practically answerable, one has to learn to engage with others about the possible 
consequences of one’s actions. One has to learn to assess whether safety measures are 
required, and if so, what kind of measures are effective. One has to learn to determine 
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whether caution is necessary, and if so, to what extent. One has to develop a willingness 
to make amends when things turn out wrong, or worse than hoped or expected. If one is 
not able to do any one of these things, one has to learn to involve, work with, and trust 
in others who are. 
 
To be attitudinally responsible, one has to learn how to act on, and be motivated by, 
one’s sense of respect and care for, and empathy with, others. One has to learn to focus 
one’s concern on things and people that deserve attention, and to read the particularities 
of specific situations in order to express one’s concern appropriately. 
 
To be answerable then, one has to learn to communicate one’s reasons, activities, and 
attitudes to others, and to listen to, interpret, and react to what others have to say. One 
has to learn to, again and again, engage in conversation with others about facts, values, 
and the relevance, application, and interpretation of abstract rules in particular 
situations. 
8.7.3 A communal effort 
This is a lot to learn, and as I stated, I believe it is a lifelong process. But this prospect 
should not be completely overwhelming, for answerability is essentially a communal 
effort, born from a continuous conversation between people. The conversation 
incentivises itself and keeps itself going, for people always need others to determine, 
acknowledge, and evaluate what is the acceptable and responsible thing to do in any 
given context. One might have to learn many things in order to be answerable, but 
others should also be willing to aid in that answerability by informing and educating. In 
fact, when it comes to determining the acceptability of actions that can negatively 
impact others, people are obliged to engage with each other. Indispensable for such 
engagement are values related to respect, such as humbleness and tolerance, values 
related to openness, such as inquisitiveness and reflectiveness, values related to 
cooperation, such as participation and attentiveness, and values related to 
trustworthiness, such as honesty and reliability. These values protect the quality of the 
conversation in which answerability for, and acceptability of, risk impositions are 
determined: “When freedom of debate and inquiry are impeded, when dogma and 
authoritarianism triumph over truth, when the mind retreats to the non-think in the face 
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of infinitude, […] there is increased risk of a moral judgment going awry” (Ingle 1968: 
333). 
 
Answerability is then born from conversation. Consider that developments in science 
and technology enable one to have a better understanding of the possible consequences 
of one’s actions, and to have contact with others that are far removed. If one did not 
contribute to those developments, one’s ability to be answerable for one’s actions is 
then enhanced by the work of others. Another indication that answerability is a 
communal effort, is that answerability is shaped partly in social and institutional 
environments. Nihlén Fahlquist (2015) argues that institutions and organisations 
influence people and the decisions they make, and that therefore good institutions and 
organisations are necessary requirements for rearing responsible decision-makers. She 
(ibid.: 199) campaigns for creating “an organisational culture conducive of ethical 
behaviour”, i.e. contexts that enable, and encourage, responsible behaviour. People can 
be enabled, or taught, to make responsible decisions through for example ethical 
courses and discussions; they can be encouraged, or stimulated, to act responsibly 
through for example incentives and rewards. Nihlén Fahlquist (ibid.: 189) hopes that 
because of such things, and good organisational structures in general, people will learn 
to act with caution, instead of being risk-prone or recklessly adventurous. However, I 
argue that responsible agents not only aim to avoid harms and reduce negative 
consequences of risk impositions, but also seek out opportunities for change, 
development, and growth, are resilient in the face of difficulties, and able to deal with 
unforeseen situations. Social and institutional structures should be conducive of actions 
that seek to adequately manage risk, which in turn has to be the main learning objective 
of an education for uncertainty. 
8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the question: Can a virtue-ethical understanding of 
responsibility offer a tenable alternative evaluation of risk impositions? I conclude that 
it can: the acceptability of risk impositions can be evaluated by using the threefold 
concept of answerability. This alternative first of all changes the focus from actions to 
agents. Or rather, it combines an evaluation of actions with an evaluation of agents and 
their character. I acknowledge that actions and their consequences can be evaluated 
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without necessarily considering the agent performing that action. For example, driving a 
car is a risk imposition irrespective of the responsible character of the driver. The risks 
any driver imposes on others can then be evaluated in their own right: how likely or 
severe are these risks, have others consented to the exposure, do others benefit from the 
exposure, etc. I also acknowledge that the character of a risk-imposing agent cannot 
simply make a risk imposition acceptable. For example, reckless driving is reckless 
driving, regardless of the person behind the wheel. Such a risk imposition is 
unacceptable even if a reckless driver compensates or apologises for his actions. 
However, I believe one gets a more complete picture of what determines the 
acceptability of risk impositions by combining an evaluation of risk-imposing actions 
with an evaluation of risk-imposing agents and their character. I am convinced that the 
acceptability of risk impositions is not only influenced by moral considerations related 
to actions, but also by the responsiveness of agents to the particularities of concrete 
situations in which they act. The acceptability of a risk imposition is then not just a 
property of the action itself: it is directly correlated to the extent to which risk-imposing 
agents can, and do, respond to the call of risk-bearers and others, and account for the 
risk imposition to them. 
 
I have extended answerability beyond providing reasons for acting. As discussed, this 
type of answerability is restricted by conditions of causality, freedom, and knowledge. 
If answerability was solely interpreted as reason-giving, agents cannot be answerable 
for a risk they did not create or contribute to; if they had no other option but to impose a 
risk; or in cases where extensive uncertainty makes it impossible to think through the 
consequences of actions. I argued that even in these cases, agents can be answerable by 
responding appropriately, in terms of management and attitudes, when harm 
materialises, or when new information about risks becomes available. In the threefold 
concept of answerability then, the notion of answerability as reason-giving is 
complemented with practical and attitudinal answerability. This enables agents to 
remain or become responsible, even when the conditions of causality, freedom, and 
knowledge are not met and reasons for acting cannot be provided. 
 
Take for example risks related to climate change, to which primarily disadvantaged 
people, and especially those dependent on agriculture or living on islands, are exposed. 
Many modern people have no other choice but to act in ways that contribute to these 
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risks, and besides, the effects of individual contributions are often negligible. It might 
then very well be pointless to demand from individuals that they provide reasons for 
their actions. However, individuals can still understand that small acts contribute to 
larger problems. Practical and attitudinal answerability incentivise and enable them to 
take on responsibility for diffuse problems, even if their contributions are insignificant. 
The specific content of answerability with regard to risks of climate change depends on 
agents’ personal circumstances. A student who has to take the bus to campus, might 
raise awareness among his fellow students; a businesswoman might opt for a job close 
to home; and a local politician might campaign for green transport solutions and curbing 
city emissions. To be answerable for a risk imposition is to appropriately express one’s 
respect and care for others in actions that avoid, manage, or adequately justify harming 
them. 
 
By allowing agents to be responsible, and take responsibility, for actions that expose 
others to risk in a multitude of ways, I believe the threefold concept of conversational 
answerability offers a comprehensive and rich account of acceptable risk impositions. I 
understand answerability as a process of address-and-response that involves primarily 
risk-imposing agents and risk-bearers, but that can also accommodate other participants 
as external judges. The acceptability of risk impositions then depends on agents’ 
willingness to reflect on their actions, to justify them to others, and to let others 
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CONCLUSION 
The acceptability of risk impositions 
This dissertation is the result of a three-year research project. I would like to use this 
conclusion to run through the most important trains of thought I had over the last three 
years, and that led me to this end point. In fact, it all started with a simple realisation: 
that most of the time when one acts, one does not know what will happen. What is 
more, life is an inherently risky endeavour, in which most actions involve at least some 
possibility of harm to other people, other creatures, or living entities. This realisation 
inspired me to think about choosing and acting wisely in the face of uncertainty, and 
justifying one’s decisions and actions when they might cause other life to suffer. It 
inspired me to work toward a more complete understanding of the notion of risk, and its 
role in normative philosophy. But quite soon after I started to explore these topics, I 
realised something else: that understanding risk might be a lifelong project, so that in 
three years, and one dissertation, I would only be able to attend to a fraction of the 
ethical questions surrounding risk. I therefore chose to narrow my research down to the 
acceptability of actions that involve risk to other human beings, and to discover to what 
extent I would be able to answer the following question: When – under which 
circumstances or conditions – it is acceptable to impose a risk on others? 
 
Subsequently, I chose to further narrow down my research by approaching this question 
from the perspectives of several main branches of normative thinking. How would, or 
could, a committed utilitarian, deontologist, libertarian, or contractualist justify risk 
impositions? I explored different justificatory routes. Firstly, a consequentialist route, 
which roughly claims that imposing a risk on others is acceptable if the beneficial 
outcomes outweigh the harmful outcomes: i.e. a utilitarian perspective. Secondly, a non-
consequentialist route, which deems it acceptable to impose risks on others if those 
others are first and foremost respected as persons, who should not be harmed without 
qualification: i.e. a deontological, rights-based, and contractualist perspective. I found 
that both routes ran into trouble because their focus is too narrow. Whether or not it is 
permissible to perform an action that exposes others to risk is not determined solely by 
the isolated justifiability of the outcomes to which they eventually lead, and the 
consequentialist realisation of benefits over harms. Permissibility is also not solely 
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determined by the intentions with which they are performed, and the adherence to the 
non-consequentialist ideal of respect for person. In short, it is not a question of either/or: 
justifying risk impositions either consequentially or non-consequentially. Rather, it is a 
question of finding a strong compromise between the two, acknowledging that both the 
outcomes and respectful treatment of human beings are important, and enabling 
consequential reasoning within non-consequential restrictions. 
A complex interplay of moral considerations 
While investigating how mainstream branches of normative theory would evaluate risk 
impositions, I found that both consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories 
brought to the fore a whole array of important considerations. I therefore argued for a 
comprehensive approach to acceptable risk impositions, that is sensitive to the 
particularities of risky contexts. As Hansson (2013: 126) rightly states: “the task of 
moral philosophers is not to produce timeless and contextless ethics – we might just as 
well run after the end of the rainbow – but to develop moral theory in relation to our 
changing society”. Leaving the end of the rainbow for others to chase, I committed 
myself to taking steps toward, and contributing to, developing a realistic ethical 
framework for the evaluation of risk impositions. This framework leaves room for the 
following considerations to be taken into account: 
 - Outcomes: what are the expected and actual outcomes of an action? What 
are the benefits and harms (or costs)? - Intentions and motivations: do risk-imposing agents act with the intention 
(and in accordance with their duty) not to harm others, or at least with the 
intention to reduce the possibility of harm to others? Are they motivated to 
respect the humanity of others, and their right not to be harmed without 
qualification? - Agency: do risk-imposing agents choose to impose a risk, or do they act 
involuntary or unconsciously? How much control do agents have with regard 
to the actual outcomes of their actions? - Cause and effect: to what extent can the actions of one agent be linked to 
harm suffered by another? Is it fair to expect of agents that they understand 
their agency, i.e. causal or supporting role in complex chains of reactions? 
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- Identification: can risk-imposing agents and risk-bearers be identified? - Distribution: who stands to lose and who stands to gain from actions 
involving risk? Are the decision-makers and the executives also the ones 
reaping the benefits or suffering the negative consequences? Can harms and 
benefits be fairly shared, traded, or otherwise distributed? - Consent: is explicit or implicit consent given to risk exposure? - Power relations: who has the information and capacities to assess, impose, 
or react to risks? Who is in the position to make choices about risk creation 
or management? Who is complicit in the imposition of risks? - Knowledge: what do, can, or should risk-imposing agents and risk-bearers 
know in advance about risks? How much (un)certainty is there? 
Rules and judgement 
In different situations involving risk to others, different combinations of considerations 
are important to different degrees. What is more, different people will assess the weight 
of different considerations differently. How does one make sense of this complex 
interplay of morally relevant aspects of risk impositions, and make good decisions and 
act justifiably in the face of so much variation? I was, and still am, convinced that one 
must be a responsible person with a good sense of judgement to do so. The importance 
of judgement naturally led me in the direction of Aristotelian virtue ethics and the 
notion of phronēsis: prudence or practical wisdom. Someone with phronēsis is able to 
deliberate sharply and dynamically, to interpret ethical principles in the light of a 
particular risk imposition, and to adequately assess the extent to which different 
considerations are relevant. At the same time, this person remains open to changing 
situations as well as alternative and opposing perspectives, and is willing to 
continuously better one’s judgement and adjust one’s actions in the light of new 
information. 
 
This ties in with the proposed change in perspective from actions to agents. I argued 
that evaluating risk impositions is not merely a matter of developing ethical rules for 
conduct or determining the rightness of actions. It is also a matter of responsible 
character and of using one’s judgement – to the best of one’s abilities – in the complex, 
chaotic, and messy contexts of everyday life (B. Williams 1973; see also Renn 1992; 
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Hogget 2005). Rachels and Rachels (2010: 168) point out that theories of right action 
neglect the question of character and therefore “cannot provide a completely 
satisfactory account of moral life”. However, theories of virtues are incomplete in the 
other direction, and leave one at a loss with regard to determining what to do and how 
to assess actions (ibid.: 168 – 170). I therefore proposed to interpret the considerations 
that influence the acceptability of risk impositions, and that are derived from theories of 
right action, within a virtue-ethical framework. It comes down to risk-imposing agents 
to judge the relevance of each consideration in situations involving risk to others. As 
Frick (2015: 223) states: “The aim and ambition of moral philosophy should be to 
inform our judgment, by making us alive to the relevant ethical considerations, not to 
abolish the need for judgment altogether”. Ethical rules are not there for one to hide 
behind, but to be given application and meaning in concrete settings. 
Virtuous, conversational, and threefold answerability 
My next challenge then was to give an account of good judgement: the kind of 
judgement that enables one to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable risk 
impositions. I argued that good judgement is responsible judgement, and that acceptable 
risk impositions are risk impositions for which one can answer. Understanding 
responsibility as answerability, I interpreted the acceptability of risk impositions in 
terms of the answerability of risk-imposing agents. Acceptability is then not just a 
property of the action itself, but is directly correlated to the extent to which risk-
imposing agents are answerable for their action to risk-bearers and others. Accounts, 
justifications, and answers are always given in response to something, to demands, 
calls, or questions. This inspired me to conceive of answerability for, and acceptability 
of, risk impositions as something one must determine in conversation with others. 
Because answerability comprises multiple dispositions and abilities, I was drawn to 
explaining it in terms of virtue: to be responsible is to have the virtue of answerability. 
An answerable agent is motivated to respond when being addressed, to engage and 
communicate with others to understand what is at stake and for whom, and to justify her 
actions to others. As such, conversational answerability provides a tool with which to 
envision possible futures, and think through how one might justify those futures. 
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In my framework of conversational answerability, risk-imposing agents and risk-bearers 
enter into a conversation with one another, be it literally or imaginary. In this process of 
call and response, one can be answerable for imposing risks on others in three ways. 
Firstly, one can give reasons for one’s actions. In order to do so, one needs to be able to 
think through the possible effects of one’s actions. This can be done on the basis of 
rational deliberation, but also of sound emotion, intuition, or trust: as long as one can 
adequately explain or motivate one’s decisions to others. This is what I called 
answerability as reason-giving. Again, whether a reason is a good reason, i.e. whether it 
in fact renders a risk imposition acceptable, is something that has to be determined in an 
open conversation between stakeholders. However, normative considerations, such as 
the likeliness of harms and benefits, fairness of distribution, and consent, can provide 
the basis for developing good reasons to impose a risk (for an overview of these 
considerations and related reasons, see Table 4 on page 179). Secondly, one can be 
practically responsive with regard to possible harm that one causes or contributes to 
(informing and obtaining consent from potentially affected parties, acting with caution, 
putting safety measures in place), and with regard to actual harmful outcomes (acting to 
avoid further harm and providing adequate compensation). This is what I called 
practical answerability. Thirdly, one needs to have certain kind of sensitivity to be able 
to respond properly to the fact that one exposes others to the possibility of harm (acting 
with caution, care, and good will toward others, i.e. the intention not to harm others 
without qualification), or actually harms them (experiencing some form of regret and 
self-blame, and offering an honest apology). This is what is called attitudinal 
answerability. Now then, I am finally able to answer the main research question: 
 
When – under which circumstances or conditions – it is acceptable to impose a 
risk on others? 
 
It is acceptable to impose a risk on others if the risk-imposing agent is 
answerable for her actions: she gives reasons that justify her actions, and 
responds in a practically adequate and attitudinally fitting way to risked or 
actual harm. 
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Necessary conversation 
Answerability then requires epistemic, managerial, and attitudinal skills. But can agents 
truly be answerable for risk impositions in this sense, or is it too much to ask? Even if 
one knows that almost every action one performs can have some negative effect on 
another person’s reality, most of the time one has limited foresight with regard to the 
possible or actual outcomes of one’s own actions and those of others. Moreover, real 
life situations are often complex and multidimensional, which impedes one’s ability to 
ascertain what is a good practical or attitudinal response. It can be very difficult to make 
ethically justifiable choices when it comes to exposing others to risk, and I therefore 
acknowledged that most agents only have the virtue of answerability to a limited extent. 
They are responsible decision-makers in specific roles, contexts, or areas of expertise. It 
is virtually impossible to be virtuous across the board, make practically wise decisions 
in all areas of life, and always be answerable for the risks one imposes on others. 
 
What is more, it is not only difficult to always be answerable for one’s actions, but also 
to be fully independently answerable. In a complex and dynamic world, one often has to 
trust other people, or abstract systems of knowledge, to make choices, act, and live. This 
naturally limits one’s answerability. But instead of seeing this as a weakness of my 
framework for the evaluation of risk impositions, I believe it gives all the more reason 
to interpret answerability conversationally and as a communal effort. 
Interconnectedness should be an invitation to engage with others in conversation, for to 
place and refuse trust intelligently, one has to communicate with others. One has to 
listen to, and learn from, others about convictions, values, and interpretations. 
Complexity and uncertainty should also be incentives for conversation. Individually one 
might for example not know how one’s actions could harm others, or what an 
appropriate practical response to risk is in a particular situation. But one could obtain 
necessary information by communicating with others, and as such enable oneself to 
make better decisions and perform actions for which one is answerable. One then needs 
others to obtain missing information, and also to check, discuss, understand, and reflect 
on available information. 
 
Conversing is then not just something one should do out of kindness or politeness. 
Rather, one has to do it out of necessity. One can only determine the value and truth of 
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actions, outcomes, situations, or intentions in relation to, and in conversation with, 
others. As Hannah Arendt (1959: 233 – 234) writes: “Factual truth […] is always 
related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are 
involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony”. The notions of 
value and truth are superfluous if there are no others to witness, acknowledge, validate, 
broaden, question, reject, or threaten one’s evaluation and understanding of things. This 
statement should not be taken to the relativistic extreme of ‘anything goes’, for not just 
anything is acceptable within the paradigm of human judgement. It should be 
understood as saying that conversation is vital within the context of human relations. 
Speaking of the acceptability of, and answerability for, actions only has meaning 
because people are connected, exposed, and vulnerable to other people. 
 
Moreover, the possibility of loss, of having to surrender or restrict one’s values and 
truths when confronted with those of others, compels one to inquire what one holds 
dear, what one stands for, what one demands from others, and what others can demand 
in return. In order to live together, people must discuss and set limits to the ways in 
which their lives – now or in the future – impact each other. The need to communicate 
with others entails the need to forge a common project. Such projects are not always 
based on based on common values, but they have to be based on intersections or 
commonalities between values in order to be sustainable.62 And in fact, the need to 
forge such projects should be celebrated, as it requires one to participate and cooperate, 
to be open, tolerant, respectful, accepting, inclusive, and solidary toward others: it 
demands one to be answerable. 
 
Nurturing awareness of one’s responsibility can then encourage one to take further 
responsibility. For indeed, one is responsible for many things, but one can also be 
responsible, and take responsibility, in many ways: not only by giving reasons for past 
and current actions, but also by engaging with, caring for, and committing to the future 
of the world, and of other people. The virtue of answerability invites one to critically 
reflect on one’s own conduct, and explore the extent of one’s knowledge about the 
impact of one’s actions. It incentivises one to deliberate with others about factual 
                                                
62 The idea of a common human project based on value intersections I owe to Lori Amy, who gave a 
presentation on security and vulnerability at the conference The Value of [In]Security in Tübingen on 29 
July 2015. 
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information, ethical considerations and interpretations, and the acceptability of 
decisions, actions, and consequences. As such, the virtue of answerability empowers 
one to make quality decisions under uncertainty. 
Drawbacks 
A first drawback of the virtue-ethical interpretation of responsibility is that it depends 
heavily on people’s willingness to cooperate. If people do not reach out, listen to, and 
respond to the call of others, neither conversation nor virtuous answerability is possible. 
I hope to have demonstrated the need to engage with others in order to acquire 
knowledge about facts and determine the value of things, as well as to meaningfully 
apply ethical principles and act in the face of an uncertain future. I also hope that the 
realisation that conversation is necessary will motivate people to engage in it. 
 
A second drawback is that virtuous answerability might be discouraging. If 
responsibility not only entails the expectation to provide good reasons for acting, but 
also to be practically and attitudinally responsive, it might be conceived as 
overwhelming, even paralysing. However, I hope that acknowledging responsibility as a 
communal project, as something shared amongst those involved, will make it a lighter 
load to carry. What is more, it can even become a uniting and empowering force. 
 
A third drawback is the misuse of power and rhetoric. Strong and eloquent voices can 
easily overrule, overshadow, or marginalise the demands of others. This has to be 
prevented, for honest conversational answerability can only originate from a process in 
which each participant has the opportunity to be heard. On the one hand, education and 
training in communication can help to strengthen people’s ability to deliberate. On the 
other hand, guidelines and rules for communication, as well as supervisory boards or 
institutions monitoring and enforcing such guidelines and rules, can help to create a 
conversational environment that offers fair opportunities for participation to risk-
imposing agents as well as risk-bearers. 
 
Other drawbacks concern the effort of engaging in conversation about the acceptability 
of risk impositions. This effort has to be circumscribed by certain restrictions, otherwise 
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the following aspects can pose significant problems for the practical feasibility of 
conversational answerability: 
 - Number of participants: there has to be a limit to how many others could 
or should be involved. One cannot be expected to involve every agent in 
one’s decision-making who potentially has a valuable contribution to make. 
If there are too many participants in, or contributors to, the conversation, 
stakeholders run the risk of not being able to come to any evaluative 
agreement or concluding judgement. - Deadline: there has to be a limit to how much time is spent on the process, 
and a point of future hypothetical retrospection has to be set from which 
stakeholders will evaluate the present risk imposition. Without a timeframe 
or deadline, conversations can go on indefinitely. - Possibilities: there has to be a limit to how many possible future outcomes 
of a risk imposition are evaluated. Without such a demarcation, stakeholders 
will be bogged down in discussing extremely remote possibilities.63 
 
These drawbacks have to be attended to in order to make conversational answerability 
truly an attractive and realisable alternative for the evaluation of risk impositions. But 
this is something for another research project. 
Ideas for future research 
The following areas also comprise ideas for future. 
Facts and reasons - Are there, or do there need to be, epistemic or moral constraints on the 
concerns, reasons, and factual views people are allowed to bring into 
conversations about acceptable risk impositions? - To what extent do connections between causes and effects – risky actions 
and harmful outcomes – need to be socially accepted or scientifically proven 
in order to be included? 
                                                
63 However, on the other hand, imagination should not be stifled too much. As Admiral James Stravridis 
(2016: 16) writes in an article in Time Magazine, referring to findings of the commission that investigated 
9/11: “the fall of the Twin Towers was not a failure of intelligence – it was a failure of imagination”. 
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- How reasonable should reasons be? 
Communication - To what extent should a risk-imposing agent and a risk-bearer be identified 
in order to be able to imagine a conversation between them? - Sometimes it is impossible or impractical to literally engage in conversation 
with others. But how can imagined participants in a conversation about 
acceptable risk impositions be given a voice? And what is the legitimising 
force of an imagined voice? - What are open, inviting, reliable, and effective platforms where agents can 
gather, engage, and converse with each other? - Is there a particular language in which participants can, or must, 
communicate? - How can such communication take place? Is it only through words, or are 
there other – perhaps more comprehensive – ways of expression? 
Accountability - Are present accountability structures, i.e. structures through which people 
can hold others responsible, sufficiently effective and fair? 
Distribution - Are risk and safety things that, like justice, can be socially distributed within 
societies or other communities? 
Goal - What is the end goal of conversations about acceptable risk impositions? - Who decides when this end goal has been reached? - Should all stakeholders agree on the acceptable level of risk? - How safe is safe enough? 
Benefits and obligations  - If a risk imposition is expected to have significant benefits for the person on 
whom the risk is imposed, is one then ethically obliged to impose that risk? 
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- Can one be blamed or punished for refusing to take a chance, or being too 
risk averse? - If risky actions have unexpected or unimagined benefits for a person, is that 
person then obliged to share their good fortune with the risk-imposer? 
A final word, for now 
I hope to have offered a convincing alternative account of the evaluation of risk 
impositions. The framework of virtuous, conversational, and threefold answerability 
combines different temporal perspectives, and therefore gives a broad range of ways in 
which one can be, can be held, and hold others responsible for actions that expose 
others to risk. First, a backward-looking perspective enables one to hold others 
accountable, to assign blame and liability for harms done, as well as to react sensibly 
and appropriately to what has happened. Second, a present-focused perspective helps 
one assess, deal with, and respond to risks and harms here and now. And third, a 
forward-looking perspective focuses on imagining, preventing, or justifying future risks, 
and enables one to responsibly manage possible outcomes. I hope that such a broad 
understanding of responsibility will motivate people to be answerable for past events, 
current affairs, and prospective developments. I hope it will aid people to make better, 
wiser, more humane, and defendable choices in the face of uncertainty. But most of all, 
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Table 4: Overview of ethical perspectives, considerations, and 
questions relevant for the evaluation of risk impositions. 
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Table 5: Overview of Adriana’s answers to ethical questions 
relevant in risk evaluation. 





Figure 1: Ngram chart of risk, threat, danger, and hazard  
[Google Ngram Viewer 28 March 2016]. 
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Figure 2: Calculation of the total expected utility of an action. 79 
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